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Two theories argue that differences in public goods provision can often be explained by 
governments’ levels of democracy, with more democratic governments spending more on public 
goods.  On the one hand, democracy may operate by making it easier to remove leaders, thereby 
limiting waste and rent-seeking behavior.  On the other hand, democracy may function through a 
process of particularistic exchange, such that supporters are rewarded with goods but non-
supporters are excluded.  Here, I test these contending theories using statistical data analysis.  I 
find that particularistic exchange appears to be most strongly and consistently associated with 
spending outcomes.  I then expand the analysis to examine the impact of opposition strength, 
civil society, and economic inequality on particularism.  I find that strong oppositions and strong 
civil society reduce particularistic exchange, and economic inequality increases particularism.  
The analysis presented here goes beyond the work of existing research by examining the causes 
of public goods provision within the population of democratic states, rather than focusing on the 
differences between democracies or authoritarian regimes.  The implication of my findings is 
that much, perhaps most public service provision is a result of a process often referred to as 
patronage, particularism, or clientelism, in which voters supply elected politicians with political 
support and in return, politicians provide tangible benefits such as government services.  Further, 
rules which strengthen oppositions, increase jurisdictional sizes, decrease economic inequality, 
or promote civil society are likely to reduce particularism.
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 Introduction 
Chapter 1 
2 
 
“Speer’s supporters in the downtown wards provided the basis of a potent political 
organization.  Indeed, Speer had the largest bloc of votes at his beck and call of any person in 
Denver… He could count on the support of these interests only so long as he gave them 
something in return, and he could offer them nothing if he lost his influence in local 
government…” (Dorsett 1977) 
The Puzzle 
The two Peruvian municipalities of Carhuaz and Chavín de Huantar are quite alike in most 
respects.  Geographically quite close (about 40 miles from one another, as the crow flies), they 
are both highland municipalities with large indigenous populations, similar (low) per capita 
incomes, and similar types of economic activity—mining and small-scale farming are important 
in both places.   
Despite these similarities, however, the two places offer widely differing quantities and 
qualities of government services.  Municipal infrastructure is illustrative.  In Carhuaz, in 2008, 
urban residents reported that the municipality lacked basic electricity infrastructure, sewage and 
potable water, roads and other transportation infrastructure, classroom space in schools, an 
insufficient number of schools overall, and had many other infrastructural needs.  Further, the 
local government had done little to address these urban problems in recent years. Instead, many 
locals seemed to believe that the local mayoral administration had primarily used political office 
for personal enrichment and the enrichment of a clique of supporters.   
Chavín de Huantar, however, featured an ambitious and competent mayoral administration 
that seemed to be effectively seeking voter support by implementing substantial public works 
across the municipality.  Projects included the construction of new roads and the upgrade of 
existing ones, the construction of schools and health clinics, promotion of environmental policies 
such as reforestation, and development of both urban and rural infrastructure such as water and 
3 
electricity infrastructure.  In short, public goods were being provided in Chavín, in 2008, broadly 
and in remarkable quantities.     
These differences are representative of the variation in public service provision across the 
full range of Peruvian municipalities.  For example, about one quarter of Peruvian municipal 
governments spent less than 44 Peruvian Soles (about $15 US) per capita on infrastructure 
improvements in 2007.  On the other hand, about five percent of all Peruvian municipalities 
spent more than 900 Peruvian Soles ($300 US) per capita on municipal infrastructure 
development the same year (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas 2007).  As demonstrated in the 
empirical chapters here, these differences cannot be explained by institutional differences, 
difference in municipal budget size, or many other intuitive factors.  
Research Questions and Theory 
Therefore, what explains these differences?  Two theories argue that differences in 
government service provision can often be explained by governments’ levels of democracy, with 
more democratic governments spending more on public goods (Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, 
Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Lake and Baum 2001).  These theoretical approaches do a good job 
of explaining differences between authoritarian and democratic regimes (Baum and Lake 2003; 
Brown 2002;  1999; Brown and Hunter 2004; Brown and Mobarak 2009; Stasavage 2005b;  
2005a) but fail to explain important variation within populations of democratic cases, especially 
across polities with identical institutional structures such as Peruvian local governments.   
One reason for this weakness may be the failure of theory to account for underlying 
clientelistic networks and particularistic traditions that exist in many democratic settings.  
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Although clientelism and particularism1 seem to be present in both democratic and non-
democratic settings, particularistic exchange can drive government policy in a way that generates 
different outcomes from those predicted by scholars of democracy.  In places where 
particularism is prevalent, democracy may tend to reinforce that particularism, although existing 
theory of democracy and government service provision suggests that democracy should reduce 
or eliminate clientelism or particularism (Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 
2003; Lake and Baum 2001). 
A sizeable literature on government service provision has developed over the last several 
years, seeking to explain variation between democratic and non-democratic regimes (Ames 
1987; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Baum and Lake 2003; Brown 1999; Brown and Hunter 
2004; Brown and Mobarak 2009; Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; 
Clarke and Stone 2007; Keefer, Neumayer, and Plümper 2011; Lake and Baum 2001; Stasavage 
2005a).  However, variation in government service provision across democratic polities is not 
well understood.  A number of scholars have attempted to explain cross-national variation in the 
provision of a range of public goods.  But with relatively few exceptions, these works have 
identified variation in regime type—the degree of democracy or autocracy of a given 
government—as the primary cause of this variation.  This means that variation within regimes of 
approximately the same level of democracy, or across sub-national jurisdictions (provinces, 
regions, cities, or municipalities, for example) within a single democratic country (that is, a 
country with a single level of democracy according, for example, to the Polity project), remains 
unexplained.  Similarly, some scholars of US politics have attempted to tie certain types of 
government service provision, including both public and excludable goods, to institutional 
                                                
1 Here, following Hicken (2011), I define “clientelism” as the contingent exchange of political support (by voters) 
for tangible government benefits or services (by politicians).  Here, “particularism” is a synonym for “clientelism”. 
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partisan structures which are not relevant outside of the US context (Alt and Lowry 1994; Arnold 
1992; Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, and Sigelman 2002; Bickers 1991; Collie 1988; Fenno 1966; 
Ferejohn 1987; Heller 1997; Hird 1991; Lee 2004; Owens and Wade 1984; Ray 1981).   
In addition, scholarship generally fails to recognize that ostensibly “public” goods can be 
provided in a way in which their benefits are targeted at some groups and excluded from others.  
Recognizing this excludability opens up the possibility that these services can be provided as 
toll/club or private goods, which in turn, opens the possibility of clientelism and particularism.   
The failure to recognize that government services can be provided as targeted, excludable 
goods leads scholars to miss processes of clientelistic and particularistic exchange—the trading 
of votes for particularistic services—as an important source of variation in government service 
provision.  And where clientelism has been considered, it has typically been examined through 
single-case, detailed sociological or anthropological research (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007a).  
At least two theories of public goods provision have been proposed by scholars to explain 
variation in public goods provision between authoritarian and democratic regimes (Bueno De 
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Lake and Baum 2001), but neither theory 
effectively explains variation in government service provision across the population of cases 
examined here—a population of Peruvian municipal governments.   
Finally, little attention has been paid to the role of electoral politics and institutions in 
structuring institutions, and scholars have called for greater investigation of the electoral roots of 
clientelistic practices (Hicken 2010). 
Project Objectives 
Here, I attempt to address these gaps:   
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First, I seek to determine the causal mechanism behind the relationship between democracy 
and greater public goods provision.  That is, how does democracy promote the provision of 
public goods?   
I argue, based on qualitative observation and the existing public goods literature, that 
elections and electoral institutions often promote clientelistic exchange between politicians and 
voters.  I test this assertion against existing theory of public goods provision, and find strong 
evidence for the role of particularism in government service provision.   
Because particularism is often undesirable, therefore, I also address a second issue.  That is, 
what factors mitigate the negative effects of particularistic and clientelistic exchange?  Scholars 
have long argued that particularism is undesirable (Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2006; 
Ashworth 1981; Escobar 1994; Hicken 2010; Keefer 2007; Roniger 1994; Schaffer and Schedler 
2007; Schneider and Zúniga-Hamlin 2005; Transparency International 2009b;  2008c;  2008a), 
therefore, how can this process, which often seems to go hand in hand with democracy, be 
mitigated?  And what factors make it more likely or more widespread?  I test the effects of three 
likely causes of clientelism, including weak opposition parties or factions, weak civil society, 
and high economic inequality.   
In short, I attempt to answer two general research questions: 
First, what is the mechanism through which democracy promotes public goods; does 
democracy promote greater government service provision through electoral competition or by 
promoting larger minimum winning coalitions through electoral rules (as scholars such as Bueno 
de Mesquita and Lake and Baum have argued), or through a process of particularistic or 
clientelistic exchange between politicians and voters? 
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Second—because I find that democracy promotes public goods through a process of 
particularistic exchange—what factors mitigate or facilitate this dynamic?   
In order to answer these questions, I use a mixed-method approach, including analysis of 
statistical data from approximately 1600 district-level Peruvian municipalities, a critical 
population of cases for the study of particularism.  I support this statistical analysis with 
qualitative data gathered in the course of approximately one year of fieldwork in Peru and other 
Latin American countries.   
Ultimately, my findings strongly suggest three conclusions.  First, democracy, at least in 
Peru, promotes public goods primarily through a clientelism-like process of exchange in which 
politicians reward voters for party or personal support with the provision of tangible goods and 
services.  Second, this clientelism-like dynamic is mitigated by several manipulable factors, 
including opposition strength, electoral institutions, and jurisdictional size.  Finally, certain 
factors make particularism more likely, including weak civil society and economic inequality.   
Theory and Literature: Democracy, Clientelism, and Public Services 
Political scientists have long noted the apparent correlation between democracy and 
government service provision (Ames 1987; Ansell 2008; Baum and Lake 2003; Bueno De 
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Chhatre and Saberwal 2005; Lake and Baum 
2001; Ribot 1999;  2002;  2008; Trounstine 2008a).  Most theory on government service 
provision, however, seeks only to explain the differences in goods and service provision between 
democracies and authoritarian regimes (Ames 1987; Ansell 2008; Baum and Lake 2003; Lake 
and Baum 2001; Olson 1993).  Differences in service provision within the population of 
democratic regimes is less well understood, and there is very little comparative work on the 
differences between democratic governments in terms of public service provision.  In chapter 
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two, I seek to fill this gap in the literature, by arguing that government services are often 
provided through a process of particularistic exchange.  In chapter three, I test this idea on a 
population of Peruvian local government cases.   
Two Theories 
Here, I briefly outline the theoretical approaches that I test in chapter three.  These theories 
are described more fully in chapter two, where I also describe testable hypotheses derived from 
each theory. 
Lake and Baum (2001) argue that the threat of removal from office—in democracies, 
effectively the closeness of electoral competition—should motivate politicians to provide more 
services in order to win greater support from voters. Lake and Baum imply that leaders should 
spend more on public services where electoral margin of victory is smaller, because in these 
cases, they should be legitimately afraid that they will lose their jobs2.   
Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003), on the other hand, argue that 
public good provision is less a factor of electoral competition than of the minimum number of 
supporters needed to maintain a leader’s hold on office, which is itself determined by electoral 
rules and institutions for the selection of leadership3.   
This “winning coalition size” or “minimum winning coalition size” is not the same as Lake 
and Baum’s degree of electoral competition.  In Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s formulation, winning 
coalition size in a democratic regime is the minimum number of votes needed, as structured by 
electoral rules, to ensure the hold on office.   In democracies, electoral competitiveness is often 
related to the actual vote share received by victorious parties, but is unrelated to the nature of 
                                                
2 Here, I define and measure the degree of electoral competition as the difference in vote share between the first 
runner-up and the victorious candidate or faction.   
3 Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Olson (1993), and Olson and McGuire (1996) call this concept the “minimum 
winning coalition” or “winning coalition”.   
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“minimum winning coalition” sizes, which are primarily determined by electoral rules.  In 
majoritarian systems, for example, electoral rules typically imply a minimum winning coalition 
size of 50% plus one vote.  However, in such systems, electoral competitiveness can vary 
widely, with some elections being very close, and others being landslides for one candidate or 
another.    
According to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), the larger the coalition of supporters needed 
to win office, the more likely governments are to spend substantial amounts on public services.  
In essence, as the necessary number of supporters increases, so does the quantity of services, 
goods, and benefits needed to buy the support of those individuals.     
However, among the population of cases studied here—Peruvian local governments—neither 
electoral competition, nor the nature of electoral rules explains the substantial variation in 
services provided by governments.  Controlling for other likely factors, the competitiveness of 
local elections is correlated with public spending in the opposite direction from that suggested by 
Lake and Baum (2001).  Further, electoral rules do not vary across Peruvian municipal 
governments, so electoral rules—a constant—cannot explain the visible variation in government 
service provision.  Although these factors—the potential for electoral competition and the nature 
of electoral rules—may significantly determine government service expenditures, they clearly do 
not predict the variation observable across sub-national regimes in Peru.  Instead, some 
additional factor or factors must be driving this variation. 
An alternative theory 
Therefore, I present an alternative to these two theories of democracy and public goods 
provision.  I argue that, in order to reduce uncertainty about future electoral outcomes, politicians 
will seek to maximize the size of their coalition of supporters by building particularistic or 
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clientelistic networks of exchange.  That is, politicians will seek to build networks of supporters 
who provide political support in exchange for tangible government services and other benefits, 
usually as toll or club goods.   
Therefore, the actual size of politicians’ supporting coalitions of voters—measured as the 
percentage of local voters supporting the victorious mayoral candidate in the last electoral 
cycle—will determine, to a significant extent, the nature of government services provided in a 
given municipality4.   
Like Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), however, I argue that governments will tend to provide 
more services where supporting coalitions—measured by the vote share received by victorious 
candidates—are large.  And like Lake and Baum (2001), I argue that monopoly rent extraction 
will be more likely where jurisdictions are less “democratic,” although I argue that rather than 
“democracy” or electoral competition, monopoly rents will be small where supporting coalitions 
are larger.  Where supporting coalitions are smaller, elected politicians will have strong 
incentives to target expenditures at small groups of supporters—including through corrupt means 
like graft and patronage—in order to exclude non-supporters from the receipt of the benefits of 
government services. 
                                                
4 I draw the term “supporting coalition” from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), who use this term to describe the 
actual coalition of voters supporting a given victorious politician, as opposed to the minimal winning coalition or 
winning coalition, which is the minimum-sized coalition that politicians must assemble to retain their political 
position.  A minimal winning coalition or winning coalition, according to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Olson 
(1993) and Olson and McGuire (1996) is smallest number of voters needed by a given politician to stay in office in a 
given regime.  For example, in a two-party democracy, the minimal winning coalition is approximately 50% of the 
voting population.  The supporting coalition, however, can be larger than 50%, and is the actual group of supporters 
backing a given politician or candidate.  In a two-party democracy with a simple plurality election rule for president, 
for example, the winning coalition is 50% plus one vote, but the supporting coalition can be larger than that.  For 
example, if a president needs 50% plus one vote to remain in office, but in a given election, receives the support of 
65% of the electorate, his or her supporting coalition size is 65%.  Here, “supporting coalition size” is synonymous 
with the vote share received by the victorious mayoral candidate in the last election.   
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Qualitative Evidence 
The study of politics is filled with examples of political leaders who successfully pursued the 
political support of key constituencies by providing them with tangible goods, making a 
theoretical description of political survival as the pursuit of a large supporting coalition 
intuitively appealing. 
Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ferdinand Marcos of the 
Philippines, two authoritarian rules with a reputation for clientelism and corruption, retained 
their hold on power by providing excludable goods to key supporters, while siphoning as much 
wealth off into personal banks accounts to fund their extravagant lifestyles.  In contrast, political 
leaders in democratic countries like the United Kingdom, the United States and Bolivia have 
much less opportunity for corrupt, self-seeking practices.  This is because democratically elected 
leaders like Barack Obama, David Cameron, or Evo Morales must spend public funds on 
publicly beneficial project, in order to remain in office (Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, 
and Morrow 2003). 
The effects of supporting coalition sizes are not limited to explaining the differences between 
authoritarian and democratic regimes.  Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) suggest that the 
provision of public goods5 is directly related to the size of “winning coalitions” within 
democracies in a way that is compatible with the theory presented here.  For example, as suffrage 
was expanded in the United Kingdom during the 19th century, public goods provision increased 
substantially, as politicians sought to buy the loyalty of newly enfranchised constituencies (p. 
101; see also Cox 1987).   
                                                
5 Note that the use of the term “public goods,” defined as goods and services which are both non-excludable and 
non-subtractable/non-rivalrous, is Bueno de Mesqita et al.’s.  Here, I argue that most services which governments 
provide are in fact club goods because they are excludable.   
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And not all local governments within a country need have the same supporting coalition size.  
Trounstine (2008) suggests that many city governments through US history have been able to 
narrow supporting coalition sizes but maintain their hold on office through unsavory practices 
like voting fraud and eligibility requirements, such that their governments could cater to the 
needs to only a select elite (not always an economic elite).  Unsurprisingly, she notes important 
cases of such “monopoly governments” in New York (under “Boss” Tweed and the Tammany 
Hall machine) and Chicago (under the Daley machine).  More surprisingly, she notes a wide 
range of other monopolies, such as Pawtucket, Rhode Island, and San Jose, California.  In each 
of these cases, some politician or group of politicians was careful to cultivate the political 
support of a key group of supporters that was provided with tangible government benefits and 
services in return.   
Denver, Colorado is another example of a city that was dominated by particularistic or 
clientelistic politics in its youth.  A political machine largely monopolized the political life of the 
city for nearly twenty years, between about 1900 and 1920.  Denver’s Speer Boulevard is named 
after political boss and sometime mayor Robert W. Speer, who, beginning in the 1890s, built a 
political machine made up of a supporting coalition of strange bedfellows (often, in both a literal 
and figurative sense).  Speer’s supporters included industrial magnates, bankers, and wealthy 
utility providers, city prostitution and saloon workers, and members of the Denver working class, 
including the Italian, Russian, and Mexican immigrant communities (Dorsett 1977; Johnson 
1969; MacMechen 1919).   
In return for their support, Speer provided wealthy Denverites such as Walter S. Cheeseman, 
William Gray Evans, Charles J. Hughes, and David Moffat with profitable monopolies on utility 
services such as public transportation and water.  And in return for the support of Denver’s 
13 
madams, gambling den proprietors and saloon owners, he allowed the sale of alcohol and 
permitted the operation of cathouses, despite progressive reformers’ efforts to eliminate them.  
Speer also developed substantial redistributive programs to maintain the support of the Denver 
working class and immigrant communities, including the construction of playgrounds and public 
pools in immigrant-dominated neighborhoods, support of shelters for the destitute, the provision 
of clothing, food, and fuel handouts for the poor.  Finally, the Speer machine sponsored a 
substantial spoils system, which functioned to build and maintain the support of blue-collar 
residents and redistribute wealth (Dorsett 1977; Johnson 1969; MacMechen 1919).   
Although seemingly less morally offensive than 19th and early 20th century US “machine” 
politics, 21st century “pork barrel” spending—projects which seek to use tax revenues from the 
majority to benefit a narrow, typically geographic, minority—are qualitatively similar to 
machine politicians’ reciprocal exchange of goods and services for votes and support.  One 
striking example is the production of ballistic missile submarines in the United States.  Years 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, elected senators and representatives continued to advocate for 
defense giant General Dynamics’ contract for the production of Ohio-class ballistic missile 
submarines.  Ohio-class subs are ballistic missile launching platforms, and are typically armed 
with 24 Trident-II ballistic missiles, each one of which carries a payload of eight 100 or 475 
megaton warheads (approximately 22,600 times the power of the fat man bomb dropped on 
Nagasaki) (United States Navy n.d.).  Although the submarine program (which yielded 14 
ballistic missile submarines) was ostensibly targeted towards defense, it is difficult to understand 
the rationale for post-1990 nuclear missile sub construction except as an attempt to provide 
tangible benefits (jobs and income) to key constituencies, including employees of General 
Dynamics in Connecticut and Virginia.   
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Peruvian municipal governments also provide strong examples of this dynamic in practice.  
The two Peruvian municipalities described above, Carhuaz and Chavín de Huantar, both in the 
Ancash department, are good examples of Peruvian local clientelism in practice.  Although they 
are similar in most important respects, including ethnicity, income, and geographic size, they 
have widely diverging outcomes in terms of government service provision, with Carhuaz 
underproviding services, except to key indigenous, rural residents, and Chavín providing services 
broadly.   
In 2008, the Peruvian Populist/Nationalist party of congressman, sometime presidential 
candidate, and current President Elect Ollanta Humala controlled the municipality of Carhuaz, 
where public services were badly underprovided.  In this municipality, the mayoral 
administration carefully cultivated a rural constituency by providing goods and services focused 
on rural areas.  Community leaders, citizens and bureaucrats described the mayoral 
administration’s clear efforts to buy rural, indigenous support with consumables (including food, 
drink, seed, animal feed and fertilizer) and with public works projects focused in rural areas, 
including rural school construction and agricultural infrastructure development, such as the 
construction and maintenance of rural irrigation infrastructure.  Because the mayor’s support was 
a narrow coalition of the rural poor, however, many urban dwellers complained of a lack of 
services.  Urban streets remained unpaved, the town square was poorly managed, and the local 
government underprovided other projects and services focused on urban dwellers. 
In Chavín, where the mayor enjoyed a much broader base of support, the government also 
worked to reward its supporters—who included both rural and urban voters—with tangible 
benefits.  However, because a larger percentage of local voters supported the municipal 
government, and because these supporters were spread through both urban and rural areas, the 
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municipal government spent money on a wide range of projects in both rural areas and the 
municipal urban center.  Ongoing projects included works beneficial to urban residents (road 
construction and maintenance, park and plaza construction and maintenance, and tourist 
infrastructure development) as well as works beneficial to outlying areas (including the 
construction of a large number of schools, health clinics, sewage and electricity infrastructure, 
irrigation systems, and tree nurseries for rural reforestation).   
A test of mechanisms  
In chapter two, I argue that democratic governments provide goods and services through a 
mechanism—particularistic exchange—different from that suggested by existing theories of 
democracy (Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Lake and Baum 2001).  I 
test this new theory of particularism against existing theory, and find strong support for the role 
of particularism in promoting the provision of government services.  I conclude, therefore, that 
much public service is driven by clientelism-like exchange of political support for government 
services, and though electoral competition and electoral institutions may be important drivers of 
government spending in many settings, they are by no means the only determinant of public 
goods or government service provision, nor does electoral competition eliminate or reduce 
clientelistic exchange in the way Lake and Baum (2001) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) 
imply.   
This result is consistent with many accounts of public service provision across the globe and 
across time which rely on a similar description of the exchange of political support for services.  
However, it is discouraging to find that democracy’s benefits are often delivered through a 
particularistic mechanism, as many scholars have derided this type of exchange as undemocratic, 
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inefficient, and inherently undesirable (Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2006; Adsera, Boix, and 
Payne 2003; Arriola 2009; Escobar 1994; Gunes-Ayata 1994a; Keefer 2007; Roniger 1994)6. 
Therefore, in chapters four, five, and six, I expand the study to determine which factors 
mitigate and which factors exacerbate this particularistic dynamic.  In chapter four, I examine the 
effect of strong opposition parties, in chapter five, I examine the role of civil society, and in 
chapter six, I examine the role of economic inequality in promoting or preventing narrowly-
focused particularism. 
The Role of Opposition Factions  
In chapter four, I examine the effects of opposition strength on the exchange of political 
support for government services.   
Few scholars have examined the effects of institutional checks and balances—such as 
municipal councils’ abilities to veto mayoral policy—on clientelistic exchange.  However, there 
is a substantial amount of scholarship which explores the effects of checks and balances on other 
forms of particularistic policy, including trade policy, economic reform, and fiscal policy (M. 
Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997; Becher 2009; Cheibub 2006; Gehlbach and Malesky 
2010; Kang and Powell 2010; Rogowski 1987; van de Walle 2003; Ziblatt 2008).   
This literature, however, fails to draw consistent conclusions about the effects of checks and 
balances on particularism. 
One set of works predicts that institutional checks and balances, fragmented governments, 
and/or relatively large numbers of “veto points” or “veto players” will generate relatively more 
                                                
6 It should also be noted that, although I see evidence of clientelism, where “clientelism” is defined as the exchange 
of political support for government services, many scholars assume that clientelism includes an element of unequal 
exchange (Hicken 2010; Roniger 1994).  I have no way to measure the extent to which the exchange of support for 
services is equal or unequal here, so I define both clientelism and particularism as the contingent exchange of 
political support for particularistic benefits directed at one’s group, locality, family, or self, following Hicken 
(2010). 
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particularistic policy.  Fiscal policy will tend to include greater spending on benefits for narrow 
interest groups, for example, and economic policy in general will tend to promote narrow rather 
than broad interests (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Cheibub 2006; Becher 2009).  These scholars 
argue that spending that policy is the result of negotiation; where negotiations involve more 
players who are capable of vetoing a given policy, those actors will be able to extract more 
constituency-specific concessions (Arriola 2009; Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006; Becher 2009; 
Cheibub 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). 
These scholars would predict that more powerful oppositions in Peruvian municipal 
governments—who will be more able to promote their own narrow constituencies’ interests at 
the expense of the local population as a whole—will tend to be associated with greater 
clientelistic exchange. 
On the other hand, at least two theoretical arguments would predict that stronger oppositions 
will generate less support-service exchange.  The first theory assumes that oppositions tend to 
play an oversight role, and when there are greater numbers of “veto players”, government is 
divided, or legislatures are divided between parties, particularistic, corrupt, or inefficient policies 
are less likely because of this accountability (Gehlbach and Malesky 2010; McKay 2009; see 
also Mayhew 2005 for another presentation of this argument).   
A second argument along these lines suggests that the larger the number of actors involved in 
policy making, the larger the proportion of society represented by those actors is likely to be.  
Therefore, where more actors are involved in policy negotiations, and where more actors are 
needed to legislate or carry out policy (as in a situation where local opposition parties can more 
successfully oppose mayoral policy), the more broad the benefitted constituency is likely to be 
(Arriola 2009; Rogowski 1987; Saha 2010).  As a result, where more actors or groups can slow 
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down, veto, or change policy (as in a situation where a municipal opposition party is relatively 
powerful), the less likely it is that mayors or other actors will successfully pursue narrowly 
targeted, clientelistic policies. 
In chapter four, I test these contending arguments.  I find that the evidence, at least in Peru, 
supports the contention that oppositions weaken clientelistic links and make particularistic 
exchange less common.   
Normally, it would be difficult or impossible to test the effect of opposition strength on 
particularism in the way I test it here, because opposition strength is typically correlated 
(negatively) to the electoral support of governing parties.  However, I am able to exploit the 
unique results of Peru’s unusual set of local electoral rules.  These rules engineer 
disproportionate representation amongst Peruvian municipalities, making it is possible to 
separate (a) the institutional strength of opposition parties and (b) the level of electoral support 
for governing parties.  It is therefore possible to interact these two variables in a way that permits 
a test of the effect of opposition strength on particularistic exchange. 
Civil Society  
A second area which is ripe for comparative investigation, and which Peruvian local 
government data is uniquely suited to test, is the relationship between civil society density and 
the exchange of political support for government services.  I examine these links in chapter five.   
Scholars have argued that civil society density plays two functions which may affect the 
exchange of services for support between politicians and their constituents.  First, dense social 
and civil society networks may promote government transparency, by lowering constituents’ 
costs of information-gathering on the provision of government services.  Where voters are 
involved with non-governmental organizations that provide a place and time, formally or 
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informally, for the discussion of political topics, it will be less costly for voters to gather a more 
complete picture of the performance of local government officials (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006; Iversen, Sen, Verschoor, and Dubey 2009; Sobel 2002).  This discussion could be formal 
or informal, and such organizations can include explicitly political or apolitical organizations 
such as church groups, neighborhood associations, women’s or peasant’s organizations, etc. 
Where these organizations make information is relatively less costly, it will be more likely that 
constituencies will hold their elected officials accountable for bad governance in elections 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Brown 
1999; Brown and Hunter 2004; Chandra 2004; Gehlbach and Malesky 2010; Gerring and 
Thacker 2004). 
In addition, civil society density may affect citizens’ abilities to organize collectively.  Civil 
society may lead to greater social capital and interpersonal trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Levi 
1996; Uslaner 2000), making collective action (and therefore, collective political mobilization) 
more likely (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Freitag and Buhlmann 2009; Levi 1996).  Where 
mobilization is more widespread, voters will be more likely to get their way (Adsera, Boix, and 
Payne 2003; Escobar 1994). 
One problem, however, is that voters’ preferences are have not been well identified.  On one 
hand, advocates of a civil society-clientelism link generally assume that voters prefer to live in 
an environment where clientelism is sparse, either because they are altruistic or because most 
voters will be disadvantaged by clientelism-like support-service exchange (Escobar 1994; 
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994).  However, it is equally plausible that many citizens will 
use civil society networks to pursue particularistic benefits for themselves, their families, their 
village, neighborhood, or ethnic group (Aldrich 2008; Aldrich and Crook 2007).  Therefore, 
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either one of the mechanisms described here might lead to either more or less particularistic 
exchange.  Here, I test the effects of civil society density, and find that civil society networks 
have a nuanced effect on public spending, decreasing government service provision where that 
provision is likely to be narrowly targeted, and increasing government spending where it is likely 
to be broadly beneficial.  
Inequality 
In chapter six, I investigate the relationship between a third factor—economic inequality—
and particularistic government service provision.  Economic inequality and other forms of 
heterogeneity are factors which are likely to drive public goods provision, although the direction 
of the relationship is contested (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Baland and J.-P. Platteau 
1999; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2009; Munoz, Paredes, and Thorp 2007; 
Savoia, Easaw, and A. McKay 2010; Varughese and E. Ostrom 2001). 
The relationship between inequality and particularism inherently interesting for policy 
reasons; inequality has been cited as a cause of poverty (Savoia, Easaw, and A. McKay 2010; 
The World Bank 2003;  2005), and if inequality promotes particularism and the under-provision 
of government services, this may be one causal mechanism through which inequality promotes 
underdevelopment.   
In addition, high levels of inequality in Peru may make the empirical sample used here 
particularly subject to concerns about generalizability.  Here, I hope to allay concerns that my 
results may not be generalizable due to the historically high levels of class- and ethnically-based 
inequality present in Peru and other Latin American polities.  Therefore, I demonstrate that my 
results regarding the prevalence of particularistic exchange hold across both relatively equal and 
unequal municipalities in Peru.   
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Empirical Strategy 
In the following chapters, I use a quantitative approach to study these two research 
questions—first, through what mechanism does democracy promote public service provision, 
and second, what factors mitigate the exchange of government services for political support?  I 
capitalize on several under-utilized sources of public statistics gathered at the municipal level in 
each of approximately 1600 Peruvian municipalities to test the effects of supporting coalition 
size, electoral competition, opposition strength, and civil society density on public service 
provision.  First, I use the 2007 Peruvian National Registry of Municipalities (RENAMU), 
second, I use the 2007 Peruvian census, and third, I use data on public expenditures available 
through Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finances (MEF).  I test the effects of supporting 
coalition size and electoral competition on several categories of public expenditures, and to 
determine the effect of opposition strength, civil society density, and economic inequality on 
clientelism-like exchange, I interact data on supporting coalition size with statistics on civil 
society density, opposition seats in municipal councils, and economic inequality.   
I support my statistical analyses with qualitative observations made in the course of 
approximately one year of in-depth fieldwork in Latin America, establishing the plausibility of 
the causal mechanisms proposed in each theoretical account of the causes of public service 
provision. 
Why Peru? 
Peruvian local governments are a critical case for the study of government service provision 
through particularistic exchange, and the ideal setting for the study of government service 
provision through particularistic exchange.  First, Peru’s unusual set of local electoral rules 
makes particularism especially likely.  Second, Peru’s electoral rules permit the disaggregation 
and control of variables which cannot often be parsed in other settings.  Third, the quality of data 
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on Peruvian local governments, especially in areas which should be particularly relevant for the 
study of particularism, is very good.  Fourth, the study of Peruvian local governments 
automatically controls for many alternative, institutional explanations, since local government 
institutions do not vary from municipality to municipality.  Finally, because some municipalities 
in Peru are very poor while others are quite rich, the Peruvian local government population 
should mean that the findings of this dissertation are generalizable to cases outside of the 
Peruvian sample.   
Unusual electoral rules may facilitate particularism 
First, because of the unusual mix of electoral rules they share, Peruvian municipalities are 
particularly susceptible to particularistic exchange of government services for electoral support.  
In perhaps no other democratic system do electoral systems generate both (a) governing 
coalitions which represent very small proportion of voters, and (b) institutionally weak 
oppositions which are typically unable to check the authority of the mayor.  As a result of these 
unusual outcomes, Peruvian local governments are particularly susceptible to politics through 
particularism. 
Peru has a mayor-council form of local government, using a modified open-list proportional 
representation (PR) electoral system for mayoral and municipal council seats.  That is, municipal 
council seats are first allocated to mayoral parties, and the remainder of seats are allocated 
proportionally (explained in greater detail below).  Because of the PR electoral system, and 
because of the use of a similar system for congressional elections at the local level, most local 
election contests feature several parties, and mayors are typically selected with only a plurality of 
votes (Ahmad and García-Escribano 2006;  2008; Estado and Locales 2006; Giugale, Retes-
Cibils, and Newman 2007; Jaramillo Baanante 2009).   
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In only a very small number of municipalities (fewer than ten, out of approximately 1600 
Peruvian district municipalities in 2006) do only two parties compete, and electoral contests 
usually feature between five and fifteen local and national political parties.  In some cases, 
mayors are selected with the support of greater than a majority of the local population (about 8% 
of the time in 2006).  However, more than half of all mayors are selected with the support of less 
than a third of the local population, and about 75% of all mayors are elected with the support of 
40% or less of the local voting population.  The median level of support is about 33% (ONPE 
2011). 
Normally, under these circumstances, mayors’ parties would only control a minority of seats 
on most municipal councils.  However, Peru’s electoral laws engineer disproportionality so as to 
strengthen the hand of the mayor and prevent gridlock.  Electoral rules state that, first, a majority 
(> 50%) of municipal council seats are allocated to the party of the victorious candidate in the 
mayoral race, with other seats allocated proportionally.  This means that the party of the mayor, 
which may have received less than 30% of the local vote, receives at least a majority of the 
municipal council.   
Imagine, for example, a municipality in which the municipal council is five seats, and four 
parties competed for office.  Party A receives 35% of the vote, party B receives 34%, party C 
receives 20%, and party D receives 11% (a relatively typical outcome).  In this case, the majority 
of seats (three of the five) would be allocated to party A.  In addition, amongst the two seats 
remaining, party A will receive 1, and party B will receive the sole remaining seat.  Therefore, 
the municipal council will be composed of four representatives from party A, and 1 
representative from party B (Jaramillo Baanante 2009).   
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The Peruvian local electoral system, therefore, generates results that may tend to exacerbate 
existing pressures for particularism, for two inter-connected reasons.  First, governments tend to 
represent only a minority of local voters.  As outlined above, governments representing small 
minorities will face strong pressure to redistribute tax revenue from the majority to the minority 
of supporters, and the smaller the group of supporters is, the more likely particularistic private 
goods provision will be.   
Second, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, governments which include relatively powerful 
oppositions are less likely to experience significant amounts of particularism.  However, because 
of the engineered disproportionality in Peruvian electoral systems, strong oppositions are 
relatively rare amongst Peruvian local governments.  
Indeed, it is quite common for local governments which represent only a small majority of 
local residents (33% or fewer).  In about half of all Peruvian district municipalities (790 
districts), mayoral seats and majorities of municipal councils represent a third or less of all local 
voters, but oppositions control less than a third of the seats on the council.   These outcomes are 
unusual in other democratic systems, but relatively commonplace in Peru, making it more likely 
that particularism will be observable in the sample analyzed here.   
Electoral rules permit disaggregation of important variables 
For similar reasons, Peruvian electoral rules permit opposition strength, electoral 
competition, winning coalition size, and supporting coalition size—which are normally so 
closely correlated that parsing these variables out would not be feasible—to be considered 
separately.  Opposition strength would normally be highly correlated with supporting coalition 
size, but in the Peruvian municipal sample utilized here, because of the engineered 
disproportionality of Peruvian municipal councils, these two variables correlate at .06.  Because 
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all municipalities enjoy the same set of electoral rules, and these rules do not vary, electoral rules 
(and therefore, minimum winning coalition size) can be easily ruled out as an explanation for 
variation in government service provision.   
Data quality and quantity 
In addition, public spending and governance data for Peruvian local governments is 
particularly well suited for the study of particularism.  First, data quality and coverage is very 
good (especially for construction/infrastructure data).  Second, mayoral supporting coalitions 
vary greatly in size, due to electoral rules (as discussed above.  Third, the characteristics of local 
electoral rules make the estimation of governments’ supporting coalition sizes tractable. 
First, governing coalitions represent widely varying percentages of local voters7.  In a few 
municipalities, governing coalitions (made up of a single party) represent fewer than 16% of all 
voters, and in a few municipalities, governing coalitions represent over 96% of local voters, with 
the bulk representing somewhere between 20% and 40%.  In most places, institutional rules 
make governance by less than a majority very uncommon, allowing the evaluation of a much 
wider range of electoral outcomes using the population of cases examined here. 
Second, it is very easy to determine what percentage of voters is represented by the 
governing coalition-that being simply the percentage of voters that voted for the victorious party.  
This makes it unnecessary to know the internal dynamics of every municipal council, where 
party alliances may change over time, and may be narrow or broader depending on who is allied 
with whom.  In short, were the electoral system to function in the standard way, it would require 
a great deal of context-specific knowledge just to know what parties participate in government, 
                                                
7 Here, I define the governing coalition as the group of parties controlling the legislature and the executive branch—
the municipal council and the mayor’s seat.  In Peru, the “governing coalition” almost always consists of a single 
political party or faction, as explained below. 
26 
and which are excluded in each municipality, knowledge that would be very difficult to gather in 
a large sample of cases.  Amongst Peruvian local governments, however, it is unnecessary to 
know what alliance of parties controls a majority of seats in the local council.  It is only 
necessary to know the party of the mayor to determine which party controls the local 
government.      
Finally, data on public spending on infrastructure improvements—the area in which 
particularism would most likely appear (Samuels 2001a;  2001b)—is gathered for every 
municipal government in Peru by the central government, making it possible to examine the full 
range of infrastructure spending outcomes.  In addition, a fairly large sample of municipal 
governments voluntarily provide total spending figures (including both current and capital 
expenditures) in a wide range of policy areas, making it possible to examine the extent to which 
total government expenditures also reflect a process of particularistic exchange.   
Comparability across units 
Although theories of democracy have traditionally been tested on samples of nation-states, I 
use sub-national data to test the same ideas here.  This approach is not without precedent 
(Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Hale 2007; D. McKay 2009; Stokes 
2005; Trounstine 2008b;  2010), and in fact enjoys several important advantages over the use of 
cross-national data.  In particular, comparison of Peruvian local governments is the ideal setting 
for the study of particularistic exchange, because many alternative explanations which have been 
proposed in the Comparative and American Politics literature do not vary across the sample.   
Studying public goods provision by using statistical tests to compare spending across 
countries (the standard approach) introduces sources of variation which are very difficult to 
control, and may confound statistical analyses.  This is not to say that such approaches are not 
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useful, but that it is difficult to know if the analyst has addressed all potential sources of omitted 
variable bias.  By restricting the sample to municipal governments—which share essentially 
identical institutional structures—inside of a single country, many potential sources of omitted 
variable bias are eliminated.  In particular, all Peruvian municipalities operate according to very 
similar institutional rules, and all possess essentially identical political structures: a popularly 
elected mayor, and a municipal council elected using a modified open-list proportional 
representation ballot (Ahmad and García-Escribano 2006;  2008; Giugale, Retes-Cibils, and 
Newman 2007; Jaramillo Baanante 2009).   
The sub-national approach, for example, helps to address the possible confounding effects of 
variables associated US congressional appropriations.  Substantial debate has taken place as to 
whether committee appointments, majority status, or links with bureaucratic agencies affect 
appropriations (Adler 2002; Arnold 1979; Ashworth 1981; Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, and 
Sigelman 2002; Goss 1972; Herron and Theodos 2004; Hird 1991; Kim and Phillips 2009; 
Owens and Wade 1984; Plott 1968; Ray 1980; Rundquist and Griffith 1976; Stein 1981; Stein 
and Bickers 1995).  These problems do not appear here, because (for example) all mayors and 
mayoral parties control municipalities as majorities, all mayors enjoy the same kinds of formal 
links with local bureaucracies, and because committees are not a factor in Peruvian municipal 
governance. 
Similarly, although there are variations across Peruvian municipalities in terms of culture (for 
example, between mestizo, Quechua, Aymara, and lowland indigenous areas), and in terms of 
informal institutions for policy-making, most of the policy-making processes explored here are 
either managed by central government agencies (including local elections) in such a way that 
there are not substantial differences across municipalities in terms of the way elections are 
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managed, including formal and informal rules, and rules-in-use and rules-in-form.  Likewise, 
municipal budgeting procedures, especially for capital projects, are managed according to a 
single, well-specified process delineated by central government decree (Ahmad and García-
Escribano 2006; Congreso Honorable Del Peru 1997;  2002; Estado and Locales 2006; IPE 2003; 
Palacios 2009).  As a result, there is little reason to believe that significant procedural or 
institutional differences should be an important cause of variation in government service 
provision or spending across Peruvian municipalities.   
Finally, because Peruvian political parties, even at the national level, are particularly weak, 
even by developing country standards, and because political parties at the local level are 
substantially pragmatic, personality-based, and non-ideological, party ideology is also unlikely to 
vary substantially across Peruvian municipalities.  Although party ideology in other settings is 
most likely an important driver of the size of the state in other places, even the ideologies of 
extreme left wing and extreme right wing parties frequently are not substantially different in the 
Peruvian local setting, making it unlikely that ideology will systematically drive expenditures in 
Peru. 
Generalizability 
Finally, many of the other characteristics of the Peruvian milieu make it likely that findings 
of this study may be generalizable to other settings.  Although Peru is considered “middle 
income” by the World Bank and other IGOs (World Bank n.d.; CIA n.d.), municipalities in Peru 
range from very poor to very wealthy.  While some district municipalities in Peru suffer from 
poverty, illiteracy, and infant mortality which is as high as the poorest countries on Earth (Drinot 
2006; IPE 2003; Giugale, Retes-Cibils, and Newman 2007; N. Jones, Vargas, and Villar 2007), 
many urban districts in Lima and other major cities enjoy indicators of wealth and development 
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which are similar to those of many Western European or North American municipalities (INEI 
n.d.).  This means that there are strong reasons to believe that these findings are generalizable to 
countries and other jurisdictions outside of Peru, in Latin America and around the world.   
A Roadmap 
In Chapter two, I present, in greater detail, a review of the existing literature on public goods 
provision and democracy, as well as an expanded explanation of how clientelism may promote 
public goods provision and government services in general.   
In Chapter three, I test the implications of this theory against hypotheses derived from the 
existing literature, using a mixed-methods analysis of three hypothesized mechanisms which link 
democracy with greater public service provision.  I ultimately conclude that clientelism is a more 
explanation for variation in government service provision than electoral rules or competition, at 
least within my Peruvian municipal sample.  These results suggest that a process of clientelism-
like exchange, in which politicians purchase the loyalty of key constituencies with public 
services, may be the most important mechanism through which democracy leads to greater 
government service provision. 
In chapters four, five, and six I expand the study, to examine three additional factors which 
might mitigate the clientelism-like exchange of political support for tangible public services.  
The intention here is to identify factors that will make clientelism less likely, and to delineate 
settings in which clientelism is particularly common or uncommon.  In particular, I focus on the 
role of economic inequality, civil society, and the institutional strength of opposition parties in 
municipal governments.     
In chapter four, I examine the effect of opposition strength—measured by the proportion of 
municipal council seats held by opposition party-members—on the clientelism-like exchange of 
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political support for government services.  I find that oppositions tend to play an oversight role, 
obstructing municipal policy where it stands to benefit only a small minority.  In chapter five, I 
examine the effect of civil society density on clientelism-like support-service exchange.  I find 
that, in general, municipalities with relatively dense civil society tend to experience less 
clientelism-like exchange than municipalities with lower civil society density.  This suggests that 
civil society also tends to play an oversight role on governments, and promoting municipal 
policies which are broadly beneficial to a majority, rather than policies which benefit only a 
narrow clique of mayoral supporters.   
In chapter six, I examine the role of economic inequality in promoting clientelistic exchange, 
with an eye to the degree of generalizability of my earlier results.  It is possible that the 
particularistic exchange examined earlier in this dissertation is only present because of the very 
high level of inequality of Peruvian society.  Therefore, I seek to determine whether 
particularistic exchange is promoted by inequality, and if so, whether particularism is only 
present in very unequal settings.  Although I do find evidence that particularism is worsened by 
inequality, particularistic exchange appears to be present in both unequal and relatively equal 
municipalities in Peru, boding well for the generalizability of my earlier results   
In chapter seven, I conclude with a summary of my results, and some implications thereof.  
Ultimately, my analysis suggests that the exchange of tangible government services for 
constituent support is an important driver of public service provision in Peru, and probably many 
places like it.  If this type of exchange is undesirable, as many have asserted (Acemoglu, Ticchi, 
and Vindigni 2006; Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003; Chandra 2004; Crabtree 2010; Islam 2006; 
Keefer 2007; van de Walle 2003), it is desirable for institutions to be structured in such a way as 
to provide opposition parties a strong voice in policy making.  It is also beneficial for electoral 
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institutions to promote large supporting coalitions of voters, and for jurisdictional sizes to be 
large enough as to make it costly for politicians to gather information about which voters, 
villages, families, or ethnic groups supported and opposed them in recent elections.  In addition, 
to the extent that civil society can be made denser, it is also desirable for NGOs and other 
organizations to pursue greater civil society engagement so as to make clientelism-like exchange 
less likely. 
Implications 
These empirical results have important theoretical and policy implications, both about the 
nature of democracy and about the provision of public goods and services.   
First, although democracy is associated with greater public goods provision, based on the 
results reported here, municipalities generally do not spend more on public goods when electoral 
competition is tighter.  Instead, supporting coalition size—the number of supporters of a given 
party or politician—is the primary driver of public goods provision, at least in Peru.  This 
suggests that, at least in some settings, democracy functions less through electoral competition 
than through a process of clientelism-like exchange, in which voters are rewarded by victorious 
politicians for their support.  In other words, democracy works through clientelism, patronage, or 
pork-barrel politics.  This finding helps to refine scholars’ understanding of the mechanisms 
through which democracy promotes public goods provision.  My findings broadly support the 
assertions of scholars who have cited the nature of electoral rules (Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, 
Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Olson 1993; McGuire and Olson 1996) and the possibility for 
democratic competition (Baum and Lake 2003; Lake and Baum 2001) as drivers of variation in 
government service provision.  However, these findings suggest that beyond electoral rules, the 
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nature of clientelistic or particularistic networks determines substantial variation in public goods 
provision. 
This process of particularistic exchange can be facilitated or mitigated by several factors, 
four of which I discuss here.  Both opposition strength and civil society density mitigate the 
relationship between supporting coalition size and particularistic exchange, making private and 
toll good provision less likely where supporting coalitions are small.  In addition, two factors 
seem to promote clientelism or particularism.  Where communities are small, particularism is 
particularly salient, as it is where inequality is especially high.  I explore these theoretical and 
policy implications in greater depth in the conclusion.   
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Background, Literature, Theory, and Hypotheses 
Chapter 2 
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Public Goods and Governments 
The provision of so-called “public goods”—which include services like national defense, 
education, and transportation services—are arguably among the most important tasks 
governments can carry out.  Some public goods—defined as goods with large, positive 
spillovers—may be inherently desirable, such as the protection of civil rights and liberties, while 
others, such as education and healthcare, are desirable because they facilitate the pursuit of other 
policy goals, such as economic development.  Some public goods are valuable for both 
reasons—they are both valued as desirable in and of themselves, and because they help policy-
makers pursue other goals.  Many types of environmental protection fit in this category.  
Education, for example, has been called the “magic bullet” for development (Ansell 2008), and 
the absence of education is a primary cause of poverty at the individual level (Brown and Hunter 
2004; Zapata, Contreras, and Kruger 2010).  Likewise, public infrastructure, including 
transportation infrastructure, is a key driver of economic development, and where governments 
do not provide spend sufficiently on transportation, higher rates of poverty are the result 
(Calderón and Servén 2004; Giugale, Retes-Cibils, and Newman 2007; IPE 2003).  Finally, the 
rise of modern states has itself been tied to the need for national defense, another public good 
(Krasner et al. 1984; Thies and Sobek 2010). 
Despite the desirability of many public goods, the provision of public goods is problematic.  
By definition, public goods are non-excludable.  That is, individuals or groups of people cannot 
easily be excluded from enjoying their benefits, once they are provided.  For example, people 
cannot easily be kept from enjoying the benefits of national defense or clean air once these goods 
are provided by other individuals, firms, or governments (V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom 1977).   
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Although seemingly desirable, the characteristic of non-excludability means that individuals 
have an incentive to wait and hope someone else provides the good so that they can benefit from 
its provision without contributing to its cost.  As a result, public goods tend to be under-
provided.  However, governments are in a good position to provide public goods, because they 
enjoy a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and can use coercion to overcome the collective 
action problem—the free-rider problem—that often makes public goods provision difficult.  That 
is, governments can use force to require individuals to contribute to the collective provision of 
public goods (McGuire and Olson 1996). 
In practice, however, governments often fail to provide sufficient quantities of public goods.  
For example, municipal education, public health, and transportation spending varies dramatically 
from place to place.  In Peru, each year, many municipalities spend less that one dollar (US) per 
resident on education spending, transportation spending, or public health spending.  On the other 
hand, a few municipalities spend more than $1000 (US) per resident on public health services, 
and more than $1200 (US) per resident on both transportation and education.  Globally, public 
goods spending varies even more broadly.  Chile, for example, spends about 12% of its GDP per 
capita (about $1800 US) on each primary school student, Israel spends about 20% (about $5900), 
and Uganda spends about 7.5% (about $90 per student, purchasing power parity adjusted) (CIA 
n.d.; World Bank n.d.).  Although economists and policy-makers might argue about the optimum 
level of education spending in a given economy, $90 per primary student is probably sub-
optimal.   
Competition and Clientelism in the Public Goods Literature 
Perhaps because “public goods” include so many types of services that are viewed as 
desirable for economic development and standards of living, such as education, sanitation, and 
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health care, scholars in Political Science and other disciplines have long studied the reasons 
some governments provide sufficient quantities of public goods but some under-provide these 
goods (Ames 1987; Lake and Baum 2001; Brown and Hunter 2004).   
Public goods are both non-excludable (it is difficult to exclude their benefits from some 
individuals) and non-subtractable (one person’s enjoyment of the benefits of the good does not 
subtract from another person’s enjoyment).  Provision of public goods is often difficult to 
organize, for the simple reason that, because they are non-excludable, they are difficult to sell in 
a market, and collective action in providing such goods suffers from free-rider problems.  
However, because of their unique position, holding a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, 
governments are well-positioned to provide such goods by requiring citizens to contribute to 
their provision (Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003).   
The provision of government services typically considered “public goods”—services like 
education, public health, electricity provision, and other infrastructure development—varies 
substantially across states and across sub-national jurisdictions (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 
1999; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Baum and Lake 2003; Brown and Hunter 2004; Brown 
and Mobarak 2009; Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Craw 2010; Lake 
and Baum 2001; Ziblatt 2008), raising the question of how to explain these differences in 
government service provision. 
At least two well-developed theories exist which identify different mechanisms by which 
democratic governments may provide more government services (Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno 
De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003), and substantial empirical work has tested and 
confirmed the broad notion that democracies provide more public goods (Avelino, Brown, and 
Hunter 2005; Baum and Lake 2003; Brown 2002;  1999;  2000; Brown and Hunter 2004; Brown 
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and Mobarak 2009; Lake and Baum 2001; Stasavage 2005b;  2005a).  However, these theories 
do little to explain variation within the population of democratic polities, including across 
Peruvian municipalities and many other sub-national regimes.  Though both theories appear to 
have substantial predictive power, they are incomplete, as they fail to explain the full range of 
variation in settings where the frequency of democratic competition and the nature of electoral 
rules do not vary. 
Democracy as competition 
One theory argues that the threat of removal from office, through elections or, in the case of 
non-democractic regimes, competition for power by other means such as violence—is the key 
factor driving democracies’ greater provision of public services like education and public health 
services.  According to these works, where politicians’ threat of removal is greater—for 
example, through frequent, competitive elections—governments will provide more public goods 
and public services (Stasavage 2005b; Lake and Baum 2001; Baum and Lake 2003; Ames 1987).  
These comparative scholars draw on a venerable tradition of scholars of US politics who see re-
election as one of the most important, perhaps the only important goal of politicians (Arnold 
1992; Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974).  
This argument is presented in its most well-developed form by Lake and Baum (2001), who 
argue that governments function like monopolistic firms which extract tax revenue from voters 
in exchange for the provision of services.  These firms/governments will extract fewer monopoly 
rents, and will provide more government services, when the risk they will be removed from office 
is higher.  This implies, as Lake and Baum point out, that democracies will provide greater 
quantities of public services.   
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Lake and Baum argue that the potential for competition through the presence of regularly 
scheduled, competitive and transparent elections may be the most important driver of 
government service provision.  However, their argument may also imply that within 
democracies, more services will be provided, and monopoly rents will be lower, in places where 
electoral competition between parties is greater, and where average margins of victory are 
greater.  It is in places with greater electoral competition, after all, that the risk that incumbent 
politicians will lose their seats is higher.   
Stasavage (2005, 54) draws the connection between electoral competition and public service 
provision explicitly: 
With several years of hindsight since the African democracy movement of the early 1990s, it 
is possible to begin investigating whether electoral competition has prompted African leaders 
to become more accountable, and to improve provision of basic services like health and 
education.  Alternatively, in many, if not most, cases one may observe that the formal re-
establishment of electoral democracy has had little impact on public service provision, 
because African incumbents face weak electoral challenges, because election outcomes can 
be rigged, or because African election campaigns focus on non policy questions (emphasis 
added).   
 
Although few other scholars have presented theory as well-developed as that of Lake and 
Baum, a number of empirical studies have relied on the notion that competition for office drives 
greater public good expenditures (see, for example, Ames 1987; Baum and Lake 2003; Lake and 
Baum 2001; Stasavage 2005b;  2005a).   
One implication of Lake and Baum (2001) may be that more competitive elections—
elections where margins of victory are narrower—may promote greater government service 
provision, as elected officials seek reelection by purchasing the support of voters through service 
provision, leading to the first hypothesis tested in chapter 3: 
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H1: Where electoral competition is greater—that is, where margins of victory are 
narrower—public goods provision will tend to be greater.   
Democracy as electoral institutions 
Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003), Olson (1993) and Olson and 
McGuire (1996) present similarly well-developed theories of public goods provision, some 
aspects of which are useful for explaining variation in Peruvian municipal government service 
provision, placing emphasis on electoral institutions in democratic regimes. 
According to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Olson (1993), and others, politicians in 
democratic systems stay in office primarily by buying support from voters through the provision 
of government services and tangible benefits.  These benefits and services are often public, but 
are also frequently private benefits aimed at individuals or small groups.     
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) draw upon the idea of the “minimal winning coalition”—a 
concept drawn from studies of US Congressional appropriations.  This is the idea that the 
smallest possible number of legislators (a bare majority in the US), will pass appropriations bills 
which redistribute wealth from all taxpayers to their own districts, so they each receive the 
maximum benefit for their districts (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Riker and Ordeshook 1973; 
Riker 1962).  Bueno de Mesquita et al. argue that political leaders internationally also rely on 
winning coalitions of supporters to stay in power, though these may be coalitions of families, 
factions, or voters. 
Where it is possible to remain in office by maintaining a small winning coalition, the 
provision of goods targeted at particular groups and individuals—private goods—is often the 
most effective strategy for holding on to political office.  Using tax revenue, politicians provide 
goods and services to individuals or small groups in return for their support (Bueno De Mesquita, 
Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003).  However, as winning coalition size increases, the amount 
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of money that can be spent, per supporter, decreases.  That is, if municipal revenue is fixed, and 
there are more supporters who need to be paid off with private goods provision, less can be spent 
per voter.  Eventually, as winning coalition size increases, it becomes more cost-effective to buy 
the support of potential voters by providing non-excludable, non-subtractable goods—public 
goods.  This is because as the winning coalition size becomes larger, more of the gains from 
public goods provision are captured by the winning coalition, even as private goods provision 
becomes less beneficial per supporter. 
In authoritarian regimes, the size of the “winning coalition” needed to hold on to office is 
determined by idiosyncratic factors, such as the size of the group in control of the police or 
military.  On the other hand, in democracies, winning coalition sizes are determined by formal 
institutions, especially electoral rules.  
Therefore, as electoral rules require larger winning coalition sizes, expenditures on 
government services such as education, health and sanitation, transport, potable water and 
sewage services will rise, as (a) the number of individuals to be compensated for their political 
support increases, and (b) the per-constituent benefits of a given quantity of “public goods” 
becomes larger than the per-constituent benefits of “private goods.”  Politicians, according to 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Olson (1993), and Olson and McGuire (1996), will spend more 
money on public services when they need larger numbers of supporters to win.  While electoral 
rules require small winning coalition sizes, government services will be more likely to take the 
form of private or excludable goods.  In addition, Bueno de Mesquita et a. (2003), Olson (1993) 
and Olson and McGuire (1996) predict that authoritarian regimes or regimes with small winning 
coalitions will tax at higher rates in order to redistribute wealth from majorities to minorities of 
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supporters.  When electoral rules require larger minimal winning coalitions, public goods 
provision is more likely, but even so, tax burdens will tend to be lower.   
Democracy as particularism 
Several works have noted that democracy can function through the reciprocal exchange of 
public services for votes.  I describe these insights here, and use them to develop a theory of 
democracy as reciprocal, particularistic exchange between voters and politicians. 
In general, scholars of particularism argue that, under some conditions, public services are 
used to reward loyal supporters in a process of clientelism or particularism.  In essence, 
politicians and supporters engage in a process of reciprocal exchange, in which voters support 
particular elected officials in return for tangible rewards such as government services, and in 
some places, denser particularistic links lead to greater provision of government services.  
Scholars in economics (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; McGuire and Olson 1996; Olson 1993), 
comparative politics (Arriola 2009; Clarke and Stone 2007), international relations (Ansell 2008; 
Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003), and American politics (Trounstine 
2008a) have all made arguments which capture some component of this dynamic.   
McGuire and Olson (1996), Ansell (2008), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), for example, 
argue that democratic governments primarily assume power by buying the support of masses 
through redistributive policies.  Olson (1993) notes specifically that democratic leaders improve 
their chances by promoting the rule of law and incentives for production, but that strong 
incentives for particularistic redistributive policies also exist (p. 571). 
These arguments are also consistent with research on municipal politics in the United States 
by Trounstine (2008; 2010) and co-authors.  These scholars have noted that political leaders such 
as mayors and city managers will often build political machines or other organizations which 
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exchange voter support for tangible government benefits.  Such exchange can sometimes result 
in broadly beneficial government services—public goods provision—but can also be used to 
limit accountability and increase the private benefits of office over time (Hajnal and Trounstine 
2005; Trounstine 2008;  2010). 
Similarly, scholars of US congressional politics argue that reelection-seeking politicians 
often use their positions of influence in congress to bring benefits to their geographic districts, in 
an effort to secure re-election.  In effect, these scholars assume that politicians exchange 
government spending for political support, although there has been substantial debate over the 
effectiveness of these efforts (Anagnoson 1982; Ashworth 1981; S. K. Bailey and Samuel 1965; 
Barry 1990; Carson and Jenkins 2010; Collie 1988; Fiorina 1981; Lee 2004; Mayhew 1974; Ray 
1980; Rundquist and Griffith 1976; Stein and Bickers 1995; Weingast and Shepsle 1981).  A 
number of scholars have argued that, within districts at the national or state levels, expenditures 
tend to be targeted to benefit powerful interest groups or important electoral supporters (Atlas, 
Gilligan, Hendershott, and Zupan 1995; Stein and Bickers 1995).  However, some scholars have 
also noted that more competitive swing districts tend to be the ones which receive greater 
expenditures (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Herron and Theodos 2004; Stein and Bickers 
1995), and these results have been supported by similar findings abroad (Nooruddin and 
Chhibber 2008; Kwon 2005).  In addition, scholars have noted the advantage of majority party 
status in the receipt of national transfer funds and programs (Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, and 
Sigelman 2002). 
Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) suggest that “winning coalition 
sizes” in democratic regimes are mostly the result of electoral rules which tend to generate 
smaller or larger winning coalitions.  However, they also posit that winning coalitions in 
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transitional and authoritarian regimes are generated through time- and place-specific processes 
which invest some individuals with much more authority than others, perhaps because those 
individuals control important economic resources or police or military force.  There are reasons 
to believe that similar, idiosyncratic processes are at work, not only in transitional or 
authoritarian states, but in states with frequent, transparent elections and many of the trappings of 
full-fledged democracy.  Such an argument is consistent with Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s 
argument, and appears appropriate, based on observation, for the way local democracy seems to 
work in Peru and many other settings.   
One such example is documented by Joshi and Mason (2011), who provide strong evidence 
that land-tenure patterns, not formal electoral rules, promote different levels of public goods 
spending in Nepali electoral districts.  These scholars argue that districts where smallholders are 
more common experience greater public goods provision, while districts with more tenant 
farmers experience less.  In districts with more tenant farmers, landlords—who can use their 
authority over tenant farmers to promote a particular electoral outcome—reap the benefits of 
elections through government provision of private goods without sharing those benefits with 
their tenants.  In effect, land tenure rules narrow or widen winning coalition sizes, leading to 
differing levels of public goods provision.  In many Peruvian municipalities, politics also seem to 
resemble such clientelistic dynamics.  
Peru and particularism 
Other scholars have suggested that clientelism-like practices are more likely in certain kinds 
of settings—often, settings that are characteristic of Peru. 
A number of scholars have suggested that certain types of cultural settings are more 
amenable to clientelism-like behaviors.  In particular, clientelism is likely in settings where gift-
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giving is an important culturally-grounded practice (Scheiner 2007; Hicken 2007a; Schaffer and 
Schedler 2007; Schaffer 2007).  Gift-giving, and particularly reciprocal exchange is an important 
part of Peruvian indigenous culture, especially Andean culture (Quechua and Aymara culture), 
where labor exchange plays an important social and political role. 
Likewise, Peru is a likely setting for clientelistic practices because of other, political 
characteristics.  Peru may be the Latin American country with the weakest political parties, even 
at the national level, and parties in Peru are more pragmatic, personality-based, and non-
ideological than they are at the national level.  Though it is not clear whether clientelism leads to 
weak parties or weak parties make clientelistic practices more likely, weak parties also tend to be 
associated with clientelism in the literature (Desposato 2007; Hicken 2007a;  2007b).  Some 
scholars argue that clientelism tends to weaken programmatic appeals by parties, leading to weak 
parties (Desposato 2007), while others argue that institutions which promote weak parties and 
the nature of parties themselves tends to promote personalistic appeals—and particularism—by 
politicians who benefit by developing a personal, rather than a party-based reputation (Hicken 
2007b;  2007a). 
A number of works have also argued that clientelism is likely where either (a) poverty is 
relatively common, or (b) poverty is widespread and inequality is high.  Poverty may make 
clientelism more likely because the particularistic provision of excludable goods to the poor 
(private or club goods) is relatively less expensive than the particularistic provision of goods to 
the middle class or the wealthy.  These effects are undesirable because clientelistic exchange 
tends to lead to the over-provision of excludable goods and the under-provision of public goods 
to needy populations (Hicken 2007a; Schaffer and Schedler 2007; Stokes 2007).  
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Toward a Theory of Particularism 
Existing theory on democracy and public goods provision fails to explain patterns of 
government service provision in Peru.  Here, order to address these weaknesses, I present a 
revised theory of the particularistic provision of government services under democracy.  This 
approach is based on the general idea that politicians build coalitions of supporters based on 
reciprocal relationships in which politicians provide government services to supporters in 
exchange for their political support.  Unlike existing theory, I argue that the both the degree of 
particularistic exchange and the level of support for victorious politicians depends on underlying 
networks of reciprocal exchange, rather than electoral rules alone. 
Weaknesses of Existing Theory—Qualitative Evidence and New Theory 
Qualitative evidence suggests that theory by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Lake and 
Baum (2001), Olson (1993), and McGuire and Olson (1996) capture many elements of 
democratic governance in developing-country, transitional settings.  However, certain elements 
of these theoretical approaches are not consistent with qualitative evidence on the relationship 
between democratic politics and government service provision, at least in the specific setting 
observed here.  To the extent that these are intended as general theories of public goods 
provision, the analysis and observations suggest that these theories are incomplete.   
First, one implication of Lake and Baum (2001) is that government service provision will be 
greater where elections are more frequent.  However, the substantial variation observable in 
Peruvian local government service provision cannot be traced to the frequency of elections, as all 
Peruvian municipalities hold elections at the same time, in four-year intervals. 
A second implication of Lake and Baum (2001) may be that more competitive elections—
elections where margins of victory are narrower—may promote greater government service 
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provision, as elected officials seek reelection by purchasing the support of voters through service 
provision.  For much of their four-year term, however, the strength of possible competitors will 
be difficult to anticipate for mayoral incumbents, because mayoral campaigning only takes place 
in the few months prior to each election.  Frequently, opposition parties are only formed and 
nominate candidates months prior to local elections.  It would be difficult, therefore, for the 
degree of electoral competitiveness, or the margin of victory in past elections, to play a role in 
promoting government service provision through the majority of a mayor’s term. 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that in democratic systems, winning coalition size—
the minimum number of supporters needed for electoral victory—can explain much variation in 
public goods provision.  This winning coalition size is itself determined by electoral rules.  
However, as all Peruvian local elections follow identical rules, electoral rules do not explain 
variation across Peruvian municipalities.  Further, Peruvian electoral rules create a situation 
where it is very difficult for mayoral candidates to anticipate the optimum coalition size for 
victory in a given election; Minimum winning coalition size (where defined as at least one vote 
greater than the vote percentage received by the first runner up) varies substantially across 
municipalities, from just over 1% of the local vote, to just under 50%, with most municipalities 
spread through a broad range, from 15% to 35%.  Further, minimum winning coalition size 
(according to this definition) is barely correlated within municipalities from one election to the 
next—for example, the correlation between the vote share of first runner-ups in 2002 and 2006 is 
about .05, and the correlation between winners’ vote shares is about .06.    
The implausibility of the minimum winning coalition approach in the Peruvian setting is 
matched by an absence of empirical evidence in the setting for which the approach originated.  
Specifically, Riker (1962) presented a theory of US congressional budget-making that argued 
47 
that minimal winning coalitions should pass budgets beneficial to as few members as possible.  
Although some scholars have found a partisan advantage in US congressional budgeting (Balla, 
Lawrence, Maltzman, and Sigelman 2002), and evidence that incumbent parties target swing 
districts for greater expenditures (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Herron and Theodos 2004; 
Kwon 2005), there is little empirical evidence for the minimal winning coalition approach.  
Instead, scholars have found that, in US politics, at least, appropriations generally benefit far 
larger numbers of legislators than implied by Riker’s theory.  Indeed, coalitions are often very 
large, and frequently include every conceivable legislator with a stake in a given program 
(Arnold 1979; Barry 1990; Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Fenno 1966; Ferejohn 1987;  1974; 
Lowi 1964; Maass and Ickes 1951; Schattschneider 1935; Weingast 1979; Weingast and Shepsle 
1981). 
At least two approaches have attempted to explain this apparent anomaly.  One approach 
argues that a norm of fairness makes minimal winning coalitions unlikely, except where the costs 
of a “fair” outcome are very high to individual committee members (Miller and Oppenheimer 
1982).  A related approach, based on rational choice modeling, argues that super-sized coalitions 
and fairness norms appear because individual legislators are willing to take a somewhat lower 
payoff in order to be assured that they will receive some benefits from an eventual budget deal 
(Weingast and Shepsle 1981; Weingast 1979).   
Finally, examination of most “public goods” at the micro-level makes it clear that few of the 
government services considered “public” by political economists are truly non-excludable.   
Education services are illustrative.  Although some benefits of education spill over onto other 
citizens, most of the benefits created by education are felt by the students themselves.  The 
presence of a system of private education in most places around the world is evidence that there 
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are substantial excludable benefits to education that students and their families are willing to pay 
for.  Other so-called “public goods” which provide benefits which are mostly excludable include 
health services, social welfare services (what can be more excludable than a pension payment?) 
and transportation expenditures, which can be targeted easily at particular ethnic groups, 
villages, and even families or individuals in some cases.   
The strategic logic of particularistic voting 
To remedy weaknesses with existing theory, I first emphasize the role of exclusion in 
electoral competition.  Existing theory notes that constituencies are, in effect, bought by one 
political faction or another by promising and providing government benefits.  I argue, however, 
that the exclusion of constituents from the benefits of government services is also an important 
tool in the ambitious politician’s toolbox.   
In democratic systems, voters face choices between multiple candidates, and seek to use their 
support (both their vote and other types of support) as a tool to bring benefits to themselves, their 
families, and their communities.  They choose between candidates who make campaign 
promises, and who have some reputation.  This reputation helps voters estimate the probability 
that individual candidates will follow through on their campaign promises.  
In particularistic systems, voters also use their vote so as to avoid being punished by 
particularistic candidates who would exclude them, their families, their village, or their ethnic 
group from benefits if they (voters) do not support the victorious candidate. 
Some candidates may promise to carry out policies which will bring substantial benefits to 
most of the local population, either directly or through spillovers.  For example, candidates may 
promise to build health clinics, construct potable water and sewage infrastructure, and build 
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roads throughout the jurisdiction in a way which will benefit most local residents.  If such a 
candidate wins, most or all residents will benefit. 
Other candidates, however, may promise to provide services which will be privately 
beneficial to the individuals to whom these services are targeted, including specific villages, 
families, ethnic groups, or individuals.   
In the presence of well-functioning democratic institutions, like transparent elections where 
ballots are truly secret, voters will tend to support candidates who they believe will benefit their 
(the voters) village, family, or the voter, personally.  Under these conditions, Lake and Baum’s 
(2001) and Bueno de Mesquita’s (2003) theories are likely to produce accurate predictions.  That 
is, where larger numbers of voters are needed to elect and re-elect candidates, voters will 
strategically vote candidates, promising broad benefits and candidates will be more likely to 
promise broadly-beneficial policies.  This is because, although voters might individually prefer 
the election of some private goods-promising candidate, they will recognize that candidates who 
run on platforms of broadly-based goods provision are more likely to win, and will therefore 
choose the best candidate among likely winners.   
As noted by Lyne (2007), where particularistic networks can subvert the functioning of 
democratic institutions, voters’ strategic calculations will be somewhat different.  Voters’ 
decisions regarding the choice of a candidate promising narrowly-targeted or broadly-beneficial 
policies form a collective action problem.   
Under particularism, benefits the voter receives from the election of a particular candidate are 
dependent both on the actions of the electorate as a whole, and on his or her own actions.  Given 
the choice between candidates promising narrowly-targeted and broadly-beneficial services, the 
voter faces a strong incentive to vote for the candidate promising narrowly-targeted goods, for 
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the following reasons.  If the electorate chooses the public goods-promising candidate, each 
voters’ payoffs will not vary with their own vote choice.  However, if the electorate selects the 
candidate promising narrowly-beneficial policies targeting groups of supporters, who can 
determine (through corrupt, particularistic networks) approximately who voted for him or her, 
each voters’ payoff will depend on whether or not he voted for the victor.  If not, he or she 
receives no benefits, and may even be penalized.  On the other hand, if he or she did vote for the 
victor, his or her payoff is some arbitrary payoff from targeted goods provision.  Because, in 
most circumstances, targeted goods provision is probably better than nothing at all (or even 
punishment) and because voters’ choice will not affect his or her payoff if the electorate selects a 
candidate promising broadly-beneficial services, he or she faces a strong incentive to vote for the 
promiser of narrowly-targeted benefits.   
In effect, voters face a prisoners’ dilemma where they may be better off, on average, if they 
elect a public goods-promising or broad benefit-distributing candidate, but each individual voter 
faces a strong incentive to vote for a particularistic benefit-promising candidate, in order to avoid 
the punishment associated with backing a losing candidate in the face of a particularistic 
candidate’s victory.   
These incentives vary substantially from those faced by a voter in an election with a secret 
ballot, where his or her own payoff is dependent on his or her actions only to the extent that it 
helps to determine the victor, and voters will not be punished for backing a losing candidate. 
Therefore, in the presence of mechanisms by which politicians can determine the vote of 
individuals, families, or villages, politicians have strong incentives to promise narrowly 
beneficial goods, and voters have much stronger incentives to vote for politicians promising 
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targeted benefits than they would in the presence of a secret ballot system.  The result is the 
perpetuation of particularistic systems of governance.   
A number of scholars have noted that politicians’ ability to ensure voter compliance with 
promises made in the course of particularistic exchange—which Stokes refers to as “perverse 
accountability” is the key problem associated with particularistic exchange.  In a situation with a 
secret ballot (such as in Peru and in most democratic settings around the world), politicians can 
extract promises of support from voters, only to have them vote for another candidate in the 
voting booth.  Therefore, politicians develop intricate and well-developed systems for ensuring 
voter compliance (Cleary and Stokes 2006; Lehoucq 2007; Stokes 2005;  2007; Medina and 
Stokes 2007).  In particular, politicians often rely on local intermediaries who are embedded in 
local communities, and who ensure voter compliance through their location in local social 
networks, and sometimes through unsavory practices such as intimidation and violence (Cleary 
and Stokes 2006; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007c; Lehoucq 2007; Stokes 2005;  2007; C.-S. 
Wang and Kurzman 2007). 
Of course, Peruvian elections are designed with a secret ballot.  However, in many places—
perhaps most places—politicians can use similar practices to determine the degree of support 
they hold at a relatively low level of aggregation.  Electoral returns are reported by party at the 
district level, which often includes only several hundred voters, and even in larger places, local 
networks of supporters, and visible demonstrations of voters’ support for different candidates, 
are used to gather information regarding the level of support politicians and their parties hold 
among different villages, or families.  Indeed, voters often willingly demonstrate their support 
for a particular candidate by painting the name and emblem of a given party on their home or 
property, or by permitting others to do so, even in sparsely populated rural settings where it is 
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implausible that such a demonstration of loyalty could sway the opinions of other voters.  
Scholars have extensively documented the operation of these mechanisms for “reverse 
accountability”. 
However, because such observations can be explained in other ways, I test the notion—
suggested by Hicken (2007)—that particularistic exchange is more common in settings where 
politicians can more easily gather information on individual voters’ electoral choices.  
Specifically, in municipalities with large populations (and some Peruvian municipalities have 
over 100,000 residents), it will be difficult and costly for elected politicians to learn who voted 
for them and who voted against, and to consequently direct policy benefits towards supporters 
and away from opponents.  On the other hand, in small municipalities (perhaps with only a few 
hundred residents), it will often be relatively easy for politicians to learn how individuals, 
families, neighborhoods, or villages voted.  In these settings, clientelistic practices rewarding 
supporters and punishing opponents should be much more common.  I test these ideas in chapter 
three, and find strong support for the notion that clientelistic exchange is common in relatively 
small municipalities, and becomes less common the larger the municipal population gets.   
The role of exclusion—competition may promote particularism 
Lake and Baum (2001) and Baum and Lake (2003) argue that in more “democratic” 
settings—where elections are more frequent, and the real possibility for electoral competition 
exists—governments are less able to behave as monopolists, and are able to extract fewer 
monopoly rents.  Qualitative observations of Peruvian local governments seem to confirm that in 
such settings, where competition is real, and where politics are not dominated by a small clique 
of powerful individuals or a particular village, family, or ethnic group, governments are able to 
extract fewer monopoly rents.   
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Frequent, transparent electoral competition, however, seems to be a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the reduction of monopoly rents.  This is because in many places, 
elections and electioneering promote, rather than prevent personalistic exchange.  In other words, 
democratic office-seeking actively promotes the provision of private benefits to small, victorious 
coalitions of supporters.  Where office is won buy buying the loyalty of a small group of 
supporters, it is good politics to prevent those individuals from defecting from the coalition by 
providing them with valuable benefits, often through the highly exclusive provision of benefits 
through graft, and the provision of private goods and services.  This argument is consistent with 
findings by a number of scholars of clientelism, who argue (contra Lake and Baum) that electoral 
competition is likely to promote, rather than prevent clientelistic practices where polities are poor 
and culture is clientelism-acceptant (Chandra 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b; Krishna 
2007b; Lyne 2007; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Scheiner 2007; Wilkinson 
2007). 
Indeed, there is little evidence, at least in the Peruvian context, to suggest that public goods 
which cannot be easily targeted at important constituencies respond to either electoral 
competition or mayors’ supporting coalition sizes (as determined by vote share).  As an example, 
environmental regulation—which probably more closely approximates a pure public good than 
any other policy area which can be measured using standard indicators of government policy 
such as expenditures, staffing decisions, or number of actions, is an almost insubstantial 
component of most Peruvian government budgets and an insubstantial share of most 
governments’ activities.  According to the same government dataset which I use in regression 
models presented in chapters three, four, five, and six (RENAMU) over 64% of all Peruvian 
municipalities have no environmental policy at all, and less than 1% have developed the full 
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range of environmental institutions recommended by the Peruvian central government.  Further, 
more than half of all municipalities have no mechanism through which citizens can even register 
environmental complaints.  These are strong indicators that, non-excludable policy is simply not 
a priority amongst Peruvian local governments.  This despite the observation that a majority of 
municipalities report problems with unsanitary drinking water, soil erosion, solid and liquid 
waste management, and other environmental problems which have a tangible impact on local 
residents’ standard of living. 
Winning coalition size vs. supporting coalition size 
According to Olson (1993), Olson and McGuire (1996), and Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003), 
a leader’s proclivity for the provision of public or private goods is a result of his or her “winning 
coalition” (and sometimes, his or her “minimal winning coalition”).  This winning coalition is 
the smallest set of individuals needed to keep a leader in office, and in democratic settings, is 
itself determined by electoral rules.  Where winning coalitions are large, politicians will be more 
inclined to provide public goods, and where they are small, private goods provision is more 
likely. 
Qualitative observations suggest, however, that neither winning coalition size nor electoral 
rules are an important determinant of variation in government service provision across Peruvian 
municipal governments, as well as in many other settings.  This is because (a) electoral rules do 
not vary across municipalities, but government service provision does vary, and (b) although 
supporting coalition size does fluctuate significantly across time and across municipalities, it is 
difficult for incumbents to anticipate their minimal winning coalition size in the next election, 
given the great variation in opposition support and number of parties observable in Peruvian 
municipalities.   
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A more likely explanation—one which is more consistent with qualitative observation—is 
that particularistic networks determine, to a significant extent, the size of politicians’ supporting 
coalitions (not minimal winning coalitions) and are also responsible for patterns of government 
service provision.   
At the local level in Peru (as well as in many other settings), the degree of electoral support a 
candidate receives is the result of his or her ability to credibly promise government benefits to 
particular groups or individuals, as a result of social, kinship, party, union, and-or 
geographically-based networks.  Individuals in a given group make electoral choices, in part, as a 
result of their membership in different groups to whom politicians have promised particular 
benefits, and their assessment of the credibility of those promises.   
The sizes of the groups to which political candidates have successfully appealed helps to 
determine the level of support received by those candidates in elections.  For example, if 
politicians in rural, Andean municipalities can successfully convince rural peasants that they will 
provide desirable government services to rural areas, those politicians will receive a high degree 
of electoral support, because these municipalities’ populations are mostly rural peasants.  If they 
can only convince the urban wealthy class that they will provide desired public services in the 
urban core of the municipality, they will receive relatively less electoral support. 
In turn, the extent to which politicians can credibly commit to provide services to a given 
group of voters depends, to a significant extent, on their reputation with different groups, and 
their place within informal institutional networks, such as village committees, kinship networks, 
and union organizations.  Where these informal institutions make it possible for voters to hold 
politicians accountable for their actions through or outside of elections, the promises of 
candidates are more likely to be seen as credible.   
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Of course, once a politician has served in office, their performance as a politician depends, to 
a substantial extent, on their reputation as an incumbent.  If an incumbent does a good job of 
providing needed services, as promised in electoral campaigns, he or she will develop a good 
reputation with a range of voters’ groups.  However, if an incumbent develops a reputation for 
breaking campaign promises to different groups, his or her promises will be viewed less 
favorably in the succeeding campaign for re-election, both amongst the groups which elected 
him to office, and among other local groups.   
This theory, therefore, generates predictions which are somewhat different from those of 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003): 
Politicians’ decisions to provide different types and amounts of government services are 
related to the size of the particularistic networks which support them, not only the electoral rules 
with which they are elected.  This implications lead to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Where mayors’ supporting coalitions are larger, spending on government services will 
also be larger. 
In short, if Lake and Baum’s (2001) account is complete, government spending on public 
services should respond primarily to (a) the frequency of elections, (b) the presence of elections, 
and/or (c) the degree of electoral competition between various parties or factions among 
municipal governments.   On the other hand, if Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) explanation for 
variation in government service provision is accurate, government spending on public services 
should respond to either (a) the nature of electoral rules (and the size of the minimum winning 
coalitions they construct), or (b) the time- and place-specific winning coalition, which is one vote 
more than the vote share of the victor’s nearest opponent.  However, if government service 
provision is primarily intended to buy and maintain the loyalty of particular voters or groups of 
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voters, and to punish non-supporters, spending will increase as politicians’ numbers of 
supporters also increase.  As neither the frequency nor the presence of elections varies across 
Peruvian municipalities, nor the nature of electoral rules, these factors cannot explain variation in 
Peruvian municipal spending and service provision.  Therefore, I test the effect of the degree of 
electoral competition, the time- and place-specific minimal winning coalition size, and the size 
of politicians’ supporting coalitions of voters for their relationship with municipal spending (and 
therefore, service provision).  
Above, in “the strategic logic of particularistic voting,” I note that the level of aggregation at 
which politicians can easily gather information may have an impact on the degree of 
particularism present.  Specifically, where politicians can more easily gather information about 
their degree of support among voters at lower levels of aggregation, particularistic policy is more 
likely.  This suggests that particularism will be more common in small municipalities, leading to 
the following hypothesis: 
H3: The relationship between supporting coalition size and government service spending will 
be more strongly positive where jurisdictional population is smaller. 
These hypotheses are consistent with observations of the US Congressional appropriations 
process.  Weingast (1979) and Weingast and Shepsle’s (1981) theory of super-sized coalition 
voting in congressional budgeting suggests that politicians may pursue coalitions which are 
much larger than minimum winning coalition-size, as a way to reduce uncertainty.  These 
scholars argue that legislators form super-sized coalitions in budget negotiations, in order to 
reduce the probability that an eventual budget deal will exclude them entirely.  Likewise, 
Peruvian politicians may pursue very large coalitions in order to reduce the probability that a 
future coalition of voters will unseat them.  In addition, voters will prefer to join extra large 
58 
coalitions as a way to reduce the chance that they will be excluded entirely from the provision of 
toll goods.  These implications lead to the following hypothesis: 
H4: Supporting coalition size will influence spending levels at high levels (above majority 
size) as well as low levels. 
Conclusion 
Having developed a theory of democracy and government service provision through 
particularistic exchange, I next turn to a series of empirical tests of the hypotheses presented 
here.  In chapter three, I present tests of hypotheses 1 through 4, before turning to an examination 
of several factors—in chapters four through six—of factors which may mitigate or exacerbate 
existing tendencies towards particularism, including opposition strength, civil society density, 
and economic inequality.   
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Does Democracy Operate Through Competition or Particularism?  
Chapter 3 
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Introduction: Competition or Clientelism? 
Here, I test two prominent theories of democracy against the newly-developed theory of 
particularism presented in chapter 2.  To do so, I use qualitative observations from approximately 
one year of in-depth fieldwork, and statistical data analysis using a cross-sectional dataset of 
public spending and electoral data from approximately 1600 municipal governments in Peru.  
Based on the evidence presented here, the theory of particularistic exchange appears to be most 
consistent with evidence.   
The analysis presented here goes beyond existing research by examining the causes of public 
goods provision within the population of democratic polities, rather than focusing on the 
differences between democracies or authoritarian regimes.  In addition, I test an explanation for 
variation in public goods provision that identifies a new mechanism—particularism—which 
causes substantial variation in government service provision in settings which are institutionally 
identical.   
I argue, like Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) that much—perhaps 
most—public service provision is a result of a process referred to variously as constituent 
service, interest group politics, pork barrel politics, patronage, cronyism, particularism, or 
clientelism.  In this process, voters supply elected politicians with political support and in return, 
politicians provide tangible benefits such as government services.  Unlike other scholars, 
however, I identify how informal networks of particularistic exchange, not formal electoral 
mechanisms or the degree of electoral competitiveness, drive much of the variation in 
government service provision.    
I use data on Peruvian local governments because they are a critical case for the explanation 
of particularistic exchange.  There are two reasons for this.  First, particularism is particularly 
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likely in Peruvian local policy because, although transparent and frequent, Peruvian local 
elections, which tend to involve many parties and therefore, victories by relatively small 
minorities, tend to create governments controlled by a small clique.  In addition, because of 
engineered disproportionality in the Peruvian municipal council system, opposition factions are 
mostly unable, because of the formal rules of the game, to check mayoral authority.  Rarely do 
democratic systems generate this combination of strong governments with only weak electoral 
support and also weak checks and balances.  Because checks and balances—as demonstrated in 
chapter three—are likely to reduce clientelistic exchange, and because particularism will be most 
visible where a small minority controls a political jurisdiction, if the presence of particularism is 
not visible in Peru, it is unlikely to be measurable anywhere else.  In essence, this rare 
combination of institutions permits the examination of particularism in a way which is not 
possible with other samples.   
This chapter is structured as follows: The next section is a review of the literature on 
democracy and public goods provision.  The third section presents qualitative evidence that 
suggests that particularistic exchange may be an important driver of public service provision in 
Peru and other democracies.  The fourth section outlines a new theory of particularistic exchange 
and how it interacts with formal electoral mechanisms in promoting government service 
provision.  Next comes some background on local governance in Peru, and an explanation why 
Peruvian local governance is a critical case for the study of particularism.  Sixth is a description 
of my empirical approach, including qualitative and quantitative data and methodology.  In the 
seventh and eighth sections, results are presented then discussed.  Finally, conclusions and 
implications are explored in the final section.  
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Quantitative Methodology and Data 
Here, I use several under-utilized public data sources on Peruvian municipal governments 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and generalized linear modeling techniques to test 
the contending hypotheses presented above. The 2008 Peruvian Registry of Municipalities 
(RENAMU), the 2007 Peruvian Census, and electoral data from the Peruvian National Office of 
Electoral Processes are the key data sources used in the analysis presented here, and I use OLS 
and extradispersed poisson regression to test the effects of particularistic vote exchange against 
the effects of electoral competition.  I perform several postestimation tests and robustness checks 
to demonstrate the robustness of my results, including re-estimation of these models with 
alternative estimation techniques such as negative binomial regression.     
Data 
The dependent variables used here as proxy measures for government service provision 
include  spending on infrastructure development per capita—spending on construction projects 
completed in 2007—in several categories which are often treated as public goods.  These include 
(a) transportation, (b) education, (c) and a summed total of spending on water, electrification, 
and sewage projects8.  I also use the summed total of all of these categories as a dependent 
variable, and also the summed total of all project spending, which includes two additional 
categories—tourism projects, and “other”.  On this set of dependent variables, I use both 
generalized linear models (extradispersed poisson reported here) and OLS regression using a 
logged variant of the variable.  This data was gathered in the 2008 Peruvian Registry of 
Municipalities by the Peruvian National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) and is 
                                                
8 The summed total of water, sewage, and electrification infrastructure project spending is, unfortunately, the way 
this data is provided by the Peruvian government, though I would of course prefer to use indicators of each of these 
three areas. 
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available for about 1600 municipalities in each category.  I also use data on each of these 
spending categories in 2005 as a control.   
I use measures of expenditures on completed new construction to examine the effects of 
particularism on government service provision. The relationship between particularism and 
construction spending is well documented (Samuels 2001a; 2001b), and construction or capital 
expenditures have been used as a proxy for clientelism by a large number of studies (Hicken 
2010).  Although the use of capital spending as a proxy for clientelism has its weaknesses, I do 
not argue here that capital spending itself is a measure of clientelism, only that capital spending 
should respond to supporting coalition size where clientelism or particularistic exchange is an 
important mechanism driving spending policy.   
New construction is also a good measure of infrastructure development, which is sorely 
needed throughout Peru, to promote economic development and improved standards of living 
(Ahmad and García-Escribano 2006;  2008; Calderón and Servén 2004; Crabtree 2010; Estado 
and Locales 2006; Zas Friz Burga 2009; Giugale, Retes-Cibils, and Newman 2007; Hordijk 
2005; IPE 2003; N. Jones, Vargas, and Villar 2007; Palacios 2009; World Bank 2003; World 
Economic Forum 2005; World Resources Institute 2003).   
In addition, I present regression results for several statistical models in which the dependent 
variables are total spending (current and capital expenditures) in several categories for 2007.  
This data is less comprehensive—data is only available for about 730 district-level municipalities 
(out of 1599), but the included municipalities are substantial in that they include nearly 80% of 
the Peruvian population, and so are an important sample in and of themselves.  Results using 
these variables generally support the results of the project spending/infrastructure development 
spending regression models.   This second set of dependent variables is available from the 
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Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finances.  Total spending and size of the public sector is also 
a common proxy measure used in the analysis of clientelism (Hicken 2010).   
My key independent variables—my proxies for electoral competitiveness and winning 
coalition size—are both derived from electoral data gathered by the Peruvian National Office of 
Electoral Processes.   
To test the effect of particularistic exchange, I use a measure of supporting coalition size.  
Because of the nature of Peruvian electoral rules (described above, in “Public Goods Provision in 
Peru”), the supporting  coalition size in each municipality is simply the percentage of the total 
vote received by the victorious party, since that party receives the mayoral seat as well as a 
majority in the municipal council.  Therefore, the supporting coalition is a coalition of voters, 
families, or villages, but is not a coalition of multiple parties.   
To test the effect of electoral competition, I generate the following measure.  First, I take the 
vote share (pct.) received by the first runner-up party.  I then subtract the percentage of the vote 
received by the victorious party from that value, resulting in a variable which ranges from -1 to 
0, where higher values represent greater (closer) competition between parties, and where lower 
values (closer to -1) indicate that one party received a substantial share of the vote compared to 
all its competitors and therefore faces very weak competition.  I also test a second measure of 
competition, which is the number of parties competing in the most recent electoral race.  This 
measure has no statistically significant relationship with the dependent variables.  Other 
measures of competition, such as the frequency or presence of elections are constant across all 
municipalities.    
One potential problem with the use of these two independent variables in the same statistical 
model is that they are quite highly correlated (r=-.72).  This is because the two measures are 
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generated from the same process—local elections.  Regardless of whether the variables are 
included in regression models alone or together, however, my findings provide strong support for 
hypothesis 2 (the “particularistic exchange” hypothesis) and only weak support for hypothesis 1 
(the “electoral competition” hypothesis).  To demonstrate the robustness of these findings, I 
show results of regressions with the variables included separately and together. 
In the statistical models in which I test the effect of community size on particularistic 
exchange, I also assemble an interaction term which is population * supporting coalition size.  
This interaction term tests the extent to which the effect of supporting coalition size varies across 
municipalities of larger and smaller sizes. 
In addition to the independent variables of interest described above, I use several control 
variables in the models presented here   
First, I include several variables made available through INEI which were generated based on 
the 2007 Peruvian census, including the average level of education in each municipality, 
population (logged), urban population (logged), and a consumption measure.  The consumption 
measure is designed to provide a measure of standards of living where many citizens, 
particularly in rural areas, do not participate in the cash economy with any intensity, and is 
derived from a series of standard Peruvian Government (INEI) poverty indicators.  This is a 
count of the average number of household appliances—radio, television, washer/dryer, 
refrigerator, sound equipment—owned by families in the municipality.  This control variable is 
particularly important, as a number of scholars have argued that economic development is an 
important driver of clientelism (Hale 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b; Lyne 2007; van de 
Walle 2007).   
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I also include several control variables from RENAMU data.  Where the dependent variable 
is construction project spending, I include the percentage of funding in each policy area which 
was funded with private donations.  This is meant to address concerns that private donors might 
use funding to influence municipal priorities.  Because there is not conditionality placed on 
transfers from regional or national governments, there is no need to include a similar measure for 
government project transfers in each area.  In addition, I use RENAMU data to control for debt 
service (pct. of total municipal budget) and total municipal budget size (total income, logged).  
Finally, I also control for prior levels of spending (during the prior mayoral term), in order to 
capture unobserved path dependence and demand for municipal services.  I also test several 
models (excluded here for purposes of space) which control for a number of other proxies for 
demand for government services, including the percentage of local residences in rural areas, and 
percentage of homes with inside water, sewage, and electricity service.  None of these variables 
substantially alter the direction or significance of the relationships presented here.   
Methods 
Where the dependent variable is total spending on projects completed in 2007, I have used 
extradispersed poisson regression.  This is one appropriate estimation strategy for a dependent 
variable which follows an extradispersed poisson distribution, and where the dependent variable 
contains many 0s, such that it cannot be transformed to normality without generating large 
numbers of missing cases (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Hoffman 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2008).  Typically, poisson models are used with dependent variables which represent 
counts or proportions.  However, poisson models assume a dependent variable with equal mean 
and variance (Hoffman 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).  Such is not the case here; there 
is significant evidence of overdispersion.  Therefore, I use extradispersed poisson models, which 
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is one appropriate strategy for data distributed like this.  The technique displayed here is square-
root of the deviance-based standard error adjustment with iterated, reweighted least squares 
optimization, but I also test these models with several other appropriate estimation techniques, 
including zero-inflated poisson, negative binomial, heteroskedasticity-robust negative binomial, 
and alternative extradispersed poisson approaches and find that my findings are robust to 
changes in estimation strategy.  I choose to show extradispersed poisson results here because 
scholars suggest that it is inappropriate to use most typical robustness checks on negative 
binomial regression (Hoffman 2004).  I also use a logged version of the summed total of all 
project spending in an OLS regression model.   
A second set of models presented here uses the logged total spending per capita (per local 
resident) in a number of policy areas.  These include administration, agriculture, education, 
energy and mining, industry, fishing, social welfare spending, health and sanitation, 
transportation, urban development and housing, total spending, and total spending in areas 
normally considered “public goods” (health and sanitation, education, social welfare spending, 
and housing and urban development).  Where the dependent variable is one of these measures, 
the method used is a log-linear approach, where the dependent variable is logged, then OLS is 
used.   
In addition, I present the results of several robustness checks on both the OLS and 
extradispersed poisson models.   
I find that both theoretical approaches (particularism and electoral competition) have some 
explanatory power, but the particularistic exchange of goods and services seems to be more 
strongly and more consistently associated with spending outcomes.   
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A note on count data models 
Social science methodologists, including Political Scientists, have frequently prescribed 
generalized linear model estimation techniques for the analysis of count data (Afifi, Kotlerman, 
Ettner, and Cowan 2007; Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Hoffman 2004; King 1989; Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal 2008).  Such techniques include negative binomial regression, poisson and 
extradispersed poisson, and zero-inflated negative binomial and poisson techniques.  These 
techniques are appropriate when dependent variables have three primary characteristics.  First, 
values are censored at 0, second, values are integers only, and third, values are not distributed 
normally, instead being highly right skewed, similar to a chi-squared distribution (Cameron and 
Trivedi 1986;  1998; Hoffman 2004; King 1989; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) 
Scholars of political phenomena have used these techniques to study a range of topics, 
including terrorism and political violence (Kollias, Messis, Mylonidis, and Paleologou 2009; 
Danzell 2010; T. Y. Wang, Dixon, Muller, and Seligson 2011), congressional bill sponsorship 
(Kollias, Messis, Mylonidis, and Paleologou 2009), foreign direct investment (Kollias, Messis, 
Mylonidis, and Paleologou 2009), legislative productivity (W. D. Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, 
and Sinclair-chapman 2003; G. W. Cox and Terry 2008), the targeting of government 
expenditures (Rickard 2009) and a range of other topics (Boehmke 2005; Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy, 
and Aranson 2003; Holmes, De Piñeres, and Curtin 2007; Ingall and Crisp 2001; Neumayer 
2005; Schiller 2006).  In other social sciences, two of the most common uses of count data 
techniques include the study of economic innovation (R. Andersson, Quigley, and Wilhelmsson 
2009; Branstetter 2001) and the demand for health services (Ekman 2007; Shin 2006; Street, A. 
Jones, and Furuta 1999) 
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In political science, count data techniques have not often been used to study expenditures, 
because most expenditure data studied by political scientists can be logged to a normal 
distribution and analyzed using OLS regression (so-called log-linear techniques).  However, the 
project expenditure data used here contains a large number of zeros, which is data which would 
be lost if logged.  This is because a large number of municipalities completed no new 
construction of, for example, schools, health clinics, roads, or potable water systems in 2006.  
These zeros are meaningful, representing no investment in the production of these types of 
projects, and their exclusion may bias regression results.     
One area of the social sciences in which the analysis of similarly distributed expenditure data 
is common is health economics.  Health expenditures for a given individual, family, or 
jurisdiction are positively skewed, contain large numbers of zeros, and include only positive 
integers, just like the project data analyzed here.  In health economics, therefore, the use of count 
models (poisson, extradispersed poisson, negative binomial, and zero-inflated models) to study 
expenditures is very common (Barnett and Nurmagambetov 2011; Kamble and Bharmal 2009; 
Noro, Hakkinen, and Laitnen 1994; Wagstaff and Doorslaer 2011) 
Quantitative Results 
In general, the hypothesis tests presented here generate four important findings.  First, 
particularistic exchange—supporting coalition size—is more consistently associated with public 
goods provision than electoral competition, and is strongly and robustly associated with project  
spending, regardless of the controls introduced or the sample used.  Second, electoral 
competition has little explanatory power, even after controlling for supporting coalition size.  
Third, the relationship between supporting coalition size and government service spending is 
positive and significant in small communities, but disappears in large communities.  Finally,  
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Table 1:	  Supporting coalition and electoral competition	  
Extradispersed poisson regression with iterated reweighted least squares optimization and square 
root of variance adjustment for overdispersion 
 Transport Health Education 
Electrification, 
water, sewage 
All public 
goods 
3.865 30.900 3.696 1.869 4.986 Supporting coalition size 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.063)+ (0.000)*** 
0.728 13.546 0.251 -0.116 0.776 Electoral competition 
(0.387) (0.000)*** (0.759) (0.897) (0.271) 
0.023 3.057 -1.804 -2.750 -0.833 Consumption 
(0.887) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
-0.428 -1.722 -0.623 -0.352 -0.569 Education (mean) 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
-0.286 -2.606 -0.244 0.037 -0.313 Urban pop. (logged) 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)** (0.669) (0.000)*** 
-0.090 0.014 -0.111 -0.201 -0.086 Municipal budget (logged) 
(0.026)* (0.763) (0.008)** (0.000)*** (0.014)* 
-2.969 13.168 -22.796 -27.386 -13.003 Debt service (pct.) 
(0.201) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
0.393     Private transfers: transport 
(pct.) (0.361)     
0.000     2005 project spending/cap: 
transp. (0.001)**     
 2.572    Private transfers: health (pct.) 
 (0.101)    
 -0.087    2005 project spending/cap: 
health (pct.)  (0.000)***    
  -0.667   Private transfers: education 
(pct.)   (0.343)   
  0.001   2005 project spending/cap: 
education   (0.113)   
   0.097  Private transfers: electricity, 
sewage, and water (pct.)    (0.860)  
   0.001  2005 project spending/cap: 
electicity, sewage, and water    (0.116)  
    66.865 Private transfers: public goods 
(pct.)     (0.000)*** 
    0.000 2005 project spending/cap: 
public goods     (0.353) 
Constant 8.334 9.552 10.567 10.428 10.462 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 1370 1370 1370 1370 1605 
p values in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at .1% 
71 
supporting coalition size has a significant effect on government service spending at levels above 
50%, just as at lower levels.  Taken together, these results suggest that particularism is one key 
mechanism driving greater spending in democracies.   
Spending on projects, infrastructure, and new construction 
The most important set of models shown here are in table 1, showing the effect of supporting 
coalition size, after controlling for electoral competition.  These models demonstrate that the 
supporting coalition size variable is robust to the inclusion of the electoral competition variable 
in the model.  In all but one model (electrification, water, and sewage construction spending), the 
supporting coalition size variable remains significant at the .1% level in the expected direction, 
once the electoral competition variable is included in the model.  In one model (health 
construction spending), the competition variable is also significant in the expected direction, but 
it is not significant otherwise.   
Table 2 shows the effect of supporting coalition size on several categories of public works 
spending.  This dependent variable, again, is the amount of spending on new construction in each 
policy area.  For example, most transport spending is road construction, most of the education  
spending is new classroom construction, and most health spending here is the construction of 
new health clinics.  In these models, the effect of supporting coalition size on electrification, 
water, and sewage, transport, health, education, and all public goods new construction is positive  
and significant at the .1% level.  These results provide strong support for hypothesis 1, 
supporting a model of democracy based on the exchange of votes for tangible benefits—in short, 
a clientelist or particularist story. 
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Table 2: Supporting coalition size 
Extradispersed poisson regression with iterated reweighted least squares optimization and square root of 
variance adjustment for overdispersion 
 Transport Health Education 
Electrification, water, 
and sewage 
All public 
goods 
3.200 11.847 3.433 1.981 4.196 Supporting coalition 
size (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
0.033 2.496 -1.793 -2.753 -0.802 Consumption 
(0.840) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
-0.418 -1.433 -0.620 -0.353 -0.560 Education (mean) 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
-0.295 -2.204 -0.247 0.038 -0.324 Urban pop (logged) 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.659) (0.000)*** 
-0.090 0.054 -0.110 -0.201 -0.085 Municipal budget 
(logged) (0.027)* (0.309) (0.008)** (0.000)*** (0.015)* 
-2.992 8.026 -22.800 -27.374 -13.005 Debt service (pct.) 
(0.197) (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
0.394     Private transfers: 
transport (pct.) (0.359)     
0.000     2005 project 
spending/cap: transp. (0.000)***     
 0.816    Private transfers: health 
(pct.)  (0.640)    
 -0.080    2005 project 
spending/cap: health  (0.000)***    
  -0.668   Private transfers: 
education (pct.)   (0.342)   
  0.001   2005 project 
spending/cap: educ.   (0.117)   
   0.094  Private transfers: elect., 
sewage, and water (pct.)    (0.864)  
   0.001  2005 project 
spending/cap: elect. 
sewage, and water    (0.115)  
    67.286 Private transfers: public 
goods (pct.)     (0.000)*** 
    0.000 2005 project 
spending/cap: public 
goods     (0.336) 
Constant 8.494 13.470 10.625 10.404 10.669 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 1370 1370 1370 1370 1605 
p values in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at .1% 
In contrast, regression models which show the effects of electoral competition (table 3) do 
not provide strong support for hypothesis two.  Although electoral competition is significantly  
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Table 3: Electoral Competition 
Extradispersed poisson regression with iterated reweighted least squares optimization and square root of 
variance adjustment for overdispersion 	   Transport	   Health	   Education	   Electrification,	  water,	  and	  sewage	   All	  public	  goods	  -­‐2.265	   -­‐5.978	   -­‐2.543	   -­‐1.553	   -­‐2.967	  Electoral	  competition	  
(0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	  0.084	   1.826	   -­‐1.715	   -­‐2.712	   -­‐0.716	  Consumption	  	   (0.601)	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.001)**	  -­‐0.392	   -­‐1.244	   -­‐0.587	   -­‐0.331	   -­‐0.529	  Education	  (mean)	  
(0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	  -­‐0.341	   -­‐1.771	   -­‐0.294	   0.012	   -­‐0.389	  Urban	  pop.	  (logged)	  
(0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.890)	   (0.000)***	  -­‐0.094	   0.011	   -­‐0.112	   -­‐0.203	   -­‐0.093	  Municipal	  budget	  (logged)	   (0.022)*	   (0.838)	   (0.008)**	   (0.000)***	   (0.009)**	  -­‐3.131	   4.400	   -­‐23.093	   -­‐27.778	   -­‐13.343	  Debt	  service	  (pct.)	   (0.180)	   (0.116)	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	  0.443	   	   	   	   	  Private	  transfers:	  transport	  (pct.)	   (0.304)	   	   	   	   	  0.000	   	   	   	   	  2005	  project	  spending/cap:	  transp.	   (0.000)***	   	   	   	   	  	   -­‐0.314	   	   	   	  Private	  transfers:	  health	  (pct.)	   	   (0.877)	   	   	   	  	   -­‐0.061	   	   	   	  2005	  project	  spending/cap:	  health	  (pct.)	   	   (0.000)***	   	   	   	  	   	   -­‐0.633	   	   	  Private	  transfers:	  education	  (pct.)	   	   	   (0.373)	   	   	  	   	   0.001	   	   	  2005	  project	  spending/cap:	  education	   	   	   (0.147)	   	   	  	   	   	   0.140	   	  Private transfers: elect.,	  sewage,	  and	  water	  (pct.)	   	   	   	   (0.798)	   	  	   	   	   0.001	   	  2005	  project 
spending/cap: elect.,	  sewage,	  and	  water	   	   	   	   (0.102)	   	  	   	   	   	   68.545	  Private	  transfers:	  public	  goods	  (pct.)	   	   	   	   	   (0.000)***	  	   	   	   	   0.000	  2005	  project	  spending/cap:	  public	  goods	   	   	   	   	   (0.233)	  Constant	   9.600	   16.327	   11.718	   11.001	   12.187	  	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	   (0.000)***	  Observations	   1370	   1370	   1370	   1370	   1605	  p	  values	  in	  parentheses	  +	  significant	  at	  10%;	  *	  significant	  at	  5%;	  **	  significant	  at	  1%; *** significant at .1%	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correlated with all areas of new construction spending, the correlation is negative, the opposite of 
the expected direction, given the hypothesis and the way the electoral competition variable was 
constructed.  The most likely explanation for the direction of the observed relationships here is  
the very close correlation between winning coalition size and electoral competition—that is, 
table two more strongly supports hypothesis one than hypothesis two.    
In sum, supporting coalition size is generally statistically significant in the predicted 
direction, with or without the inclusion of the electoral competition control variable.  On the 
other hand, electoral competition is rarely significant in the correct direction, and then, only 
when the supporting coalition size variable is included.  These findings strongly support 
hypothesis number 1, and a theory of democratic provision of public goods grounded in 
particularistic exchange.  
Total spending 
Also reported here is the effect of supporting coalition size and electoral competition on total 
expenditures, including both current and capital expenditures.  The project spending dependent 
variables used above are probably better to test the effect of any variable associated with  
particularism, and data quality of the RENAMU survey used to assemble the public goods 
infrastructure development variables used above is more comprehensive than data available on 
total spending from the Ministry of Economy and Finances.  However, the use of infrastructure 
development/new construction spending alone raises legitimate questions about the different 
ways in which capital vs. current expenditures may be used to promote particularistic exchange, 
potentially biasing the results I present here (Samuels 2001a;  2001b). Therefore, I present 
several alternative models which use total spending in each of several categories as a check.  In 
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general, these results are weaker than the models presented above—this is most likely because of 
a smaller number of observations  (data for only about 500 municipalities is available, 
as compared to about 1600 municipalities for the project spending variables used above).  
However, these statistical models also provide support for hypothesis 2 (particularistic  
exchange/supporting coalition size) but no support for hypothesis 1 (electoral competition). 
Table 4: Total expenditures per capita (current and capital) 
Heteroskedasticity-robust OLS: logged expenditures per capita 
 
Administration 
and planning Agriculture Transport 
Health, 
education, and 
transport Total 
1.144 3.346 1.736 1.207 1.204 Supporting 
coalition size (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
0.185 -0.898 -0.138 0.141 0.126 Consumption 
(0.002)** (0.000)*** (0.239) (0.034)* (0.019)* 
0.177 0.531 0.079 0.117 0.140 Education 
(mean) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.387) (0.028)* (0.003)** 
-0.455 -0.639 -0.383 -0.469 -0.498 Urban pop. 
(logged) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
0.204 0.484 0.275 0.268 0.266 Municipal 
budget 
(logged) 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
0.810 -3.680 -0.874 -1.487 -1.404 Debt service 
(pct.) (0.477) (0.366) (0.668) (0.228) (0.217) 
Constant 3.619 -2.622 1.413 3.175 4.397 
 (0.000)*** (0.042)* (0.079)+ (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 538 301 515 538 538 
R-squared 0.454 0.300 0.177 0.355 0.524 
Robust p values in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at .1% 
 
Table 4 shows the results of five regression models, in which the dependent variables are, 
respectively, (a) administration and planning, (b) agriculture, (c) health, education, and transport, 
and (d) total expenditures.  In each of these models, the effect of supporting coalition size is 
significant and positive, supporting hypothesis one. 
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Though not every spending category is positively and significantly associated with 
supporting coalition size,  these outcomes, when pooled, are positively associated with 
supporting coalition size. 
Table 5: The effect of community size on particularistic exchange 
Extradispersed poisson regression with iterated reweighted least squares optimization and square 
root of variance adjustment for overdispersion 
 
Total water, sewage, electrification, public health, 
education, and transportation project  spending 
4.680 Supporting coalition size 
(0.000)*** 
-0.000 Population 
(0.951) 
-0.000 Supporting coalition size * 
population (0.020)* 
-0.539 Asset ownership (mean) 
(0.009)** 
-0.757 Education (mean) 
(0.000)*** 
-0.114 Urban population (logged) 
(0.151) 
-0.018 Municipal budget (Thousands of 
Peruvian Soles, logged) (0.636) 
-9.785 Debt service (pct.) 
(0.000)*** 
58.889 Private project transfers (pct.) 
(0.000)*** 
0.000 Total "public goods" project 
spending 2005 (0.500) 
Constant 9.597 
 (0.000)*** 
Observations 1605 
p values in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at .1% 
Also tested was a logged total project spending dependent variable using these same control 
variables and OLS regression.  Like the other OLS models shown here, these results support 
hypothesis 2 over hypothesis 1 (competition is not significant).   
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The role of jurisdictional size 
As predicted in hypothesis 3, jurisdiction size (population) has a substantial impact on the 
relationship between supporting coalition size and spending in a range of areas.  For an example, 
see table 5 (above) and figure 3 (below, in discussion).  Where community size is small, the  
Table 6: The effect of supporting coalition size in super-sized coalition municipalities 
Extradispersed poisson regression with iterated reweighted least squares optimization and square 
root of variance adjustment for overdispersion 
 Full population Minority coalitions Majority coalitions 
Supporting coalition size (pct.) 4.192 3.508 5.557 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.012)* 
Asset ownership -0.749 -1.666 2.391 
 (0.001)**** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Education (mean) -0.890 -0.759 -1.527 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Urban population (logged) -0.230 0.091 -1.976 
 (0.001)*** (0.219) (0.000)*** 
Municipal budget size (logged) -0.214 -0.290 0.125 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.211) 
Debt service (pct.) 2.702 5.510 -121.550 
 (0.148) (0.002)** (0.000)*** 
Project private transfers (pct.) 2.967 3.216 -11.994 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.013)* 
Total project spending/cap 2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.229) (0.231) (0.021)* 
Constant 12.877 12.186 17.204 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 1561 1437 123 
p values in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at .1% 
effect of supporting coalition size is strongly positive and highly significant.  In larger 
communities, however, the relationship becomes weaker, and ultimately insignificant.  This 
interactive relationship is consistent with the theoretical assertion that particularistic exchange is 
an important driver of public service provision.  For simplicity’s sake, only one regression table 
and one graphic is shown here depicting this relationship—specifically, total “public goods” 
project spending is shown here.  However, the relationship also holds across all areas of project 
spending and most areas of total spending.   
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Super-sized supporting coalitions 
As predicted in H4, above, supporting coalition size has an impact on public goods spending, 
even where supporting coalitions are larger than majority size.  For an illustration, see table 6.   
Although the effect of supporting coalition size is less significant where coalitions are larger 
than a majority, because of the relatively small number of cases involved, the effect is still 
significant.  This suggests that politicians do not only seek to maintain the support of a minimal 
winning coalition through the provision of government services, but seek to build and maintain 
the support of coalitions of voters which may be much larger than necessary, through 
particularistic exchange, in order to reduce future uncertainty about election outcomes.   
Postestimation 
Post-estimation tests demonstrate the robustness of these results.  In particular, the supporting 
coalition variable is quite robust.  None of the supporting coalition models are sensitive to the 
exclusion of influential outliers, and there are no apparent problems with the functional form of 
estimators.  The reported results generally quite robust to estimation technique (including 
poisson regression with chi-squared extradispersion adjustment, negative binomial regression, 
and heteroskedasticity-robust negative binomial regression).  Though the chi-squared adjustment 
did render supporting coalition size insignificant in the transportation spending and water, 
sewage, and electrification spending models, these models displayed much poorer model fit 
statistics (log likelihood, Aikake’s Information Criterion and Bayes’ Information Criterion) than 
other models.  Therefore, the most likely explanation for these results is poor model fit, rather 
than any issue of substantive importance.  Each of the square root of deviance adjusted poisson 
models’ residuals showed some deviation from normality, however, heteroskedasticity-robust 
negative binomial regression generated no differences in the direction or significance of 
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coefficients, suggesting that non-normal residuals are not a problem.  Finally, the supporting 
coalition size variable never lost significance or changed direction when other control variables 
were added or excluded from the model.   
In general, the electoral competition variable is more sensitive and less robust than the size of 
the supporting coalition.  In addition, because the direction and significance of the electoral 
competition variable never matches that predicted by Lake and Baum (2001; 2003), the 
robustness checks performed here support the contention that  public goods’ association with 
democracy is more likely the result of particularistic exchange than electoral competition.  The 
electoral competition variable was generally robust to the exclusion of high-influence cases, as 
measured by deviance, anscombe, and pearson residuals, with the exception of and electricity, 
water, and sewage project spending and health project spending, in which coefficients lost their 
significance when Coronel Castañeda, Ayacucho, and Huamanquiquia, Ayacucho—the most 
distant outliers—were excluded from the regression models.  In the other three models, however, 
outliers were not a problem. 
Plotting deviance residuals against the electoral competition variable suggested that a logged 
competition term might better capture the effect of electoral competition, but models with a 
logged competition variable did not provide substantially different results from a linear term, nor 
did residual distribution vary. 
Residuals did deviate from normality in each of these models, but this is explained by the 
overdispersion of the dependent variable (Hoffman 2004) and therefore should not be a problem.   
The use of a chi-squared extradispersion adjustment and negative binomial regression with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors produced coefficients which never differed in direction 
or significance than those reported.  In addition, model fit statistics (log likelihood, AIC and 
80 
BIC) generally were better with negative binomial models.  However, poisson results are 
reported here because some scholars (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Hoffman 2004) advise against 
the use of many postestimation diagnostics with negative binomial regression.   
Finally, electoral competition models were robust to the addition and exclusion of control 
variables in a series of sensitivity tests.   
In general, the models presented here which include both electoral competition and winning 
coalition size variables are the least robust of the three sets of models, because of collinearity and 
variance inflation (correlation between these variables is .71).  The measures are, after all, the 
result of the same process (local elections) which will tend to produce high competition only 
when vote shares for the victorious party are lower.  However, robustness checks continue to 
support the theory of particularistic exchange and hypothesis 2 more strongly than theories of 
electoral institutions and hypothesis 1.   
First, several of these models are sensitive to the exclusion of outliers—in particular, the 
regression models where transportation project spending, health project spending, and education 
project spending become insignificant when the municipality of Coronel Castañeda, Ayacucho 
are excluded from the regression.  Total project spending is robust to the exclusion of outliers. 
Here again, plotting residuals against each of the independent variables shows the possible 
utility of a logged competition variable, however, inclusion of such a term does not change the 
direction or significance of the results reported. 
Thirdly, plotting these models’ residuals (Anscombe, deviance, and Pearson) against a 
hypothetical normal distribution show some deviation from normality, though this is probably 
not a problem, because of the extradispersion adjustment (Hoffman 2004).   
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In several models, including total project spending, education project spending, and transport 
spending, the use of different estimation techniques produces insignificant results, though as 
above, these alternative models display poorer model fit statistics.  In the case of health project 
spending, the use of a chi-squared extradispersion-adjusted poisson technique and 
heteroskedasticity-robust negative binomial regression generates significant and positive results 
for the supporting coalition size variable, but the competition variable becomes insignificant.   
	  
Figure 1:  The effect of supporting coalition size on transportation project spending. As 
winning coalition size increases, the amount of money municipalities spend on transportation 
infrastructure projects—especially road construction and maintenance—increases dramatically, 
in line with the predictions made by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).  This graphic was 
originally generated with 95% confidence intervals around the predicted variables with control 
variables held at their means, but the confidence intervals were so close as to be 
indistinguishable from the predicted values themselves.   
Finally, these models, like the models described above are robust to the exclusion of control 
variables as a test of model sensitivity.   
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These models, like the regression models above, support hypothesis 2 much more strongly 
than hypothesis 1, and generally are much more supportive of the theory of particularistic 
exchange than theories of electoral institutions. 
In short, these statistical models support the conclusion that public goods provision in 
democracies is often the result of particularistic exchange.  By contrast, electoral competition is 
rarely significantly associated with spending in any policy category, suggesting that electoral 
competition is not as important in driving greater public goods provision.   
	  
Figure 2:  The effect of supporting coalition size on total project spending. This effect is 
similar to that shown above in Figure 1; as winning coalition size increases, predicted amounts 
spent on public works projects (new construction) increase dramatically.  This graphic, and 
Figure 1 (above) were originally drawn with 95% confidence intervals around the predicted 
values with control variables held at their means, but the confidence intervals were narrow 
enough to be nearly indistinguishable from the predicted values themselves. 
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The OLS models reported above are also robust to the full range of robustness checks, 
including the exclusion of outliers and high-influence cases, splitting the sample various ways, 
and including and excluding control variables.  Residuals are distributed normally.  
Models presented which use only a sub-sample of municipalities with supporting coalitions 
smaller and larger than 50% are generally somewhat sensitive to the exclusion of outliers, 
although robust to other postestimation checks.  However, this is most likely because of the 
relatively low numbers of observations in these models (123, for example, shown in Table 5).   
 
Figure 3: Community size has an effect on particularistic exchange.  Where communities are 
small (here, pop. 1000), there is a strong and significant relationship between supporting 
coalition size and government spending.  Here, the dependent variable is total “public goods” 
project spending—transportation, public health, education, sewage, water, and electrification 
projects—but this relationship also holds for each of those policy sub-categories, as well as 
several areas of total spending.  Here “high population” is 10,000 residents.   
Models in which community size was interacted with the supporting coalition size variable 
was were also tested with a series of robustness checks.  These models are also robust to the 
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exclusion of outliers and high-influence cases, splitting of the sample, and sensitivity tests.  
Residuals are also distributed normally here.    
Discussion 
Taken together, the results presented above provide strong support for the second hypothesis, 
which is drawn from the theory presented here which explains government service provision in 
terms of particularistic exchange.  In short, supporing coalition size is consistently significant in  
the predicted direction, while electoral competition is almost never significant in the direction 
predicted by hypothesis 1.  The first set of models (Table 1) supports hypothesis 2 robustly, the  
second set of models (Table 2) fails to support hypothesis 1, and the third set of models (Table 
3), though subject to some methodological problems, is much more supportive of hypothesis 2 
than hypothesis 1.   
In essence, these results support the notion that democracy promotes the provision of public 
goods through the exchange of political support for tangible benefits—politicians win votes by 
providing supporters with tangible benefits, such as schools, health clinics, roads, and electricity, 
water, or sewage infrastructure. 
For an intuitive interpretation of the effects of winning coalition size on transportation 
project spending, see figure 1.  As winning coalition size increases from below 20 percent to 
above 60 percent, predicted expenditures on transportation project spending (mostly road 
construction) increases from just over 50 Soles per capita (about $18 US) to nearly 250 Soles per 
capita (about $100 US).   
Likewise, the effect of supporting coalition size on total project spending is substantial.  
Where supporting coalition size is about 20 percent of the voting population, total project 
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spending is about 100 Soles per capita (about $37 US), but where supporting coalition size is 60 
percent, the predicted amount of total project spending per capita is nearly 600 Soles per capita 
(about $220 US).  This is a 600% increase in the new construction spending per capita.  
Supporting coalition size has a similar effect on the other dependent variables in these 
regression models and all these results are most highly significant where supporting coalition 
size is between 20% and 45% of the local electorate.   
As a secondary test of the theory of particularistic exchange and government service 
provision described here, I also tested the effect of community size on the hypothesized 
supporting coalition size-government service spending relationship.  Hypothesis three predicted 
that smaller communities would experience greater particularistic exchange, because in these 
places, where voting returns are reported at a relatively low level of aggregation, and other forms 
of information gathering (including particularistic networks) capture a greater share of local 
voting behavior, it will be easier for politicians to know who to reward with government 
services.   
Regression results (extradispersed poisson regression) support hypothesis three.  Where 
community size is small, there is a strong and significant relationship between supporting 
coalition size and government service spending.  However, where community size is large, 
politicians are effectively unable to determine who to reward and who to punish, and government 
spending no longer is related to supporting coalition size.   
Finally, I examine the effect of supporting coalition size on government service spending 
where supporting coalitions are above majority size—above the level where Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. (2003), Olson (1993), and Olson and McGuire (1996) suggest they should make a 
difference.  Contrary to these scholars’ predictions, and consistent with Hypothesis 4, supporting 
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coalition size has a positive and significant effect on government service spending where 
supporting coalitions are above 50%.  This suggests that particularistic exchange is a more 
important mechanism for the provision of government services than a formal assessment of 
minimal winning coalition size by elected politicians.  In many places, at least, politicians seek to 
form and maintain the support of very large supporting coalitions through a process of 
particularistic exchange. 
Conclusion 
Scholars have presented two contending explanations for the apparent correlation for 
democracy and public goods provision.  Some have argued that democracies provide more public 
goods because under democracy, electoral competition makes it easier for political leaders to be 
removed from office and requires that leaders buy the support of larger numbers of voters 
through public goods provision.  (Ames 1987; Lake and Baum 2001; Baum and Lake 2003).   
However, existing theory fails to explain the variation in government service provision 
visible across governments in decentralized regimes where formal democratic institutions are 
identical.  To remedy these issues, I present a theory of democracy and government service 
provision based on particularistic exchange.   
I test this theory of particularistic exchange against existing theory using sub-national data 
from approximately 1600 Peruvian municipal governments.  The use of sub-national data is ideal 
for the purposes of this examination, because it eliminates any variation in institutional forms 
which might confound my results. 
In addition, the causes of public goods provision in sub-national governments is an important 
and understudied research question in its own right (Berry 2008; Donahue 1997; Faguet 2004; 
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Faguet and Sanchez 2008; Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Howell-Moroney 2008; Oates 1999; Ribot 
2008; World Bank 2003; World Resources Institute 2003).  
Finally, Peruvian local governance is a critical case for this theory of particularistic exchange 
because of the unusual way in which it promotes small supporting coalitions and weak 
oppositions, and therefore, in theory, facilitates particularism. 
My findings suggest that supporting coalition size is consistently associated with greater 
public goods provision, while there is little statistical evidence that electoral competition leads to 
greater public goods provision.  I corroborate these findings with qualitative observations from 
fieldwork conducted in Peruvian municipalities in 2008 and 2009. 
These findings also elucidate the mechanisms through which democracy likely influences 
public goods provision.  In short, the analysis presented here suggests that particularism, pork 
barrel politics, or interest group politics may be one of the most important mechanisms through 
which democracies provide public goods.   
Many scholars would argue that particularistic exchange like that documented here is 
undesirable for a number of reasons, including its inequity and inefficiency (Acemoglu, Ticchi, 
and Vindigni 2006; Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003; Crabtree 2010; Keefer 2007; Roniger 1994).  
Therefore, the appropriate follow-up for the analysis contained here is to question what factors 
reduce these clientelism-like links between voters and politicians.  This is the question to which I 
turn next.   
In particular, I focus on three factors which scholarly research suggests may affect 
particularistic exchange.   
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First, scholars suggest that fragmented or divided government may have an effect on 
distributional politics, including particularism (Arriola 2009; Becher 2009; Cheibub 2006; 
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002; Tsebelis 2002; Tsebelis and Chang 2004).  In the 
following chapter, I examine the effects of opposition strength on the presence of particularistic 
exchange.  Ultimately, I find that strong oppositions tend to dampen particularism. 
Second, scholars argue that civil society density may impact particularism, clientelism and 
other forms of corruption by promoting mobilization and making information less costly 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Escobar 1994; Gunes-Ayata 1994a;  1994b; Iversen, Sen, 
Verschoor, and Dubey 2009; Levi 1996; Sobel 2002).  In chapter five, I investigate the impact of 
civil society on particularistic exchange, finding that particularism is also reduced by dense civil 
society. 
Finally, I address one threat to the generalizability of my findings in chapter six.  One reason 
why particularism may be especially salient in Peru is the country’s very high level of economic 
inequality.  In chapter five, I construct a measure of economic inequality based on asset 
ownership, and incorporate this variable into my statistical model of particularism.  I find that 
inequality worsens particularism, but the effect of particularism is present in both relatively equal 
and relatively unequal municipalities.  The implication, therefore, is that particularism may be 
present in both equal and unequal places around the world, not only extremely unequal settings 
like Peru, although the effect of particularism may be dampened in more equal places.   
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Opposition Strength, Divided Government, and Particularistic Service 
Provision 
Chapter 4 
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Introduction 
In chapters one, two, and three, I have developed and tested a theory which identifies how 
democracy promotes public goods provision through particularism.  I find that the exchange of 
political support for public services is a more important source of public goods spending than 
electoral competition or electoral institutions, at least in Peruvian municipal governance.   
Many scholars have expressed concerns about the particularistic or clientelistic exchange of 
political support for public services.  Economists, Political Scientists, and Sociologists argue that 
this type of particularism promotes inefficiency, lower rates of economic growth and lower 
living standards overall, unequal treatment under the law, lower quality of governance and lower 
quality of public service provision, and is inherently undemocratic (Acemoglu, Ticchi, and 
Vindigni 2006; Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003; Crabtree 2010; Keefer 2007; Roniger 1994).   
Here, I attempt to identify mechanisms that mitigate this type of exchange between 
politicians and political supporters.  One such mechanism—which may be manipulated through 
institutional design—is the institutional strength of opposition parties or factions9.  However, two 
theories of institutional politics make opposing predictions about the effects of political 
institutions on particularistic exchange.  The first of these suggests that the presence of strong 
oppositions—which operate through the presence of “veto points” or “veto players”—will make 
particularism exchange more likely.  The second makes the opposite prediction—that strong 
oppositions will discourage particularism.    
                                                
9 This concept—which I refer to here as “opposition strength” is a measure of the strength opposition parties or 
factions hold within Peruvian municipal councils (the legislative branch of Peruvian local governments).  This 
concept, intended as a proxy for opposition factions’ abilities to veto mayoral policy, is measured as the proportion 
of seats held by parties other than that of the mayor.   Therefore, if the mayor’s party holds 80% of the seats in the 
municipal council, and other parties hold 20%, this variable is coded as .2, and if the mayor’s party holds 90%, this 
variable is coded as .1. 
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Each of these theories, if true, has clear policy implications in Peru.  In the local Peruvian 
milieu, opposition parties’ abilities to veto or alter policies proposed by the mayor is limited by 
Peruvian electoral laws (although oppositions may sometimes check mayoral authority because 
of the highly personalized nature of Peruvian politics, and because of the small-scale and often 
poorly-organized nature of Peruvian mayoral administrations).  If the absence of institutional 
checks and balances facilitates particularism, then the designers of Peru’s early-2000s 
decentralization reforms may have made an important mistake that should be rectified.   
Further, understanding which of these theoretical approaches is correct is important for better 
understanding the operation of political institutions in settings like Peru.   
Unlike most empirical work studying clientelism and particularism in a comparative setting, I 
use large-N statistical techniques, using municipal-level data from Peru, supported with 
qualitative observations from the field.   
The Peruvian local setting is ideal for the study of opposition strength and particularism, 
because unique electoral rules permit two important factors, fundamental to the quantitative 
study of particularism and opposition strength, to be disaggregated in the Peruvian setting.  
Although supporting coalitions size—that is, the proportion of the local population which voted 
for the victorious mayoral candidate in the previous election—and the strength of local 
opposition parties in municipal councils are strongly negatively correlated in most settings, they 
can be easily parsed in Peruvian municipalities.   
In addition, the use of Peruvian sub-national data data permits the easy control of many 
potentially confounding factors, especially institutional factors, which are constant across 
municipalities.   
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Finally, because of the unusual institutional structure of Peruvian municipalities, which 
creates especially weak oppositions, Peru should be a hard case for the effects of institutional 
checks and balances on Particularism.  Any positive results from this analysis, therefore, should 
be taken as strong evidence that opposition strength affects particularism.   
My findings suggest that institutional checks and balances in the form of relatively strong 
municipal oppositions do mitigate the effects of particularistic exchange.  Where oppositions are 
stronger, the provision of particularistic benefits to selected constituencies appears to be strongly 
reduced.   
I have structured the remainder of this paper as follows:  First, I present a summary of the 
two theoretical approaches that present opposing predictions about the effects of opposition 
strength on particularistic exchange.  Second, I provide some background on Peruvian municipal 
governance, identifying factors that make Peruvian municipal governance a particularly useful 
setting for the empirical testing of these theories.  Third, I present the two theories tested here, 
and the predictions they make.  Fourth, I outline my quantitative methods and data.  Fifth, I 
present my quantitative findings.  Next, I discuss these findings and briefly present the results of 
my qualitative investigation.  Finally, I present the conclusions and theoretical and policy 
implications of this work.   
Democracy, Public Goods, and Institutions 
Here, I outline a body of scholarship which examines the effects of institutional 
fragmentation, “veto points,” or “veto players” on particularistic policies.  This body of 
scholarship includes works which suggest opposite predictions regarding the effects of checks 
and balances on particularistic behavior clientelism-like exchange.  I also introduce a third body 
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of scholarship that specifically addresses the causes of “clientelism”, though rarely from an 
institutional angle.   
The Effects of Institutions on Particularistic Policies 
One reason for the apparently pervasive particularistic exchange present in Peruvian 
municipalities (as outlined in chapter 3) may be the unusual structure of Peruvian municipal 
governments, which is a result of its atypical election laws.  By law, although Peruvian local 
governments include both popularly elected mayors and municipal councils elected through a 
modified system of proportional representation, the victorious party in each municipality’s 
election—the party of the mayor—automatically receives a majority in each municipal council.  
Although opposition factions are still often able to veto or modify mayoral initiatives, because of 
the disorganization of many local political factions, and because the often personalistic and 
fragmented nature of Peruvian local parties, these electoral institutions tend to substantially 
weaken the municipal opposition (Jaramillo Baanante 2009).   
Scholars have rarely, if ever examined the effects of institutional checks and balances on 
clientelism.  However, there is a substantial amount of scholarship which explores the effects of 
checks and balances on other forms of particularistic policy, including trade policy, economic 
reform, and fiscal policy (M. Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997; Becher 2009; Cheibub 
2006; Gehlbach and Malesky 2010; Kang and Powell 2010; Rogowski 1987; van de Walle 2003; 
Ziblatt 2008).  This literature, however, fails to draw consistent conclusions about the effects of 
checks and balances on particularism. 
One set of works predicts that institutional checks and balances, fragmented governments, 
and/or relatively large numbers of strong “veto points” or “veto players” will generate relatively 
more particularistic policy.  Fiscal policy will tend to include greater spending on benefits for 
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narrow interest groups, for example, and economic policy in general will tend to promote narrow 
rather than broad interests (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Cheibub 2006; Becher 2009).  These 
scholars argue that policy is the result of negotiation.  Where negotiations involve more players 
who are capable of vetoing a given policy, those actors will, in sum, be able to extract more 
benefits for special interests (Arriola 2009; Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006; Becher 2009; Cheibub 
2006; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). 
This school of thought suggests that more powerful oppositions in Peruvian municipal 
governments will tend to be associated with greater clientelistic exchange in municipal 
governance, and that governments which include weaker oppositions will be tend to be 
characterized by lower amounts of clientelism: 
H1: Stronger municipal oppositions will tend to be associated with more particularism, such 
that where supporting coalition sizes are small (and therefore, fiscal policy tends to be 
particularistic), spending will be greater. 
On the other hand, at least two theoretical arguments would predict that stronger oppositions 
will generate less particularistic exchange.  The first theory assumes that actors tend to play an 
oversight role on one another.  Therefore, when there are greater numbers of “veto players”—
where government is divided, or legislatures are divided between parties—particularistic policies 
are less likely because of the resulting greater accountability (Gehlbach and Malesky 2010; 
McKay 2009; see also Mayhew 2005 for another presentation of this argument).   
A second argument along these lines suggests that the more actors involved in policy 
making, the larger the proportion of society represented by those actors is likely to be.  
Therefore, where more actors are involved in policy negotiations, and where more actors are 
needed to legislate or carry out policy (as in a situation where local opposition parties can more 
successfully oppose mayoral policy), the more broad the benefitted constituency is likely to be 
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(Arriola 2009; Rogowski 1987; Saha 2010).  And because the particularistic provision of private 
goods or club goods is less beneficial to individual voters and more costly to governments where 
supporting coalition sizes are larger, governments where oppositions are strong will often find 
that it is more cost-effective to provide public goods than private or toll goods10.  Therefore, 
where more actors or groups can slow down, veto, or change policy (as in a situation where a 
municipal opposition party is relatively powerful), the less likely it is that mayors or other actors 
will successfully pursue narrowly-targeted, clientelistic policies. 
These theoretical arguments are also consistent with recent findings in Comparative Politics, 
that institutional polarization is associated with lower levels of corruption (Brown, Touchton, 
and Whitford 2011). 
Both of these arguments lead to the following hypothesis:   
H2: Stronger municipal oppositions will tend to be associated less particularism, such that 
where supporting coalitions are small—and therefore, where policy is likely to be 
particularistic—spending will be lower. 
In addition to these theories, scholars and practitioners have argued that a number of other 
factors cause variation in the quantity of clientelism.  These variables include community size 
(Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003), transparency (Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003; Brown and 
Hunter 2004; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Islam 2006; Kaufmann et al. 2010), social capital 
(Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003; Crabtree 2010; Escobar 1994), political instability (Campante, 
Chor, and Do 2009; Keefer 2007), other institutional structures than those considered here, 
including parliamentarism (van de Walle 2003; Gerring and Thacker 2004) and federalism 
(Gerring and Thacker 2004; J. Platteau 2003), economic modernization (Gunes-Ayata 1994a;  
1994b; Roniger 1994; Silva 1994), natural resources (Kaufmann et al. 2010), economic 
                                                
10 For a detailed explanation of this theory and empirical evidence, see Bueno de Mesquita et Al. 2003.   
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inequality and ethnic heterogeneity (Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2006; Chandra 2004; 
Crabtree 2010), and education (Truex 2010). 
Several of these variables are controlled here using statistical techniques, including 
community size, economic modernization, and education.  Others are controlled through research 
design—these are factors which do not vary across Peruvian municipalities, including political 
instability, parliamentarism and federalism.  Finally, a third set of variables are not controlled 
here, but are addressed in greater detail elsewhere in this ongoing project.   These factors include 
social capital, inequality and heterogeneity.  For the operationalization of each variable, see 
“Data and Methods”, below. 
Local Government in Peru: Some Background 
Local governments in Peru are set up like most municipal governments in the United States.  
The primary difference, however, is the share of local municipal councils controlled by 
opposition parties; because of Peruvian electoral rules, oppositions are very weak in Peruvian 
local governments, making these governments a “hard case” for theories which argue that checks 
and balances should affect distributional politics.   
Local Government Structures 
Like most local governments in the United States, Peruvian local governments resemble 
presidential national systems, with independently elected executives (mayors) and separately 
elected legislatures (city councils).  Formal authority vested in these institutions is similar to that 
in other presidential-style governments such as that of the United States, in which the mayor and 
his staff are charged with carrying out local regulations (including budgets) passed by the 
municipal council.   
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Electoral laws 
One important difference between local governments in Peru and those in most other 
countries is the way in which mayors and municipal council members are selected; Peruvian 
electoral rules were engineered in such a way as to significantly strengthen the hand of the 
mayor, and to prevent gridlock in local policy-making.  Elections take place using a modified 
proportional representation rule, and mayors and municipal councils are elected on the same 
ballot.  Mayors are elected by plurality, but municipal council-members are seated in an unusual 
way; the party of the mayor (the party which wins the most votes) is granted a majority of seats 
on the council, with the remainder of seats allocated proportionally (Jaramillo Baanante 2009).  
All of this takes place in a context where there are rarely fewer than four or five parties 
competing in local races.  The end result is that governing parties (which rarely receive more 
than 30% of the vote in a given municipality) typically receive 60% or more of the seats on the 
municipal council.   
These rules mean that institutional checks and balances tend to be weaker in Peru than 
elsewhere, making Peruvian municipal governments a “hard case” for testing the effects of 
checks and balances on clientelistic exchange.  If checks and balances have an effect here, where 
they are so weak, they will most likely have an effect in other governments as well.   
Methodological importance for this study 
In addition, these electoral rules mean that opposition strength (the proportion of municipal 
council seats controlled by opposition parties) and supporting coalition size (the proportion of 
the local electorate which voted for the mayor) are only weakly correlated (r = -.08). As a result, 
it is methodologically possible to interact supporting coalition size and opposition strength using 
the data utilized here, to determine the effect of opposition strength on the relationship between 
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supporting coalition size and expenditures.  This type of interaction is not methodologically 
feasible with most other systems’ electoral data, where opposition strength and supporting 
coalition size are highly negatively correlated.   
Theory: Opposition Strength, Supporting coalition Size, and Service Spending 
Here, I identify two ways in which theories on public goods provision and opposition 
strength may be combined.  The statistical model I use to test the two resulting theories, using an 
interaction term, is not as straightforward as the interpretation of a single linear variable 
coefficient, therefore, I also explain the predictions of these two theories in some detail here.   
Supporting coalitions and “private goods” 
According to the theory presented in chapter 2, and tested in chapter 3, politicians gain and 
hold political office by assembling and maintaining a coalition of supporters called the 
“supporting coalition.”  In municipalities in Peru, I define the supporting coalition as a coalition 
of individuals who vote for the victorious mayoral candidate and his party in municipal elections.     
As supporting coalition sizes rise, expenditures on government services will also rise, as 
politicians reward larger numbers of supporters with targeted goods and services.  Where 
supporting coalitions are small, graft and corruption will be common, as an effective strategy for 
paying off narrow cliques of supporters.  Where they are larger, goods (typically club goods) will 
be targeted more broadly, such that these goods have larger beneficial spillovers for non-
supporters.  
Are “public goods” really non-excludable? 
Typically, services which are generally considered the role of government—services like 
education, health and sanitation, transport, potable water and sewage services—have been 
considered public goods (Ansell 2008; Baum and Lake 2003; Brown and Hunter 2004; Lake and 
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Baum 2001; Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Olson 1993; McGuire and 
Olson 1996).  Sometimes, the provision of such goods will take the form of public goods.  
However, these services are often provided as toll or private goods, targeted at particular groups 
or individuals.  In chapter 3, I have provided evidence that within Peruvian municipalities, as 
supporting coalition size increases, so does spending on services like education, transportation, 
public health and sanitation, and public infrastructure.  These findings are consistent with the 
theory presented here and in chapter 2.   
Although government-provided services are rarely completely excludable, individuals can 
often be excluded from enjoying their benefits.  For example, public health services, public 
education, transportation services, potable water, sewage services and public electrification 
services are often considered “public goods” (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Baum and Lake 
2003; Brown and Hunter 2004; Brown and Mobarak 2009; Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, 
and Morrow 2003; Stasavage 2005a; Ziblatt 2008).  However, the benefits of all of these types of 
services can be excluded from certain potential beneficiaries under many circumstances, making 
them “club goods” or “toll goods”.  In rural Peru and around the developing world, for example, 
a politician may choose to build a school in one village rather than another, making it very costly 
for students from the excluded village to receive an education.  Health clinics can be built and 
staffed in some places rather than others, and public potable water systems and sewage services 
can easily be provided to one family and excluded from the next village, neighborhood, street, or 
residence.   
One political tool which politicians may use is the targeted provision of club goods.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this type of targeted service provision is a common political 
tool used by municipal and other politicians in Peru and elsewhere.  Villages which are strongly 
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supportive of a particular candidate find that they are rewarded with irrigation, drinking water, 
electrification, or education services while the next village up the valley which was more 
supportive of a losing party or candidate finds that they are denied those services. 
Although anecdotal evidence suggests that municipal politicians often use private goods 
provision to win elections in Peru (see above), stories of the targeted provision of club goods to 
villages, neighborhoods, and even extended families are also not uncommon. 
Indeed, there is often no way to distinguish between public service spending in “public 
goods” and spending as private or toll goods, which is targeted to benefit a particular group of 
people.  Therefore, I proceed with the assumption that most government services can be provided 
either as public, toll, or private goods.  As such, I will avoid the use of the terms “public goods” 
and “private goods” in favor of more general terms like “government services”, which I define as 
any type of services provided by governments, or more exact terms such as “excludable goods.”  
In addition, henceforth, I refer to the exchange political support (on the part of constituents) for 
tangible government services (on the part of politicians) as particularistic exchange. 
Opposition strength and particularism 
In general, as per the discussion of the two relevant literatures on oppositions, veto players, 
divided governments, and legislative coalitions described in the literature review, institutional 
theory predicts two different relationships between opposition strength and particularistic 
exchange.  One set of theories predicts that strong oppositions will encourage greater 
particularistic exchange, as they demand to be paid off with excludable goods for their 
constituencies.  Another set of theories predicts that they will prevent particularistic exchange in 
favor of the provision of goods to all local voters. 
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In general, if oppositions are sufficiently weak, they will be unable to have any impact on 
policy at all.  There is qualitative evidence to suggest that, in Peru, where electoral rules 
intentionally weaken oppositions, there are many municipalities where opposition parties, though 
opposed to mayoral policies, are unable to change or stop the mayor and his party from carrying 
out their own set of policies.   
However, there is also substantial evidence that relatively strong oppositions can impact 
policy at the municipal level.  Because of divisions within mayoral factions and because of the 
poor organization of many local political parties, relatively strong, well-organized oppositions 
can veto or change municipal policy, despite the fact that they can never win a majority of seats 
on the municipal council.   
Theory 1: Strong oppositions increase particularism 
If oppositions prefer to improve their own political fortunes by promoting the provision of 
excludable goods to their own constituency of supporters, and if supporting coalitions are small, 
opposition strength will tend to be positively associated with particularistic exchange and public 
service spending.  This is because governments that assume and maintain local political power 
through a small supporting coalition will prefer to provide excludable goods to their own set of 
supporters, rather than provide goods which benefit all local voters.  Strong oppositions which 
might otherwise veto mayoral policy may agree to cooperate with mayoral efforts to provide 
excludable goods to his supporters, on the condition that their supporters are likewise 
compensated with excludable goods.  Therefore, where supporting coalitions are small, strong 
oppositions may be associated with greater particularistic exchange—and greater public service 
spending—than weak oppositions.   
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Where supporting coalitions are large, however, opposition strength will have little effect on 
public service spending.  This is because, as per Bueno de Mesquita et Al. (2003), larger 
supporting coalition sizes will tend to be associated with provision of broadly beneficial services 
and goods.  These goods and services will tend to be provided in ways which also benefit 
opposition supporters.  Therefore, oppositions will tend to support mayoral policy of non-
excludable goods provision, and will have little or no observable effect on service provision and 
public spending.   
Theory 2: Strong oppositions decrease particularism 
On the other hand, if oppositions are unwilling or unable to extract concessions from 
supporting coalitions in the form of excludable goods provision to their supporters, opposition 
strength may be associated with less particularism and less spending on public services where 
supporting coalitions are small. Strong oppositions may, for example, be capable of vetoing 
municipal policy if it does not suit them, but unable to enact a policy which they prefer, because 
the mayor controls the agenda.  Or, opposition members may prefer to exercise an oversight role 
and prevent the mayor from rewarding only his supporters with government services. 
In this case, opposition strength will be associated with lower levels of spending where 
supporting coalitions are small, because oppositions will seek to veto mayoral attempts to reward 
his own supporters using tax revenues extracted from the local population as a whole.   
Where supporting coalitions are large, however, as above, spending under weak and strong 
oppositions will tend to converge at relatively high levels, because governments with large 
supporting coalitions will tend to promote inoffensive, broadly-beneficial service provision 
which will benefit all municipal voters.   
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Operationalizing these hypothesized relationships 
I test these theories using an interaction term, in which opposition strength is hypothesized to 
affect the relationship between supporting coalition size and public goods spending.  Elsewhere, 
I have found that public goods spending responds directly to supporting coalition size, 
suggesting that politicians seek the support of a core of supporters by providing them with 
benefits and seeking to exclude non-supporters from those benefits.  As supporting coalition size 
increases, spending on services targeted at political supporters likewise increases, because each 
individual in the supporting coalition requires a certain payout in order to continue to support the 
mayor and his party (as per Bueno de Mesquita et Al. 2003).   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Hypothesized effects of opposition strength on the relationship between 
supporting coalition size and public goods spending.  According to one theory (left graph), 
strong oppositions promote greater excludable goods provision and therefore greater government 
service spending (on narrowly targeted constituencies) where supporting coalitions are small.  
According to a second theory (right graph), strong oppositions diminish public spending where 
supporting coalitions are small, by limiting particularistic policies.  According to both theories, 
however, high-opposition municipality and low-opposition municipality government service 
spending converges where supporting coalitions are large and promote greater broadly-beneficial 
spending.  
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Above, I hypothesize that opposition strength will make particularistic exchange more likely 
(H1) or less likely (H2).  These hypothesized relationships are somewhat complex, however, and 
deserve some further explanation. 
As in figure 1, the first hypothesis argues that opposition strength will be associated with 
greater spending where supporting coalition size is small.  Where coalition size is large, 
however, spending on government services under weak and strong oppositions will tend to 
converge, as municipal governments provide greater quantities of broadly beneficial goods 
which benefit mayoral and opposition supporters. 
The second hypothesis makes a different prediction.  Here, oppositions attempt to veto 
mayoral attempts to provide services targeted only at supporters.  Therefore, where supporting 
coalitions are small, opposition strength will be associated with less government service 
spending.  However, as above, spending in strong-opposition and weak-opposition municipalities 
will tend to converge at relatively high levels where supporting coalition sizes are large, as 
municipal governments provide greater quantities of broadly beneficial goods.    
Empirical Strategy 
Here, as in chapter 3, I use two estimation techniques to test these hypothesized relationships.  
The first of these is Ordinary Least Squares regression, which I use where the dependent variable 
is logged total municipal spending in one of several policy areas (including several areas, like 
education, health and sanitation, and transportation, which are typically considered public 
goods).  I also use extradispersed Poisson regression in several models, where the dependent 
variable is total spending on infrastructure improvements (new construction) in each of several 
policy area categories.  My independent variables of interest are measures of wining coalition 
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size, opposition strength, and an interaction term which is opposition strength multiplied by 
opposition strength.  I also include a number of control variables. 
Dependent variables 
The first dependent variable used here is spending on infrastructure development per 
capita—spending on new construction of public works projects completed in 2007—in several 
categories which are often treated as public goods.  These include (a) transportation, (b) 
education, (c) and a summed total of spending on water, electrification, and sewage projects11.  
This data was gathered in the 2008 Peruvian Registry of Municipalities by the Peruvian National 
Institute of Statistics and Informatics.  This data is available for about 1800 municipalities in 
each category.  I also used data on each of these spending categories in 2005 as a control.  
The second dependent variable used is total spending in each of several policy categories—
including education, housing and urban development, industrial policy, and several other policy 
areas.  This data was compiled from the Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finances, available 
on the internet at http://www.mef.gob.pe, and represents total spending from 2007.  Here, data 
coverage is not as good as the public works project spending data described in the paragraph 
above, and data from the prior mayoral term is not easily accessible for use as a control.  
However, even with poorer coverage and without the control data, results from models using 
these variables as outcomes are consistent with the results of the public works project spending 
variable models, with a few important exceptions that I note below.   
                                                
11 The summed total of water, sewage, and electrification infrastructure project spending is, unfortunately, the way 
this data is provided by the Peruvian government, though I would of course prefer to use indicators of each of these 
three areas. 
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Independent variables of interest 
I use three independent variables of interest, including a measure of the supporting coalition 
size of the victor in the most recent election, a measure of the strength of the opposition in local 
governments, and an interaction term, which is the product of these other two variables. 
The first of these independent variables, supporting coalition size, is a measure of the 
percentage of municipal voters who supported the victorious mayoral candidate in the previous 
election.  This variable was generated using publicly available data through the Peruvian 
National Organization of Electoral Processes, the independent government agency which 
oversees elections.  Elsewhere (chapter 3), I have used this variable to measure the extent to 
which public expenditures are the result of particularistic exchange. 
The second variable, opposition strength, is simply the percentage of the municipal council—
the primary institutional check on mayoral power—controlled by opposition parties.  Though 
electoral rules in Peruvian local government elections are structured such that this value is almost 
never greater than 50%, I assume that greater percentages controlled by opposition parties means 
that oppositions have more frequent opportunities to veto mayoral policy, because of the 
personalistic and fragmented nature of Peruvian political parties.  This data is available through 
the Peruvian National Electoral Panel, the judicial organization which oversees the 
implementation of election results. 
The third—and most important—independent variable of interest here is an interaction term, 
which is the product of both the opposition and supporting coalition measures, such that very 
high values represent municipalities where there are both large supporting coalitions and a high 
probability that opposition parties will be able to check mayoral authority.  This variable will 
107 
measure the extent to which the effect of “opposition strength” on public spending will vary 
across different values of “supporting coalition size.”   
Control variables 
In addition to the independent variables of interest listed above, I include a number of control 
variables in the model.   
First, I include several variables made available through INEI which were generated based on 
the 2007 Peruvian census, including the average level of education in each municipality, 
population (logged), urban population (logged), and a consumption measure.  The consumption 
measure is designed to provide a measure of standards of living where many citizens, 
particularly in rural areas, do not participate in the cash economy with any intensity, and is 
derived from a series of standard Peruvian Government (INEI) poverty indicators.  This is a 
count of the average number of household appliances—radio, television, washer/dryer, 
refrigerator, and sound equipment—owned by families in the municipality.   
I also include several control variables from RENAMU data—each model includes a control 
variable, which is the percentage of completed project funding in each policy area which was 
funded with private donations.  This is meant to address concerns that private donors might use 
funding to influence municipal priorities.  Because there is no conditionality placed on transfers 
from regional or national governments, there is no need to include a similar measure for 
government project transfers in each area.  In the models in which the dependent variable is 
public works project spending, I also control for spending in the previous mayoral term (year 
2005).   
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Methodology 
The dependent variables in the first set of regression models presented here represent 
spending on projects completed in 2007, and many municipalities completed no projects in one 
or more policy areas in that year.  Therefore, the distributions of these dependent variables are 
skewed, with large numbers of cases at 0, and a long right tail.   
For dependent variables where the distribution follows approximately a poisson or negative 
binomial distribution—such as the public works project spending variables I use here—there are 
several appropriate techniques which can be used.  Standard poisson regression is not appropriate 
here, because the variance of the dependent variable is much greater than the mean, one of the 
important conditions for the appropriate use of poisson regression.  However, extradispersed 
poisson regression is appropriate (that is, poisson regression with standard errors adjusted for the 
extra variance), as is negative binomial regression12 (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Hoffman 2004; 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). 
Because of the large numbers of zeros in each of the dependent variables used here, I also 
test similar models using a zero-inflated poisson estimation strategy.  This approach is 
appropriate where the variance on the dependent variable is inflated because of large numbers of 
zeros determined by some factor which can be incorporated in a two-stage model (Cameron and 
Trivedi 1998; Hoffman 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).   
After examining each of these models, I compare goodness-of-fit statistics to determine the 
most appropriate link function (AIC, BIC, and log likelihood statistics).  In general, 
extradispersed poisson models using an iterated, reweighted least squares optimization procedure 
                                                
12 I test these models both with and without heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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and standard-error rescaling produced the best model fit, but the models presented here provided 
substantively very similar results regardless of the estimation technique used.   
I ran a number of robustness checks on these models, including eliminating outliers, splitting 
samples in several ways, and running sensitivity tests by removing and adding control variables 
in groups and singly.  With a single exception—transportation project spending—the models 
presented here did not change in significance or direction through these tests.    
Where the dependent variable of these regressions is normal—this includes the variables 
measuring total spending in each policy category—I use heteroskedasticity-robust OLS 
regression.  I also test these models with a series of robustness checks, including plotting 
independent and dependent variables against residuals, examining the normality of residuals, and 
re-testing models with outliers or high-leverage cases excluded.  Generally, the reported results 
are robust to these checks, though there are some exceptions which I note below.  In general, this 
second set of regression models is more sensitive to the exclusion of outliers than the first set—
where the dependent variable is public works project spending on new construction—because the 
first set of variables is more complete, and therefore, include a higher number of observations.   
My key independent variable here is an interaction between “supporting coalition size” and 
“opposition strength.”  Because the coefficient and significance of the interaction term itself is 
not substantively meaningful or important (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005), I provide a 
graphic depiction of the effect of differing effects of “supporting coalition size” on public goods 
spending across values of “opposition strength” and include regression tables in the appendix.   
Results 
The two sets of dependent variables used here generate somewhat different substantive 
results.  The first set of dependent variables—total spending on infrastructure development (new  
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Table 1: Project (new construction) spending 
Extradispersed poisson regression with iterated reweighted least squares optimization and square root of variance 
adjustment for overdispersion 
  
Transportation Health Education Electrification, 
water, and sewage 
All "public 
goods" 
categories 
6.303 -7.176 -3.007 -3.714 6.242 Supporting coalition size 
(0.000)*** (0.243) (0.652) (0.242) (0.000)*** 
9.028 -75.253 -29.677 -25.236 1.679 Opposition strength 
(0.026)* (0.001)*** (0.186) (0.006)** (0.730) 
-15.757 96.834 32.837 32.125 -4.642 Supporting coalition size * 
Opposition strength (0.054)+ (0.002)** (0.328) (0.044)* (0.560) 
0.009 2.501 -1.799 0.210 0.553 Consumption 
(0.954) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.098)+ (0.000)*** 
-0.423 -1.569 -0.653 0.130 -0.373 Education (mean) 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.032)* (0.000)*** 
-0.324 -2.176 -0.242 -0.389 -0.731 Urban population (pct., 
logged) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
-0.090 0.072 -0.099 0.081 0.111 Muni. budget size (logged) 
(0.027)* (0.176) (0.018)* (0.010)* (0.000)*** 
-3.043 9.604 -21.936 -6.576 -3.776 Debt service (pct.) 
(0.192) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.041)* 
0.369         Private transfers: 
transportation (pct.) (0.392)      
0.000         Transportation spending/cap 
2005 (0.001)***      
  3.007       Private transfers: health 
(pct.)  (0.073)+     
  -0.058       Health spending/cap 2005 
 (0.000)***     
    -0.726     Private transfers: education 
(pct.)   (0.306)    
    0.001     Education spending/cap 
2005   (0.133)    
      0.875   Private transfers: 
electrification, water, and 
sewage (pct.) 
   (0.001)***   
      0.002   Electrification, water, and 
sewage spending/cap 2005    (0.000)***   
        74.216 Private transfers: total 
"public goods" (pct.)     (0.000)*** 
        0.000 "Public goods" 
spending/cap 2005     (0.067)+ 
Constant 6.896 28.464 16.498 8.787 7.216 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 1366 1366 1366 1365 1598 
p values in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at .1% 
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construction) in education, health care, transportation, consistently displays the pattern described 
in hypothesis 2.  Total spending in several policy categories also produces statistically significant 
results, though these patterns are not exactly as described in either hypothesis.  These results and 
possible explanations are described here, and discussed below.   
Where the dependent variable is total spending on public works projects (new construction), 
results of these regression models support hypothesis 2 with a great degree of consistency—that 
stronger oppositions are associated with less particularistic exchange.  In each of the policy areas 
I examine, opposition strength decreases public spending where supporting coalitions are small,  
but these differences become statistically insignificant where supporting coalitions are large.  
These findings are consistent with the assertion that oppositions play an oversight role, limiting 
spending where it is targeted only at supporting coalition-members, but not obstructing spending 
where it is targeted more broadly, to benefit the general population of local voters.   
These results are remarkably consistent across policy areas.  The one area of spending in 
which the results do not initially support hypothesis two—transportation project spending—does 
in fact show the same dynamic in support of hypothesis two is a single outlier (a very small 
municipality with extremely high per-capita spending on road construction, located outside of 
Ayacucho, Peru) is excluded from the model.  In addition, total project spending and project 
spending on sewage, water, and electrification spending do not display the same pattern.  
However, if electrification, sewage, and water spending is excluded from total project spending 
(the sewage, water, and electrification project spending is consistently problematic, and seems 
suspect), the newly-generated total project spending less electrification, sewage, and water 
spending measure does also show the same pattern.  In addition, both total spending and 
infrastructure, water, and electrification spending show the same pattern as hypothesized under  
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Table 2: Total spending 
OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
Industrial 
policy 
Social 
spending Education Fishing 
Housing and 
urban 
development 
Public 
health and 
sanitation Transport 
-10.474 -0.555 -3.475 -74.937 -8.132 0.185 -0.195 Supporting 
coalition size (0.029)* (0.701) (0.286) (0.019)* (0.070)+ (0.925) (0.933) 
-13.251 -0.479 -7.979 -167.958 -13.075 0.119 -4.124 Opposition 
strength (0.034)* (0.818) (0.055)+ (0.009)** (0.038)* (0.963) (0.226) 
43.348 5.277 18.194 400.403 42.062 2.977 8.328 Supporting 
coalition size * 
Opposition 
strength 
(0.026)* (0.412) (0.197) (0.014)* (0.040)* (0.697) (0.397) 
0.292 0.005 -0.226 1.377 0.287 0.432 -0.147 Consumption 
(0.207) (0.934) (0.048)* (0.111) (0.066)+ (0.000)*** (0.217) 
0.364 -0.107 -0.023 0.948 0.443 0.149 0.066 Education 
(mean) (0.079)+ (0.034)* (0.804) (0.126) (0.003)** (0.058)+ (0.474) 
-0.795 -0.310 -0.609 -0.298 -0.627 -0.443 -0.351 Urban 
population 
(pct., logged) 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.629) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
0.385 0.194 0.371 -0.101 0.284 0.318 0.274 Muni. budget 
size (logged) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.697) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
-7.173 -0.164 3.002 -2.218 -6.715 -4.479 -1.010 Debt service 
(pct.) (0.146) (0.886) (0.135) (0.950) (0.092)+ (0.045)* (0.627) 
Constant 2.896 3.513 4.062 30.641 2.558 0.607 2.236 
 (0.148) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.010)* (0.102) (0.463) (0.032)* 
Observations 249 536 518 35 363 521 513 
R-squared 0.211 0.256 0.375 0.431 0.211 0.189 0.184 
Robust p values in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at .1% 
H2 if a single municipality with an implausible level of spending per capita (approximately 
$330,000 US) is excluded.     
Specifically, this pattern is as follows: municipalities with small supporting coalitions spend 
less on public works projects in each of these policy area categories than municipalities with 
large supporting coalitions.  Often, the differences are dramatic.  However, the strength of the 
opposition also matters, and its effect varies across values of “supporting coalition size.” Where 
supporting coalition sizes are small, strong-opposition municipalities spend substantially less on 
public works construction projects in health care, education, and transportation than weak-
opposition municipalities.  This is because oppositions in these municipalities veto mayoral 
attempts to provide excludable goods to his constituency alone, leading to overall lower levels of 
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spending.  On the other hand, as supporting coalition sizes rise, these differences between strong-
opposition and weak-opposition municipalities diminish, even as project spending rises, and the 
differences ultimately become statistically insignificant.   
In addition, the independent variables of interest here—supporting coalition size, opposition 
strength, and the interaction of these two factors—are significantly related to total spending in 
several categories, including several categories which have typically been considered “public 
goods,”—in particular, social services and social protection spending, housing and urban 
development, education, and expenditures on local government support of industry and business.  
However, these relationships are not all robust to the exclusion of outliers (in particular, social 
spending is sensitive to the exclusion of high-leverage cases and outliers) and the local industrial  
support variable, housing and urban development, as well as social spending show a somewhat 
different pattern than those two patterns described in the theory section, above.  I discuss these 
results and some possible explanations below.   
Discussion 
In most of the policy areas for which there is available data, the relationships of interest are 
statistically significant, though the details of these significant relationships are not always as 
hypothesized earlier.  In most policy categories, regression results are consistent with hypothesis 
two, above—that strong oppositions play an oversight role in preventing particularistic exchange 
where it only stands to benefit a small minority of governing-faction supporters.  However, in 
several models where the dependent variable is total spending in a given policy category, 
regression results show a somewhat different result from that hypothesized in either H1 or H2 
above.  I identify some possible explanations for these results. 
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Figure 2: The effect of opposition strength on health project particularism.  Where 
supporting coalitions are weak, strong-opposition municipalities show much lower rates of 
spending on health projects on average compared to weak-opposition municipalities.  Where 
supporting coalitions are large, however, these levels of spending begin to converge, ultimately 
becoming statistically insignificant where supporting coalitions represent about 60% of local 
voters.  The dynamic shown here is consistent with hypothesis two.   
In figures 2, 3, and 4, the interactive effect of supporting coalition size and opposition 
strength on public service spending is shown in an intuitive way.  In each of these graphs, one 
line (with 95% joint confidence intervals) shows the relationship between supporting coalition 
size and spending (in a given category) where oppositions are strong (40% of the municipal 
council), and another line (also with confidence intervals) shows the same relationship where 
oppositions are relatively weak (20% of the municipal council).   
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Health project spending 
In figure 2, the dependent variable is spending on new construction in public health—
generally, this represents the construction and repair of health clinics, especially in rural areas.   
Where oppositions are weak, spending on health projects remains low where supporting 
coalitions are small-up to about 30%, spending per capita on health projects is less than one 
Peruvian Sol (about $.30) per person.  Beyond that point, expenditures begin to rise fairly 
rapidly, such that where supporting coalitions are about 45% of voters, spending is about 5 
Soles/capita, and where supporting coalition size is about 60% of voters, spending is about 15 
Soles/capita. 
Where oppositions are strong, spending on health projects remains very low for much 
longer—supporting coalition sizes approach 60% before spending begins to rise.  Above that 
point, however, spending increases very rapidly, rising to approximately 15 Soles/capita by the 
time supporting coalitions are 75% of local voters.   
These dynamics are consistent with hypothesis two.  Based on these results, I would suggest 
that (a) mayors and their factions often use health project spending as a reward for supportive 
constituencies, (b) the size and frequency of these projects increases as there are more supporters 
to reward, and (c) once supporting coalition sizes are a majority of local voters, such rewards 
increase rapidly, because health project spending is a relatively efficient way to visibly reward 
supporters, and because spillover effects are more likely to benefit supporters than non-
supporters.  Also (d) oppositions are frequently successful at vetoing health projects where these 
projects are intended to reward a minority, but (e) oppositions are much more likely to permit 
health project spending where it will benefit a larger proportion of local voters.   
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Figure 3: The effect of opposition strength on education project particularism.  The joint 
effect of supporting coalition size and opposition strength on education project spending per 
capita is similar to that shown above in health project spending/capita.  Where supporting 
coalitions are small, strong-opposition municipalities show lower rates of spending on education 
projects on average compared to weak-opposition municipalities.  Where supporting coalitions 
are large, however, these levels of spending begin to converge, ultimately becoming statistically 
insignificant where supporting coalitions represent about 55% of local voters.  The dynamic 
shown here is consistent with hypothesis two.   
Education project spending 
The interactive effect of supporting coalition size and opposition strength on education 
project spending per capita is similar to the effect discussed above, in “Health project spending.”  
Again, this is spending in new construction, generally infrastructure development, and in this 
category generally includes school construction and public school campus improvements.   
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As above, supporting coalition size tends to increase spending on education project, 
regardless of the size of the supporting coalition.  However, where supporting coalition sizes are 
small, strong-opposition municipalities spend significantly less than weak-opposition 
municipalities.  These differences become statistically insignificant where supporting coalition 
sizes are large—above about the 55% mark.   
 
 
Figure 4: The effect of opposition strength on total education spending.  As above, where 
supporting coalitions are weak, strong-opposition municipalities show lower rates of spending on 
education (total eduation spending) compared to weak-opposition municipalities.  As supporting 
coalition size increases, however, these differences very quickly become statistically 
insignificant (near the 30% mark).  The dynamic shown here is also consistent with hypothesis 
two.   
Again, these results suggest that mayors and their supporters in the municipal council often 
use school construction as a reward for supporting constituencies—like health clinics, schools 
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are a government service which can easily be targeted geographically, provided to one village 
but not another, thus rewarding key constituencies and ensuring their support.  Where supporting 
coalitions are small, oppositions will often attempt—and apparently, frequently succeed—at 
reducing these targeted expenditures.   
Where supporting coalitions are large, however, and mayors attempt to use education project 
spending to reward large proportions of the local population for their support, oppositions are 
less likely to veto education project spending.  This is because attempts to reward supporters 
with these services, at this scale, will create large spillovers which will also benefit opposition 
supporters.   
Total education spending 
Like the two areas of spending described above, total education spending (not only project 
spending) shows a similar pattern, and is consistent with hypothesis two.  Where supporting 
coalitions are small, weak- and strong-opposition municipalities’ spending diverges, with less 
spending on education per capita in strong-opposition municipalities.  I argue that this is because 
oppositions in these places veto mayoral attempts to provide targeted education spending, 
directed at his own constituency.  Where supporting coalition sizes are larger, however, the 
difference between weak- and strong-opposition municipalities becomes statistically 
insignificant.  This is also likely because mayors in these municipalities pursue policies of public 
goods provision to most effectively reach their large supporting coalitions, and these policies 
have spillover benefits which affect opposition supporters, reducing the difference between 
oppositions’ and mayors’ policies.   
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Total housing and urban development spending 
Three other policy areas, including housing and urban development, local industrial policy 
(spending on support for local business and industry), and social welfare spending show a second 
pattern which is not consistent with either hypothesis one or hypothesis two.  In total housing  
 
 
Figure 5: Opposition strength promotes greater spending where supporting coalition size is 
large.  In a few policy areas, the effect of opposition strength on the relationship between 
supporting coalition size and spending is not consistent with either theory laid out above.  This is 
one example.  Here, strong-opposition municipalities’ spending on housing and urban 
development quickly converges with that of weak-opposition municipalities, but becomes 
significantly greater where supporting coalition sizes increase above 60%.  Local industrial 
policy (spending on business and industry) and spending on social welfare, and social protection 
is similar. 
and urban development spending, where supporting coalitions are small, as in the other policy 
areas reported above, weak-opposition municipalities spend more than strong-opposition 
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municipalities.  This is likely because oppositions can sometimes veto mayoral attempts to 
provide targeted, excludable goods to his supporters alone.  The difference between high-
opposition and low opposition municipalities very quickly becomes insignificant, but unlike the 
areas described above, these differences become statistically significant where supporting 
coalition size is above 60%, but with strong-opposition municipalities experiencing significantly 
greater spending than weak-opposition municipalities.   
One explanation for these differences may be that municipalities with large supporting 
coalitions and weak oppositions actually represent municipalities where mayors and their 
supporters use extra-judicial means to control municipal governing institutions, thereby ensuring 
that they need not provide services to large supporting coalitions, as suggested by Trounstine in 
the US municipal context (Trounstine 2008a;  2010).  However, a set of secondary statistical 
tests  
suggest that these municipalities—those with large supporting coalitions and weak oppositions—
are actually more likely to engage in ostensibly democratic procedures such as participatory 
budgeting and citizen engagement in policy-setting through citizen roundtables and town 
meetings, implying that these are municipalities are more, not less responsive to citizen demands. 
A second explanation is that municipalities with weak and strong oppositions and large 
supporting coalitions differ in some way which is not included in the model but correlated with 
housing and urban development, social welfare spending, and industrial support spending.  One 
possible candidate is urbanization.  Perhaps urban municipalities—where housing policy, social 
welfare policy, and industrial policy are more important—are more likely to have strong 
oppositions.  However, urbanization is already included in the model as a control variable 
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(percent of local population located in an urban area), so urbanization is unlikely to explain these 
differences.   
Therefore, I tentatively conclude that these results are a result of differences between these 
policy areas and the others used here as dependent variables.  Industrial policy, social welfare 
benefits, and housing and urban development policy are more likely to take the form of private 
than public or club goods provision, compared to policy areas like education, public health, and 
sanitation service provision.  It is likely, therefore, that where oppositions seek to pursue private 
or club benefits for their constituencies, they are more likely to press for benefits in these areas.  
Further, mayoral administrations are most likely to agree with these policies where supporting 
coalition sizes are large, in a sort of universal-benefit coalition arrangement, as discussed by 
scholars of congressional appropriations in the United States (Collie 1988; Ferejohn 1974; 
Weingast and Shepsle 1981; Weingast 1979). 
Qualitative evidence 
In general, observations from the field are consistent with these statistical results.  If the 
causal process outlined in the theory section does, in fact, explain the outcomes observed in 
public service provision in Peruvian municipalities, at least five processes should also be 
observable in Peruvian municipal governance.  First, despite rules which mandate that mayors’ 
parties receive a majority or more on municipal councils, strong but minority oppositions must 
sometimes be capable of vetoing mayoral policy.  Second, oppositions must sometimes veto 
mayoral policies when those policies are perceived as benefitting only the mayor’s constituency.  
Third, oppositions must acquiesce to policy which benefits most voters or residents in the 
jurisdiction.  Fourth, mayors should reward supporters with public services, and finally, those 
constituencies should reward the mayor with their political support, in return.  Clear examples of 
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all these dynamics are visible across Peru.  Here, I highlight several strong examples of these 
dynamics from several Peruvian municipalities. 
First, in order for the theory identified above to adequately explain the regression results 
presented here, Peruvian opposition parties must be capable of vetoing or altering mayoral 
policies, despite the fact that election rules never permit opposition parties to hold majorities in 
municipal councils.  I argue that, because local political parties are often disorganized, and 
because divisions often exist within mayoral factions, it is often possible for opposition parties to 
stop or alter mayoral policies.  The district municipality of Ranrahirca, in the Callejón de 
Huaylas, about 28 miles North of the central Andean city of Huaraz, is an excellent example of 
this dynamic.  Here, a relatively weak opposition is able to veto mayoral policies, with the 
support of splinter elements of the mayor’s own party.  In Ranrahirca, mayoral intransigence in 
the face of requests for documentation of municipal expenditures—in the interest of government 
transparency—is an important contributor to the fractionalization of the mayor’s party.  In this 
case, the result is a slow-moving government which is unable to carry out many municipal 
functions.  For example, the municipal government is unable to spend significant portions of the 
municipal budget, consistent with the theory presented above, in which oppositions should 
attempt to veto mayoral policies where those policies are seen not to benefit their own 
supporters, leading to lower level of expenditure overall.   
This second component of the theory presented above—that municipal oppositions should 
attempt to veto policies which are seen not to benefit their constituencies—was also visible in the 
provincial municipality of Carhuaz, only ten miles Southeast of Ranrahirca.  Here, the mayoral 
administration is widely perceived as favorable only to rural interests, and in fact, the mayor is 
associated with a national-level party, Partido Nacionalista Peruano, which seeks a rural 
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constituency.  In Carhuaz, unlike Ranrahirca, the mayor’s party is reasonably cohesive, and as a 
result, the opposition has little success in pursuing their own policy goals.  However, opposition 
parties, representative of interests located in the municipal town center—the urban capital of the 
municipality—are vocal opponents of the mayor’s policy, arguing that the mayor is clientelist, 
corrupt, and authoritarian.   
Where mayoral policy is broadly beneficial to mayoral supporters as well as opposition 
supporters, however, the theory and statistical results presented above suggest that opposition 
parties should acquiesce to mayoral policy.  This dynamic is visible in Chavín de Huantar, a 
district municipality located about 30 miles East of Carhuaz, on the Eastern slope of the Andean 
spine.  Here, the municipal council’s sole opposition party councilman explained that he was 
supportive of mayoral policy because, although his party differed from that of the mayor, 
mayoral policy favored most residents of the municipality, leaving him little reason to complain.  
Indeed, this observation seemed unsurprising, as Chavín has an extremely active municipal 
government carrying out a wide range of public works projects in all parts of the municipality, 
including rural school and health clinic construction, rural electrification, and beautification of 
the urban core of the municipality.      
Finally, qualitative observations suggest that mayors do seek to reward supportive 
constituencies with public services, and these constituencies reciprocate with further political 
support.  One clear example comes from the provincial municipality of Anta, Cusco, where rural 
community leaders from the village of Paltaybamba—a village strongly supportive of the 
mayoral faction in the 2006 elections—were rewarded with a rural electrification project.  This 
project, the first public works project that had ever reached the rural community, brought 
electricity to the village for the first time, and cemented the loyalty of village residents, which 
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could then be reliably counted upon to support the mayor and his party’s candidates in the 
upcoming municipal elections.   
In summary, qualitative observations from Peruvian municipalities illustrate the plausibility 
of the causal path theorized above, linking opposition strength with particularistic exchange.  
Minority oppositions are capable of vetoing mayoral policy, and attempt to do so where mayoral 
spending fails to benefit opposition supporters.  However, oppositions acquiesce to mayoral 
spending policy where that policy is broadly beneficial to voters, including opposition 
supporters.  Finally, mayors do seek to retain the support of targeted constituencies through the 
provision of public works and services, and in return, benefitted constituencies reciprocate with 
political support for the mayor.   Although these qualitative observations are not conclusive, 
combined with the results of the statistical data analysis presented above, they provide very 
strong evidence for theory which suggests that oppositions attempt (and often succeed) at 
vetoing mayoral policies which are targeted at mayoral supporters but fail to benefit opposition 
supporters.   
Conclusion 
Scholars have long recognized that democracies provide more public goods than autocracies 
(Ames 1987; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Baum and Lake 2003; Brown 1999;  2002;  
2000; Brown and Hunter 2004; Brown and Mobarak 2009; Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, 
and Morrow 2003; Lake and Baum 2001; Stasavage 2005b;  2005a).  However, the factors that 
affect public service provision within democracies are less well understood.  Elsewhere, I have 
found that supporting coalition size is closely associated with spending on public services in a 
range of policy areas (chapter 3).  Here, I test the effect of opposition strength on this 
relationship. 
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A number of scholars suggest that divided or fragmented governments are more likely to 
provide targeted goods to well-defined constituencies, as those constituencies’ representatives 
negotiate with agenda-setters, demanding services for their particular constituencies (Cheibub 
2006; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Heller 1997; D. McKay 2009; O'Halloran and Lohmann 
1994).  On the other hand, a different set of scholarly works implies that divided or fragmented 
governments are less likely to provide targeted goods to specific constituencies, and are more 
likely to provide public goods to large portions of the population because fragmentation allows 
oppositions to hold governing cliques accountable (Gehlbach and Malesky 2010; M. De 
Secondat 1914; D. McKay 2009). 
Here, I test these contending theoretical assertions using data from approximately 1600 
Peruvian municipal governments with varying degrees of fragmentation, supported with 
qualitative observations from approximately one year of fieldwork. 
I find substantial evidence for the assertion that fragmentation—and strong opposition 
factions—leads to lower levels of targeted provision.  The interaction term which is the 
independent variable of interest here behaves in a way which is consistent with the notion that, 
generally, oppositions provide oversight and accountability, and generally do not demand 
targeted services for their constituencies.  These results provide insights into the ways 
oppositions behave, and implies that institutions which limit the power of oppositions, such as 
those in Peru, are undesirable. 
In addition, qualitative observations from Peruvian municipalities demonstrate the 
plausibility of the causal path theorized here.   
These results suggest that oppositions are often a constructive force in public goods 
provision, preventing so-called “clientelist” exchange, in which politicians’ supporters are 
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rewarded and reciprocate with further political support, while opposition supporters are 
bypassed, but permitting the provision of broadly-beneficial services.   
In a few policy areas, however, the statistical tests presented above generate anomalous 
results which are not adequately explained by either theory tested here.  These findings deserve 
further inquiry and explanation. 
In addition, the topic examined here deserves serious further study.  A number of other 
contextual factors should be tested for their relationships with public service spending and 
targeted service provision.  These factors include (but should not be limited to) (a) the role of 
civil society, and (b) the role of economic inequality in promoting or preventing particularistic 
exchange.  Next, in chapter five, I address the first of these two factors—the role of civil society 
in promoting or preventing particularism.   
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Civil Society and Particularistic Exchange 
Chapter 5 
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Introduction 
Particularistic exchange—the exchange of voter support for tangible government benefits for 
a particular group of supporters—sometimes called “clientelism,” “particularism,” or “pork 
barrel politics,” is widespread in the developing world, and appears to be endemic to Peru.  This 
fact is documented in chapter 3 of this dissertation, and noted by a number of scholars of 
Peruvian politics (Crabtree 2010; Giugale, Retes-Cibils, and Newman 2007; Hordijk 2005; 
Munoz, Paredes, and Thorp 2007).   
Definitions of clientelism, particularism, and pork vary (see, for example Keefer 2007 and 
Roniger 1994 for different definitions).  However, most scholars agree that particularism 
involves the exchange of political support (by citizens) for tangible government benefits or 
services (by politicians).  Further, most agree that clientelism is undesirable, as it is anti-
democratic, inequitable, and economically inefficient (Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2006; 
Escobar 1994; Gunes-Ayata 1994a;  1994b; Kaufmann et al. 2010; Keefer 2007; Roniger 1994; 
Silva 1994). 
In the previous chapter, therefore, I seek to identify factors that mitigate or facilitate 
clientelism and particularistic exchange in Peru.  I focus on the institutional strength of 
opposition parties, and I test the effect of opposition strength on particularistic exchange.  I 
provide evidence that strong oppositions in municipal governments play an oversight role in 
preventing municipal spending which is targeted at narrow constituencies.  In short, strong 
oppositions play a role in preventing particularistic exchange.  More specifically, strong 
oppositions reduce public expenditures where those expenditures target benefits at small groups 
of political supporters.  Where expenditures benefit larger proportions of the local population, 
however, oppositions usually have no visible effect on expenditures. 
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Here, I expand the investigation to examine the effects of civil society density on 
particularistic exchange13.  Scholars have suggested that dense civil society may impede 
clientelism (Escobar 1994), because civil society (a) may make information gathering about 
government performance less costly for citizens and (b) may facilitate collective mobilization, 
making citizen oversight easier and more effective (Escobar 1994; Iversen, Sen, Verschoor, and 
Dubey 2009; Sobel 2002).  However, there is also evidence that dense civil society can promote 
clientelism-like exchange for similar reasons.  By allowing groups to mobilize and promote their 
particularistic interests rather than broad societal interests and the public good, civil society may 
sometimes encourage clientelism-like politics that favor particular groups (Aldrich 2008; Aldrich 
and Crook 2007; Gunes-Ayata 1994b;  1994a; Iversen, Sen, Verschoor, and Dubey 2009).      
Therefore, what is the effect of civil society on public goods provision?  And further, under 
what conditions does civil society promote, and under what conditions does it prevent 
particularistic exchange?  Here, I use statistical data analysis of municipal-level governance data 
from Peru and qualitative data gathered in the course of approximately one year of in-depth 
fieldwork to determine what effect, if any, civil society density has on clientelism-like exchange, 
I find that civil society density seems to lessen the scale of clientelism.  Specifically, civil society 
density is associated with lower expenditures where those expenditures are most likely to be 
particularistic, but greater spending where those expenditures are most likely to be broadly 
beneficial.   
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows:  First, I present some background 
regarding clientelism, civil society, and Peruvian local governance.  Second, I present a summary 
                                                
13 Here, I define civil society density as the number of memberships in formal organizations which are not managed 
by government itself.  As described below, I use a proxy for this concept, which is the number of memberships in 
several specific organizations which exist in most municipalities across Peru (see “Independent Variables of 
Interest”, below).  
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of the literature on civil society, using the literature to generate two contending hypotheses that 
make opposing predictions.  Third, I describe my empirical approach, including my data and 
methodology, and identifying how I operationalize the relationships I examine here.  Fourth, I 
present my empirical findings, followed by a discussion of my statistical and qualitative results.  
Finally, I present some conclusions and implications of these results.   
Background: Civil Society and Peruvian Governance 
In chapter two, I generated the hypothesis that politicians will spend more on public services 
where they have greater numbers of supporters to reward for their political support.  Indeed, 
there is a strong and statistically significant correlation between public spending in a range of 
policy areas.  This statistical relationship strongly suggests that clientelism-like, particularistic 
exchange is an important cause of variation in public service provision in Peru.  Further, 
qualitative observations strongly suggest that the exchange of government services for political 
support is commonplace in Peru and elsewhere around the world.  A number of characteristics 
may make clientelism-like exchange more likely in the context of Peruvian municipal 
government compared to other places around the world.  I outline these characteristics in this 
section.   
Supporting coalition size and public service provision 
In chapter three, I present strong evidence that clientelism-like exchange is an important 
cause of variation in public service provision across Peruvian municipalities, after outlining a 
theory of particularistic provision of government services in chapter 2.  I present statistical 
evidence for the presence and importance of clientelism-like exchange (see Figure 1).  These 
results are inconsistent with two major theories of the democratic provision of government 
services, including a theory of electoral competition which argues that governments will provide 
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more services where margins of victory are small14 (Lake and Baum 2001), and a theory of 
democratic institutions15 (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003).  In short, 
because particularistic exchange is an important driver of government service expenditures, 
expenditures rise as politicians’ supporting coalitions (as measured by vote share) increase in 
size, because larger supporting coalitions mean larger numbers of supporters to reward for their 
support and loyalty.  For greater detail regarding this theory and supporting empirics, see 
chapters two and three.   
 
Figure 1: Typical particularistic effects. The strong and highly significant relationship between 
supporting coalition size and transportation project spending demonstrates particularistic 
exchange.  This graphic was originally generated with 95% confidence intervals around the 
predicted variables with control variables held at their means, but the confidence intervals were 
so close as to be indistinguishable from the predicted values themselves.  Note that the grey X 
markers represent predicted values with other variables in the model held at their observed 
values, while the black line (and indistinguishable confidence intervals) represents predicted 
values with all control variables held at their means. 
                                                
14 In fact, margin of victory makes little difference once supporting coalition size is controlled. 
15 Electoral institutions are constant across Peruvian municipalities, so cannot explain variation in government 
service provision. 
132 
Local government data and generalizable theory 
Although theories of democracy have traditionally been tested on samples of nation-states, I 
use the increasingly common approach of testing generalizable theories using sub-national data 
(Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010; Brehm and Rahn 1997; McKay 2009; Trounstine 2008; 
2010). This approach is superior in several ways to the use of cross-national data.  First, Peruvian 
municipalities operate according to essentially identical institutional rules, eliminating one 
potentially confounding source of variation.  Second, the unique nature of Peruvian local 
electoral rules (a) make it very easy to distinguish supporting coalition size, and (b) also tends to 
create an unusually large amount of variation in supporting coalition size, compared to other 
electoral democracies.  Finally, the operation of municipal governments is important as a 
research topic in its own right, as a substantial number of governments around the world now 
operate under some degree of decentralization (Lessmann and Markwardt 2010; Ribot 2002; 
Treisman 2007; World Resources Institute 2003, 2005).  It is also true that this approach raises 
questions about the external validity of any inferences drawn from such a sample, but as part of a 
much larger research program, analysis like that presented here has can play a role in developing 
knowledge of the way that democratic governments function. 
Civil society groups in Peru 
In much of Peru, civil society is an interesting intermixture of organizations associated with 
traditional forms of indigenous, communal governance and modern civil society groups.  
Because traditional institutions can impose sanctions for violation of communal norms and 
agreements, and because traditional organizations overlap in membership and function with more 
modern forms of civic engagement, this mixture may make Peruvian civil society groups 
particularly dynamic and powerful, making Peru, again, a critical case for the study of civil 
society and particularism.    
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The measures of civil society density used here are measures of “modern” civil society 
groups—groups such as women’s organizations, workers’ and peasants’ groups, and 
neighborhood associations (as opposed to organizations which are linked closedly with local 
indigenous traditions)16.  These types of organizations, in the Peruvian milieu, resemble similar 
organizations elsewhere around the developed and developing world, in that they include 
volunteer membership, are generally organized by a committee (typically headed by an elected 
president and secretary), meet regularly in formal meetings, and do not include binding rules or 
sanctions for participation or non-participation.   
However, these types of organizations—typically with some loose but formal organization, 
including a general conception of group membership, some leadership hierarchy chosen through 
some formal process such as elections, and regular meetings—overlap with much older, 
traditional forms of communal governance, which originated during the pre-Columbian period.   
These traditional forms of governance vary widely, but are often geographically based, 
associated with a village or cluster of villages, operate through a process of consensus, and are 
much more informally organized, typically led by respected, older community members.  Such 
village organizations are usually not formally associated with modern forms of government such 
as municipal governments, but often cooperate and overlap with modern governments, much like 
modern civil society groups.   
Traditional organizations command few financial resources, but can operate through a 
powerful system of graduated social sanctions which permit communities to sanction wayward 
neighbors for transgressions of community rules or violations of communal agreements.  Such 
organizations often operate informally.  These punishments range from verbal warnings, 
                                                
16 Described in greater detail in “Empirical Strategy,” below. 
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demands for financial compensation and public shaming to more severe punishments, including 
corporal punishment, property damage, ostracism, and in extreme cases, the exclusion of 
community members from communally-owned lands. 
In addition to such communal organizations, Andean communities engage in a complex 
series of cooperative social relationships in which individuals give and receive aid, in the form of 
labor, from other members in their community and neighboring communities in a reciprocal 
fashion at key times of the year, or during major projects (harvest, construction activities, etc.)   
These traditional forms of governance and mutual aid often overlap with modern civil society 
organizations in terms of membership, leadership, and function.  These inter-linked civil society 
networks can be particularly effective at mobilization because of the tangible sanctions imposed 
by traditional organizations.  However, because of poverty, low levels of education and literacy, 
language and other barriers, civil society networks in Peru also vary substantially in terms of 
their level of organization and effectiveness in coordinating and mobilizing local populations.  
Nevertheless, where dense, civil society in Peru is likely to make collective mobilization 
particularly likely.  As a result, Peru may be a critical case for the study of civil society’s effects 
on clientelism and particularism; if civil society fails to impact particularism in Peru, it may be 
unlikely to affect particularism in other settings where it may be less powerful. 
Theory and Empirics on Democracy, Civil Society, and Particularism 
Scholars have long noted the apparent correlation between democracy and public goods 
(Ansell 2008; Baum and Lake 2003; Brown 1999; Brown and Hunter 2004; Bueno De Mesquita, 
Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Lake and Baum 2001; Olson 1993; McGuire and Olson 
1996).  In chapter two, I develop a theory in chapter two that argues that this relationship is due 
to particularistic or clientelistic exchange of political support (by voters) in exchange for 
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government services (by politicians).  In chapter three, I provide evidence in support of the 
theory, based on large-N statistical analysis of municipal-level data from Peru, and qualitative 
data from fieldwork in Latin America and primary historical research.  Here, I examine the effect 
of civil society on particularistic exchange.  
Since Robert Putnam’s publication of Making Democracy Work (1994), the civil society, 
social capital, and civic engagement literature has exploded, becoming one of the major streams 
of research in the social sciences (Sobel 2002).  This research program, however, presents two 
types of theoretical arguments that imply that civil society can either promote or prevent 
particularism.   On one hand, by reducing information costs, encouraging interpersonal trust and 
collective action, and facilitating mobilization, civil society may discourage particularistic policy 
and encourage the broadly beneficial provision of government services (Escobar 1994; Gunes-
Ayata 1994a; Kingston 2008; Krishna 2007a; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994; Sobel 2002).  
On the other hand, if civil society engagement is distributed unevenly, civil society may make 
particularism more common (Aldrich 2008; Aldrich and Crook 2007; C. J. Anderson and 
Paskeviciute 2006; El-Said and Harrigan 2009; Fox 1996; Gunes-Ayata 1994b).   
In two classic papers, Weingast and Shepsle model legislators’ preferences for district-
specific, pork barrel spending.  They argue that legislators will prefer spending bills which 
provide benefits to all or most districts in order to reduce uncertainty about future benefits 
(Weingast 1979; Weingast and Shepsle 1981).  Following a similar logic, I argue that most civil 
society groups will act strategically, tending to push for broadly beneficial benefits, in order to 
reduce the probability that policies will exclude them in the future.   
Both of these arguments imply nuanced, interactive relationships between civil society 
density, supporting coalition size, and government service provision, outlined below.   
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Civil society may facilitate particularistic exchange 
Many contemporary works suggest or imply that civic engagement, social capital, or civil 
society may facilitate or promote particularism or clientelism-like exchange through a number of 
mechanisms.  
Perhaps the most important of these arguments, for the purposes of the analysis presented 
here, is that uneven social capital can promote particularism and uneven public goods provision 
across geographic areas, (and uneven provision of “public bads”—Aldrich’s term for public 
goods with undesirable spillovers).  In short, policy-makers will cater to the needs of groups of 
citizens who are well-organized, at the expense of less well-organized citizens, resulting in a 
pork barrel-like or clientelism-like process of exchange in which elected politicians pander to 
well-organized constituencies in exchange for electoral support (Aldrich and Crook 2007; 
Aldrich 2008).   
Aldrich and Crook (2007) present evidence that this dynamic determined policy in New 
Orleans and other parts of the Gulf coast after hurricanes Katrina and Rita, where well-organized 
communities pressured politicians and bureaucrats to place temporary housing trailers—viewed 
as undesirable—elsewhere, leading to a concentration of trailers in poor, under-organized 
neighborhoods.  Aldrich (2008) suggests that a similar dynamic has taken place in Japan, where 
nuclear power plants and other industrial facilities are placed in locations where civil society is 
less dense.   
Adhikari and Goldey see a similar dynamic in the sustainability of community-based 
organizations in Nepal, where divided communities with uneven social capital have a harder time 
sustaining self-organization because of elite capture (Adhikari and Goldey 2010). Other scholars 
find similar results cross-nationally (C. J. Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006). 
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Another set of researchers suggests other reasons why civil society may be associated with 
greater levels of particularistic exchange.  Several scholars suggest that clientelistic networks are 
themselves one type of independent association and that they generate social capital (El-Said and 
Harrigan 2009; Gunes-Ayata 1994b;  1994a).  El-Said and Harrigan describe changes in social 
capital over time in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, presenting a definition of Jordanian 
traditional modes of social capital—called wasta—which is nearly identical to many scholars’ 
definition of clientelism.  According to El-Said and Harrigan, wasta means “to employ a middle 
man, broker, go-between or intermediary—usually a person of high social status and accepted 
rank—to achieve one’s ends.”  In effect, this suggests that in some cases, social capital may be 
identical to clientelism (El-Said and Harrigan 2009).   Similarly, Fox argues that in authoritarian 
settings, civil society organizations will only be sustainable where civil society actors have 
connections with political elites that can provide them with tangible benefits (Fox 1996).  
Although Fox is interested in authoritarian settings, much the same results might be present in 
weak democracies like Peru.  Finally, Iversen et al. argue that social networks have important 
micro-level effects that affect individuals unevenly, including in economic job-seeking (Iversen, 
Sen, Verschoor, and Dubey 2009).   
Therefore, this body of research suggests the following hypothesis: 
H1: Places with denser civil society will experience greater particularistic exchange, such 
that spending will be higher where it benefits small groups (small supporting coalition sizes) 
and will be lower where it benefits large proportions of local residents (large supporting 
coalition sizes). 
Civil society may discourage particularistic exchange 
In Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam argues that civic engagement, social capital, 
and interpersonal trust allow citizens in Northern Italy to cooperate to pursue policies which are 
broadly beneficial.  The result is the prosperous North’s divergence from Southern Italy, where 
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social capital is much weaker. As a result, in the South, clientelism-like exchange takes place 
between politicians and voters, who pursue personal and familial gains at the expense of others.  
In short, particularism and clientelism-like exchange are the natural result of a social-capital 
scarce polity.  In social capital-rich polities, however, citizens develop greater interpersonal trust, 
which allows them to overcome the collective action problem of particularistic policy making, 
leading to greater public goods provision, and policy which is broadly beneficial, and produces a 
secure society, and one with high rates of economic growth and corresponding prosperity 
(Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994). 
Many recent publications concur with Putnam in arguing that social capital discourages 
particularistic exchange.  For example, Escobar suggests that civic engagement and civil society 
has reduced the reach of clientelistic networks amongst poor rural people in Northern Colombia 
(Escobar 1994).  Sobel notes important claims that civil society density and social capital makes 
information less costly, and therefore, makes particularistic exchange less likely (Sobel 2002). 
Krishna notes an empirical correlation over time between higher levels of social capital and 
lower levels of inequality, suggesting that, empirically, social capital does not encourage 
unequally-beneficial policy (Krishna 2007a).  Finally, Kingston generates a game theoretic 
model that suggests that informal ties between individuals can help citizens overcome collective 
action problems to fight a “culture of corruption” which permits or facilitates particularistic 
exchange and other forms of corruption (Kingston 2008).  Interestingly, Stokes argues that 
interpersonal trust facilitates, rather than prevents clientelistic exchange, although in a way 
which suggests that civil society density would, itself, prevent clientelism; where accountability 
is easier (including in environments where citizens can effectively gather information about 
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politicians’ performance), clientelism is less likely, as long as citizens are skeptical of 
politicians’ intentions (Stokes 2005).  
One puzzle is why relatively small civil society groups (each of which will generally only 
contain a tiny minority a given population) might prefer to prefer to exchange broadly-beneficial 
policies rather than narrowly-targeted policies for their political support.  One likely answer 
comes from classic studies on US Congress.  In two classic papers by Shepsle and Weingast 
model legislators’ preferences for distributional (particularistic) spending under conditions of 
uncertainty.  They find that, although legislators and their constituents might benefit more over 
the short term by forming minimum winning coalitions that distribute benefits between as small 
a number of districts as possible (so each district receives the maximum amount possible), 
legislators may prefer super-sized or universal coalitions which provide some benefits to all 
districts in situations of repeated play.  This is because, although each district will benefit more 
from the formation of minimum winning coalitions and the provision of narrowly-targeted 
benefits to those districts, in any budgetary cycle, just under half of all districts will be left out of 
the winning coalition.  Therefore, in any budgetary cycle, legislators face a high probability that 
they will be excluded from the winning coalition and will receive no benefits.  However, through 
the development of a norm of universal or super-sized coalitions, whereby all legislators take a 
smaller pie of the spending pie, all or nearly all legislators can be guaranteed some benefit in 
every budgetary cycle.  In essence, if legislators prefer to receive some benefits in every cycle 
rather than maximum benefits in some fiscal cycles a universalist norm will arise, whereby all 
districts will receive some benefits in each cycle (Weingast and Shepsle 1981; Weingast 1979).   
A similar logic leads to the prediction that civil society groups will prefer a “fair” distribution 
of benefits, whereby all segments of society—or at least, all groups represented by civil society 
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groups—will pursue broadly distributed benefits. In order to maximize the probability that they 
will receive some benefits in most budgetary cycles, civil society groups will prefer universal 
benefits, or benefits for large majorities, rather than benefits focused on their own small group.  
This does not necessarily mean that civil society groups will pursue public goods—instead, they 
may pursue the provision of broadly distributed club or private goods.  But according to this 
logic, civil society groups will, over time, tend to collude so that all groups receive some 
benefits. 
This theoretical argument, and the literature described above, suggests Hypothesis 2, tested 
here: 
H2: Places with denser civil society will experience less particularistic exchange, such that 
spending will be lower where it benefits only small groups (small supporting coalitions) and 
will be greater where it benefits larger numbers of local residents (large supporting 
coalitions). 
In short, the literature provides empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that civil society 
may be either positively or negatively associated with particularistic exchange.  I argue, 
however, that uncertainty over time will lead to cooperation between civil society groups, 
leading civil society to reduce particularism and clientelism.  In this chapter, I test both theories 
using an under-utilized quantitative dataset from Peru.  I describe my data and methods in the 
next section.   
Theory and Operationalization: Taxing and Spending and Service Provision 
Here, I present several theoretical innovations.  In addition, I describe the operationalization 
of the hypotheses presented above. 
In government fiscal policy, politicians gather tax revenues, generally from the whole 
population, then decide whether these revenues should be spent in areas which benefit the 
population as a whole, or on specific individuals or groups.  Groups have a short-term incentive 
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to lobby for group-specific expenditures so that they individually receive greater benefits from 
government expenditures (Olson 1965), leading to greater particularism.  However, groups may 
collude to generate broadly-beneficial spending policies, in which governments provide broadly-
spread club or private goods, or public goods.   
There are strong reasons to believe that groups will tend to resist policies that they pay for 
(through taxation), but from which they do not benefit.  However, groups’ level of success in 
resisting those policies will depend on a number of factors, including their level of social capital, 
which is itself associated with civil society density.   
Civil society groups might, however, press for particularistic spending policies—policies 
which benefit their own small group—or they might pressure politicians for broadly beneficial 
public goods.  The results of these pressures will be different than the results of political 
polarization, discussed in the previous chapter, because unlike opposition groups in Peruvian 
local governments, civil society actors can play the role of agenda setter, pressuring mayors and 
opposition politicians to change agendas throughout the policy process.   
Hypothesis 1: Civil society may promote particularism 
Where particularism is salient, dense civil society may (a) encourage particularistic exchange 
which benefits small groups over majorities, as well as (b) promote greater expenditures where 
policy is not targeted at small groups, but designed to be broadly beneficial.   
Where civil society is weak, the relationship between supporting coalition size and public 
goods spending and provision will resemble that shown in Figure 1 (below).  Specifically, as 
supporting coalition sizes increase, spending on public services will increase.  This is because 
politicians will use public service provision to reward their supporters—and ensure their 
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loyalty—and as numbers of supporters increase, there will be more voters to reward, and 
therefore, more money will be spent.   
If civil society density is unevenly spread among the population, if civil society organizations 
are associated with specific parties, and if civil society members’ preferences are, on average in 
favor of the provision of private, rather than public goods, civil society groups may promote 
particularistic exchange, and greater civil society density will be associated with greater amounts 
of particularism. 
 
Figure 2: Hypothesis 1.  If civil society density increases particularist exchange, the relationship 
between supporting coalition size and spending on government services will be similar in high-
density and low-density cases.  However, in high density cases, the intercept will be higher.  This 
is because civil society groups will press successfully for greater quantities of government 
services as targeted, excludable, private goods where supporting coalitions are small, and where 
they are large, they will successfully press for greater quantities of public goods.   
In this case, the relationship between civil society density, public service spending, and 
supporting coalition size will resemble that in figure 2.  As supporting coalition size increases, so 
will spending on government services, regardless of the density of civil society.  However, low 
civil society density municipalities will spend less on government services than high density 
municipalities across the board.  This is because civil society groups in dense municipalities will 
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be able to successfully press for greater amounts of government spending.  In municipalities 
where supporting coalitions are small, this spending will be concentrated in areas which are more 
excludable—so called private goods or club goods—and targeted at groups of supporters.  
However, in municipalities where supporting coalitions are large, governments will spend more 
on broadly-beneficial policies, including broadly distributed club goods and public goods 
provision.   
Therefore, regardless of supporting coalition size, civil society density will be associated 
with greater spending on government services.  Where supporting coalitions are large, this may 
be desirable, as civil society pressures may result in greater quantities of services reaching most 
segments of the population.  However, where supporting coalitions are small, it indicates that 
governments are redistributing greater revenues from the population as a whole to small groups 
of supporters, through taxation and spending policy, which may be inequitable  
Hypothesis 2: Civil society may prevent particularism 
On the other hand, civil society may discourage particularistic policy.  According to 
hypothesis 2, most civil society members will prefer to collude with other civil society groups to 
pursue policies that will be beneficial to most or all residents.  Over time, by developing a 
fairness norm under which all local residents receive something regardless of their position vis a 
vis the winning coalition, civil society groups will be able to reduce uncertainty that they will 
receive at least some benefits in a given budgetary cycle.   
The resulting theoretical predictions regarding the relationship between supporting coalition 
size, civil society density, and government service spending are visible in figure 3.   
Where supporting coalition size is small, high civil society density municipalities will spend 
less on government services, as civil society groups press governments not to spend tax revenue 
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in areas where those individuals will not benefit.  Where civil society is less dense, these 
individuals and networks will be less successful at preventing excludable goods provision, and 
therefore, spending will be higher.  In other words, civil society groups will promote policy 
which is more beneficial because it extracts fewer taxes from the majorities which receive no 
benefits from those policies. 
 
Figure 3: Hypothesis 2.  If civil society density prevents particularist exchange, municipalities 
with high civil society density will spend less on government services in municipalities where 
mayors have small supporting coalitions—where most spending is concentrated in excludable 
goods provision—but where supporting coalitions are larger—where spending tends to be non-
excludable goods provision—civil society groups will press for greater spending.   
Where supporting coalition size is large—and therefore, governments are inclined towards 
broadly-beneficial service provision with large positive spillovers—these relationships will 
reverse.  In these places, civil society will encourage the provision of broadly-based services 
because they will benefit from those goods, and even where civil society groups are connected 
with mayoral administrations such that they could benefit particularistically, they will press for 
broadly-beneficial services.  This is because of fairness norms which reduce uncertainty over 
time, as described by Shepsle and Weingast (1979) and Weingast (1981).  In these places, 
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citizens will be more successful in achieving these goals where civil society is dense.  Therefore, 
government service spending will be greater in places where civil society density is greater. 
Excludability and policy goals 
The theoretical argument presented in chapter two posits that politicians intentionally 
exclude non-supporters from the receipt of government services.  This implies the provision of 
excludable goods (club or private goods) or the provision of goods which might be non-
excludable under certain circumstances (education, for example) in an excludable way.  As I 
posit in chapter two, most government services are excludable to a greater or lesser degree.    
However, different government services are excludable to greater or lesser degrees; some 
services can be provided in an excludable way quite easily, while others are more difficult to 
provide in a way which excludes certain individuals or groups.   
Some services, such as the provision of sewage, water, or electrification services can be (and 
often are) provided in a highly targeted way, in which particular villages, neighborhoods, streets, 
or even residences are provided with these services, but others are not.  Because sewage, water, 
and electrification services benefit, almost exclusively, the individuals who live in the 
geographic zones where those services are provided, they are highly excludable.   
Other services, however, such as public health services, are used by area residents as well as 
non-residents.  Public health services often bring benefits to a broader population, by preventing 
the spread of disease and by servicing large geographic areas.   
Finally, some services can be provided in either excludable or non-excludable ways, such as 
education services or health services.  Health services, for example, can be highly public, when 
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they prevent the spread of easily communicable diseases.  Where they promote the health of 
particular villages or neighborhoods, however, they take the form of club goods.    
Where politicians, driven by political incentives and institutional constraints, pursue the 
support of important constituencies, the most important characteristic of a given policy project 
may be the degree to which the benefits of the policy can be limited to supportive constituencies.  
Therefore, politicians may strategically pursue particular types of projects which are more or less 
excludable, depending on the size of their supporting coalition and other factors.   
For example, mayors with large supporting coalitions will be more likely to pursue policies 
which have large positive spillovers, because more of the spillovers will be captured by their 
supporting coalition.  Conversely, mayors with small supporting coalitions will tend to pursue 
policies which are more excludable at the individual, neighborhood, or village level.  Mayors 
with large supporting coalitions, therefore, will be more likely to implement transportation, 
education, and public health programs.  On the other hand, mayors with small supporting 
coalitions will be more likely to pursue construction projects (so that that benefits can be directed 
at cronies and their employees) and in particular, construction projects in relatively excludable 
policy areas, such as water, sewage, and electricity service provision.    
Therefore, where mayors’ policy goals include the provision of club or private goods to key 
supporters, factors which promote particularistic exchange (including economic inequality) will 
tend to promote greater spending in more excludable areas.  Further, where mayors’ policy goals 
include the provision of broadly beneficial services (including the provision of public goods), 
variables associated with greater spending in broadly-beneficial policies will tend to promote 
spending in less excludable areas.   
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Following this logic, I present the following secondary hypotheses, which are themselves 
dependent on findings regarding H1 and H2: 
If tests of H1 and H2 show that civil society reduces particularism, 
H3:  Where government services are relatively more excludable (such as in sewage, water, 
and electrification project spending), high civil society density will be more likely to suppress 
spending regardless of supporting coalition size, as mayors shift funds into less excludable 
areas.  Where government services are relatively less excludable (such as in public health 
expenditures), civil society density will tend to promote greater expenditures, as mayors shift 
spending into these areas. 
On the other hand, if hypothesis tests of H1 and H2 demonstrate that civil society promotes 
particularism, 
H3:  Where government services are relatively more excludable (such as in sewage, water, 
and electrification project spending), high civil society density will be more likely to increase 
spending regardless of supporting coalition size, as mayors shift funds into less excludable 
areas.  Where government services are relatively less excludable (such as in public health 
expenditures), civil society density will tend to reduce expenditures, as mayors shift spending 
into these areas. 
Empirical Strategy 
These four hypotheses were tested using quantitative data analysis using municipal data from 
approximately 1600 Peruvian municipalities. 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables used here are identical to those used in Chapters 2 and 3.  The first 
dependent variable is spending on infrastructure development per capita—spending on new 
construction of public works projects completed in 2007—in several categories which are often 
treated as public goods, although they may include private, club, or public goods.  These include 
(a) transportation, (b) education, (c) and a summed total of spending on water, electrification, 
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and sewage projects17, as well as (d) the total of all these areas.  This data was gathered in the 
2008 Peruvian Registry of Municipalities by the Peruvian National Institute of Statistics and 
Informatics.  This data is available for about 1800 municipalities in each category.  I also use 
data on each of these spending categories in 2005 as a control.  
The second dependent variable used is total spending in each of several policy categories—
including education, housing and urban development, industrial policy, and several other policy 
areas.  This data was compiled from the Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finances, available 
on the internet at http://www.mef.gob.pe, and represents total spending from 2007.   
Independent variables of interest 
Here, I use three independent variables of interest, including a measure of supporting 
coalition size, a measure of the density of civil society, and an interaction term, which is the 
product of these other two variables. 
The first of these independent variables, supporting coalition size, is a measure of the 
percentage of municipal voters who supported the victorious mayoral candidate in the previous 
election.  This variable was generated using publicly available data through the Peruvian 
National Organization of Electoral Processes (ONPE), the independent government agency 
which oversees elections.  In earlier chapters, I have used this variable to measure the extent to 
which public expenditures are the result of support-service exchange—where support-service 
exchange is greater, the correlation between supporting coalition size and public spending will be 
greater, as politicians spend more money to satisfy a larger number of supporters, as suggested 
by Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003). 
                                                
17 The summed total of water, sewage, and electrification infrastructure project spending is, unfortunately, the way 
this data is provided by the Peruvian government, though I would of course prefer to use indicators of each of these 
three areas. 
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The second independent variable of interest is a proxy for the density of civil society.  This is 
a measure of the per capita membership of a number of prominent types of civil society 
organizations, including mothers’ groups, local committees for Peru’s Vaso de Leche conditional 
cash transfer program, local “people’s cafeteria” (comedor popular) volunteer committees, child-
care organizations, adults’ and juveniles’ social clubs, and an “other” category.  The Peruvian 
RENAMU (National Registry of Municipalities) provides this data, broken down by category.   
 
Figure 4:  Civil society density varies substantially across Peruvian regions.  Interestingly, 
civil society membership seems to be highest in the Southern Andean region.   
For each municipality, the total membership in all organizations was divided by the total 
municipal population, providing a per capita measure of civil society membership.  This measure 
ranges from near 0 to to over 3, roughly forming a poisson distribution, with the mean near .4.  
In other words, in the average Peruvian municipality, slightly less than 1 in 2 people are 
members of some civil society organization, but in some places, membership is closer to 1 in 
100, and in some places, on average, every person is a member in more than three organizations.  
Interestingly, civil society density is greatest in the Southern Andean region—a region with a 
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strong indigenous tradition, but a region where the Shining Path uprising was particularly salient 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.   
The third independent variable of interest here is an interaction term, which is the product of 
both the civil society density and supporting coalition measures, such that very high values 
represent municipalities where there is both large supporting coalitions and high civil society 
density.  This variable will measure the extent to which the effect of “civil society density” on 
public spending will vary across different values of “supporting coalition size.”   
Control variables 
In addition to the independent variables of interest listed above, I include a number of control 
variables in the model.   
First, I include several variables made available through INEI which were generated based on 
the 2007 Peruvian census, including the average level of education in each municipality, 
population (logged), urban population (logged), and a consumption measure.  The consumption 
measure is designed to provide a measure of standards of living where many citizens, 
particularly in rural areas, do not participate in the cash economy with any intensity, and is 
derived from a series of standard Peruvian Government (INEI) poverty indicators.  This is a 
count of the average number of household appliances—radio, television, washer/dryer, 
refrigerator, sound equipment—owned by families in the municipality.   
I also include several control variables from RENAMU data—each model includes a control 
variable, which is the percentage of completed project funding in each policy area which was 
funded with private donations.  This is meant to address concerns that private donors might use 
funding to influence municipal priorities.  Because there is no conditionality associated with 
transfers from regional or national governments, there is no need to include a similar measure for 
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government project transfers in each area.  In the models in which the dependent variable is 
public works project spending, I also control for spending in the previous mayoral term (year 
2005).   
For summary statistics of all the variables used here, see the appendix. 
Methodology 
The dependent variables in the first set of regression models presented here represent 
spending on projects completed in 2007, and many municipalities completed no projects in one 
or more policy areas in that year.  Therefore, the distributions of these dependent variables are 
skewed, with large numbers of cases at 0, and a long right tail.   
For dependent variables where the distribution follows approximately a poisson or negative 
binomial distribution—such as the public works project spending variables I use here—there are 
several appropriate techniques which can be used.  Standard poisson regression is not appropriate 
here, because the variance of the dependent variable (variance from the mean) is much greater 
than the mean, one of the important conditions for the appropriate use of poisson regression.  
However, extradispersed poisson regression is appropriate (that is, poisson regression with 
standard errors adjusted for the extra variance), as is negative binomial regression18 (Cameron 
and Trivedi 1998; Hoffman 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). 
Because of the large numbers of zeros in each of the dependent variables used here, I also 
test similar models using a zero-inflated poisson estimation strategy, which is appropriate where 
the variance on the dependent variable is inflated because of large numbers of zeros determined 
by some factor which can be incorporated in a two-stage model (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; 
Hoffman 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).   
                                                
18 I test these models both with and without heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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After examining each of these models, I compare goodness-of-fit statistics to determine the 
most appropriate link function (AIC, BIC, and log likelihood statistics).  In general, zero inflated 
poisson models produced the best model fit, but the models presented here provided 
substantively very similar results regardless of the estimation technique used.   
I ran a number of robustness checks on these models, including eliminating outliers, splitting 
samples in several ways, and running sensitivity tests by removing and adding control variables 
in groups and singly.  The models reported here were all robust to these tests.   
Where the dependent variable of these regressions is normal—this includes the variables 
measuring total spending in each policy category—I use heteroskedasticity-robust OLS 
regression.  I also test these models with a series of robustness checks, including plotting 
independent and dependent variables against residuals, examining the normality of residuals, and 
re-testing models with outliers excluded (high residual, cook’s d, and DFITS cases).  In general, 
the results I report here are robust to these checks, although in some cases—notably, health and 
sanitation spending, the exclusion of certain outliers does render the interaction term 
insignificant.   
My key independent variable here is an interaction between “supporting coalition size” and 
“civil society density.”  Because the coefficient and significance of the interaction term itself is 
not substantively meaningful or important (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005), I provide a 
graphic depiction of the effect of differing effects of “supporting coalition size” on public goods 
spending across values of “civil society density” and include regression tables in the appendix.   
A note on multicollinearity 
Elsewhere (in chapters 4 and 6), I test the effects of several other independent variables on 
the relationship between supporting coalition size and government spending in several spending 
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categories.  For purposes of display, I have shown my statistical regression models without the 
other chapters’ independent variables of interest.   
One concern, therefore, is that the results reported here are significant because important 
control variables—the independent variables of interest in the other chapters—are correlated 
with the independent variables of interest.  One way to allay these concerns is to test each 
interactive effect in a model where the other interactions are present.  Therefore, I have tested 
each of the models with each of the other interaction and base terms from the dissertation.   
In general, the results reported here are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables.  
There are a few exceptions, however, which deserve some note.  Where all interactions and base 
terms are included, the models which use total spending in a given policy category frequently 
become insignificant.  Directions of relationships do not change, however, and predicted values 
do not vary substantially.  In addition, where one set of interactions and base terms or another is 
included as a control (but not all interactions) these results are more often significant.  
 Therefore, the most likely explanation is that multicollinearity inflates the variance of these 
coefficients, leading to inefficient estimates.  This explanation is consistent with the correlation 
of interaction terms and their base terms, which frequently are worrisome.  For example, the 
inequality measure used here is correlated with its interaction (with supporting coalition size) at 
.76, opposition strength at .34, the opposition strength interaction with supporting coalition size 
at .15, as well as the standard of living (consumption) measure at .58.  These correlations raise 
legitimate concerns about overspecification, multicollinearity, and inefficient estimates, 
especially where each interaction and all included base terms are included in a regression model.  
Variance inflation statistics, when all variables are included in a given model are very high, 
ranging between 12.6 and 35.4, depending on the independent variable and dependent variable of 
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interest.  These numbers are high enough to suggest that inclusion of all independent variables of 
interest will generate false negative results.  These very high VIF statistics further demonstrate 
the extreme robustness of these results, where they remain significant.    
The following also deserves to be emphasized.  First, project spending models, with a larger 
number of observations, are robust to these controls.  Second, total spending models are robust to 
the inclusion of each interaction and base terms in sets.  Third, predicted values and the direction 
of relationships do not vary when these additional controls are included.  Fourth, total spending 
models have much smaller numbers of observations, making them more susceptible to problems 
of variance inflation through multicollinearity.  Finally, the correlation between the independent 
variables of interest here (supporting coalition size, civil society density, opposition strength, and 
inequality) is low enough that omitted variable bias should not be a concern, and where 
correlations are higher (such as between inequality and opposition strength, with r of .34), 
models are robust to the inclusion of the relatively well-correlated control variable. 
Results 
In general, statistical tests are much more supportive of hypothesis two (that dense civil 
society prevents particularistic policies) than hypothesis one.  In general, therefore, civil society 
tends to reduce particularistic exchange of votes for tangible goods and services.  However, 
although overall spending tends to respond to civil society pressures as predicted by hypothesis 
2, spending in particular policy areas often responds differently, suggesting that spending tends  
to be focused in one area or another based on the ease with which service provision may be 
provided in an excludable or non-excludable way.      
The variables of interest here are interacted, making interpretation from a standard regression 
table difficult.  In many cases, interaction terms which are statistically significant alone in a  
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Figure 5:  Civil society prevents particularistic exchange.  In most policy areas tested, results 
strongly support of hypothesis 2—that civil society prevents particularistic exchange.  Where 
supporting coalition size is small—and therefore, where most spending is targeted, excludable, 
‘private’ goods provision—municipalities with denser civil society have significantly lower 
levels of expenditures than municipalities where civil society is less dense.  Where supporting 
coalition size is large, however, and most expenditures are broadly beneficial ‘public goods’ 
provision with large positive spillovers, dense civil society municipalities spend more on 
government services with non-excludable benefits, like health and sanitation services and 
transportation projects. Total municipal spending also follows this pattern.  These graphs were 
made with differing civil society density for display purposes. In all graphs, “low density” is .1 
civil society memberships/capita.  In total project spending and total health and sanitation 
spending, “high density” is 2.1.  In the other graphs, “high density” is 1.1. Total ‘public goods’ 
spending includes health and sanitation, education, and transport—areas where most spending 
probably produces mostly non-excludable benefits. memberships/capita.  Confidence intervals 
are 95% joint confidence intervals around point predictions.  
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regression table are not substantively significant in combination with the interaction base terms, 
and often terms which appear insignificant are, in fact, substantively and jointly statistically 
significant.  The easiest way to interpret interactions is through the use of graphic depictions of  
statistical relationships (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005).  Here, the significance of the 
interaction term on its own is not important—what is important is the effect of each base term on 
the dependent variable, as it varies across the other base term.  Therefore, graphic depictions of 
the relationships of interest are provided here, and regression tables are included in the appendix. 
Civil society prevents particularism 
In general, results support hypothesis two—that particularistic exchange is lower where civil 
society is denser.  Results in several policy areas, including transportation project spending, total 
energy and mining spending, and total health and sanitation spending, are consistent with 
hypothesis two.  In addition, total spending, total project spending, and total public goods  
spending are associated with civil society density and supporting coalition size in the way 
predicted by hypothesis two.  For examples of these results, see the four graphs in figure 5.   
The upper left-hand graph shows the interactive effect of supporting coalition size and civil 
society density on transportation project spending (almost entirely spending on road construction 
and road upgrading).  First, regardless of the degree of civil society density, spending on 
transportation projects increases with supporting coalition size.  However, the slope of the 
relationship is much steeper where civil society is denser.  In municipalities with small 
supporting coalitions (below about 45% of the voting population), expenditures on transportation 
projects are lower in dense civil society municipalities.  These differences are significant where 
supporting coalition size is less than approximately 30% of local voters.  Where supporting 
coalition size is above about 45% of municipal voters, however, this difference reverses, and 
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municipalities with greater civil society density spend more on transportation projects.  This 
difference increases rapidly as supporting coalition size increases, and becomes significant where 
supporting coalitions are greater than about 80% of local voters.  The substantive differences in  
  
Figure 6:  Differing relationships.  In several policy areas, although civil society density has a 
significant impact on the relationship between supporting coalition size and government service 
spending, the relationship differs from that shown in figure 5.  In a few policy areas, such as 
education project spending and water, sewage, and electrification project spending, the 
relationship resembles that in the left-hand graph.  In these cases, civil society density is 
associated with lower spending across the board, but these differences become insignificant 
where supporting coalitions are large.  This result suggests that, in these policy areas, most 
spending, even where supporting coalitions are large, is excludable, and ‘private’.  In several 
other areas, including health project spending, administration and personnel (mostly wages and 
salaries), social welfare spending, and housing and urban development, the relationship 
resembles that shown in the right-hand graph, where civil society-dense municipalities have 
greater spending across the board.  These results, taken together, suggest that some policy areas 
may be more ‘public’ and non-excludable than others, and that services often considered 
“public,” such as education, may not be non-excludable.  Where incentives (such as civil society 
pressure) promote public or private goods provision, mayors will tend to allocate funds in more 
or less excludable areas.   
spending are quite substantial.  Where supporting coalition sizes are very small, high civil 
society density municipalities spend about 30 Soles/capita (about $10 US), while low civil 
society density municipalities spend more than three times more—about 100 Soles/capita (about 
$34).  Where supporting coalition sizes are larger, the differences are even more substantial.  
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Where supporting coalition sizes are about 60% of local voters, high civil society density 
municipalities spend about 300 Soles/capita (roughly $100), while low civil society density 
municipalities spend less than 200 Soles/capita.   
Similar dynamics exist in a number of other policy areas, including total spending on energy 
and mining, and total health and sanitation spending.  More importantly, however, this dynamic 
holds across spending more generally.  Total municipal spending, total project spending, and 
total spending on public goods (here, health and sanitation, education, and transportation) all 
respond in the same way to supporting coalition size and civil society density.   
These findings demonstrate that, in general, civil society plays a role in promoting 
accountability and oversight, and thereby, prevents particularistic exchange and promotes 
broadly beneficial public goods provision.   
Different policy areas respond differently 
Although total spending and spending in several policy areas respond to civil society density 
and supporting coalition size in the way predicted by hypothesis 2—that civil society will tend to 
reduce particularistic exchange—other policy areas respond differently to the joint effects of 
supporting coalition size and civil society density.  Two general types of dynamics are apparent 
in these relationships, which are consistent with hypothesis 3.  Here, I identify these alternate 
relationships. 
In several policy areas, particularistic exchange appears to vary with civil society density in 
much the same way as it responds to opposition strength (see chapter 3).  This relationship is 
shown in the left hand graph in figure 6.  Here, high civil society density is associated with lower 
levels of spending where supporting coalition sizes are small, but these differences become 
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insignificant where supporting coalition sizes are larger.  Education project spending and 
sewage, water, and electrification project spending both show this dynamic.   
In other policy areas, including health project spending, administration and personnel, social 
welfare spending, and housing and urban development, the relationship between supporting 
coalition size, civil society density, and spending is similar to that predicted by hypothesis 1.  In 
these areas, spending is greater where civil society is denser, regardless of supporting coalition 
size (although in most cases, the differences increase as supporting coalition size increases).   
Discussion 
Although the results presented here are broadly supportive of the second hypothesis 
presented above—that civil society density reduces particularistic exchange—these results also 
suggest that different policy areas, including different so-called “public goods” respond 
differently to the same pressures.  Here, I present one possible explanation for these different 
relationships.  In addition, I present qualitative evidence of the nature of the causal relationships 
between civil society density and particularistic exchange.  Finally, I discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of these results. 
Explaining differences across policy areas 
The differing interactive effect of civil society density on the relationship between supporting 
coalition size and spending in different policy areas is consistent with H3, above.  Some areas of 
spending respond differently to the combined effects of supporting coalition size and civil 
society density because spending is sorted into categories which are easier or more difficult to 
provide as excludable, private benefits.  Therefore, some areas only receive funding when large 
quantities of private or public goods are desired, leading to different relationships than those 
hypothesized.   
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Spending in nearly all policy areas can result in either the provision of non-excludable goods 
or excludable goods, but some services are easier to provide in a targeted, excludable way than 
others.  For example, project spending in electrification, sewage, ans water provision typically 
targets particular geographic regions, including villages or neighborhoods, and can easily be 
targeted at streets and even, in some cases, particular families.  Therefore, the provision of 
targeted, “private goods” or “club goods”is easy with such expenditures.  On the other hand, 
public health expenditures can much less easily be targeted at small constituencies or individuals, 
because most tasks undertaken by public health functionaries—including vaccination campaigns 
and the provision of sanitary facilities—are beneficial to the population broadly by preventing 
the outbreak and spread of disease.   
Where civil society groups prefer club or private goods, they may pressure mayors to spend 
on patronage and other private goods, and where they prefer public goods, they may pressure 
mayors to spend on public health and sanitation.   
Taken together, then, the results reported above suggest that, as a result of civil society 
pressure or other incentives, mayors differ in their preferences for private and public goods 
provision.  Based on the incentives they face, mayors sort spending into policy areas where it is 
easier or more difficult to target benefits to particular constituencies.  Thus, while total 
expenditures are associated with supporting coalition size and civil society density in a way 
which is consistent with hypothesis 2—that civil society density prevents particularistic 
exchange—in some policy areas, these dynamics look different, consistent with hypothesis 3, as 
mayors sort funds in and out of policy areas which are more or less excludable. 
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Qualitative evidence 
In general, qualitative evidence also supports the results and interpretation provided above.  
Carhuaz, Ancash, Peru, once again, provides a good example, this case, in the ways that civil 
society density helps promote collective action which prevents particularistic exchange. 
First, civil society organizations and civil society networks are useful mechanisms for 
promoting information flow and transparency about government activities within voting 
populations.  In Carhuaz, for example, NGOs, neighborhood groups, producers’ associations, 
village and peasant organizations overlapped, making it less costly for voters—particularly 
poorly educated rural voters—to gather information about the quality and quantity of 
government services.  Organizations with formal, cooperative relationships with local 
government personnel—including, for example, organic farmers’ cooperatives, small-animal 
raising associations, and neighborhood groups, were able to communicate with members, other 
citizens, and other organizations, through dense social networks, the frequency with which the 
municipal government failed to carry through on promised projects in these areas.  Citizens 
could report numerous examples of unfulfilled promises regarding government services, and 
could describe the means through which they gathered this information—typically through some 
combination of social networks with friends, family, and neighbors, and through formal or 
traditional organizations such as village associations or producers’ groups.   
Civil society groups also made processes of mobilization less costly, and therefore, made it 
easier for local voters to self-organize and coordinate in promoting their own interests, both by 
lobbying local government, and by mobilizing in favor of opposition candidates at election time.  
Local civil society groups functioned as a learning environment where local leaders could 
develop organizational skills and repertoires through which they were able to mobilize support 
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for political candidates and for particular local government policies.  In addition, local civil 
society networks made it easier for community leaderships, by providing social networks for the 
dissemination of information, by generating trust between individuals, and by encouraging 
collective action through traditional mechanisms of reciprocity and shared social obligations.  
For example, the leadership of modern civil society groups could use their links with civil 
society members to organize and persuade others to vote for a particular candidate, or to pressure 
local politicians for particular policies.  Likewise, traditional communal networks which 
facilitate shared labor such as road maintenance and communal harvesting, could be used to 
promote communal voting and mobilization for or against particular political candidates.   
In rural communities in Peru, as elsewhere, there are frequently (one is tempted to say 
always) organizations which would prefer private goods provision.  However, if civil society is 
well-organized, and able to mobilize on a mass scale, majorities of voters are often able to 
overcome the collective action dilemmas they face to a degree where larger numbers of groups 
and individual voters are able to mobilize against policies which use tax revenue gathered from 
the many in benefit of the few.  Even if benefits are distributed to small groups, if the overall 
provision of government services are broadly distributed, civil society groups seem less inclined 
to mobilize against particular projects—organizations, in effect, generally seem willing to “log 
roll,” permitting broadly distributed private benefits, as long as one particular group is not 
targeted for disproportionate benefits.  For example, voters were unconcerned with the provision 
of government funds to projects that benefited small groups of voters, such as subsidies for small 
animal raising projects or organic fertilizer.  However, civil society leadership generally seemed 
very concerned with the provision of patronage jobs and private benefits to members of the 
mayor’s political party.   
163 
Reverse causality 
One objection to the conclusions presented here might be endogeneity or reverse causality.  
In particular, one argument may be that civil society density promotes larger supporting 
coalitions for victorious candidates, and also more broadly beneficial policy.   
First, both supporting coalition size and civil society density are included in the models 
presented here, so the intervening effect of supporting coalition size, if there is one, is controlled 
in the statistical analysis, by the presence of the supporting coalition size variable.   
Second, the arguments that (a) civil society density promotes larger supporting coalition sizes 
as well as more broadly beneficial spending, or (b) that civil society promotes more broadly 
beneficial spending entirely through larger supporting coalition size is not consistent with the 
interactive nature of the relationship observed here.  I find that civil society density has a 
different effect on government spending depending on the size of the mayor’s supporting 
coalition.  Such a relationship is not consistent with the argument that such a relationship is 
endogenous, which would find that either supporting coalition size, or civil society density or 
both would have a simple, linear relationship with government service spending.   
Finally, the correlation between supporting coalition size and civil society density provides 
little reason for concern (r = .04), and although civil society engagement is typically associated 
with political participation (Aldrich 2008; Aldrich and Crook 2007; Levi 1996; Putnam, 
Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994), there is little theoretical reason to believe that civil society will 
promote larger or smaller supporting coalitions.    
Conclusions and Implications 
This chapter presents tests on the effect of civil society density on particularistic exchange.  
This analysis is in response to earlier findings which suggest that particularistic exchange 
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(clientelism, pork barrel spending, patronage, or constituent service) is an important mechanism 
that connects electoral democracy with public goods provision.  I seek to identify whether 
clientelism promotes or prevents particularism, testing two conflicting theories which make 
opposing predictions.  
Quantitative results using municipal-level data from approximately 1600 Peruvian local 
governments suggest that civil society has a nuanced effect on government service expenditures.  
Specifically, civil society density tends to suppress government service expenditures where these 
expenditures benefit only small cliques of mayoral supporters, and harm majorities of residents 
through taxation.  However, civil society density increases spending where that spending is most 
likely to benefit larger proportions of municipal residents.   
In addition, qualitative observations suggest three mechanisms through which this effect of 
civil society on particularism operates.  First, civil society makes information about government 
performance less costly to citizens, thereby promoting transparency and accountability.  Second, 
civil society leadership provides citizens with opportunities to develop leadership skills and 
repertoires of citizen mobilization.  Finally, civil society membership promotes interpersonal 
trust, making collective mobilization less costly and therefore more likely.   
In addition to their theoretical value, these results carry clear policy implications for 
government bureaucrats, advocates of democracy and decentralization, community organizers, 
and policy-makers.   
First, local governments are likely to be more effective at providing public goods provision 
where civil society is dense.  Second, the promotion of civil society is likely to facilitate 
improved governance across the board, and is likely to produce less particularistic outcomes in 
places where particularism has been rampant.   
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Despite the strength of the results presented here, important questions remain about the 
impact of civil society on spending.  For example, the relationship between civil society and 
spending varies across policy categories.  I hypothesize here that these results are due to the ease 
with which spending in particular policy categories can be directed at particular groups.  The 
extent to which different policy activities such as public health provision, education, and road 
construction can be particularized, however, is unclear, and should be studied in greater detail. 
Although the data used here is specifically from Peru, these results provide evidence 
regarding the likely effects of civil society density on particularistic exchange in a range of 
different settings, including both developing- and developed-world locations.  Although Peru is a 
middle-income country, there is substantial variation in income and standards of living across 
Peruvian municipalities, and Peru—and the data used here—includes municipalities where 
standards of living are as high as some members of the European Union19, and some 
municipalities where rates of extreme poverty surpass 50%.    Therefore, these findings are likely 
generalizable to governments outside of Peru, Latin America, and indeed, outside of the 
developing world.   
However, further questions remain about the generalizability of these findings, not due to 
questions of applicability to richer or poorer places, but because of Peru’s (and Latin America’s 
history of ethnicity- and class-based inequality.  This is the question to which I turn in the 
following chapter.  Specifically, I proceed by examining the effects of economic inequality on 
particularistic exchange.   
 
                                                
19 For example, the Human Development Index value for several provinces in Lima is similar to that of Poland or 
Purtugal, according to the United Nations.  Although HDI figures are not available for district-level municipalities, 
many districts within Lima are substantially richer than average, and likely would have HDI figures near that of the 
Scandinavian countries. 
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Table 2: Project spending/capita (Peruvian Soles) 
Extradispersed Poisson with Square Root of Deviance Extradispersion Adjustment and Iterated Reweighted Least 
Squares Optimization 
 Transport Health Education 
Water, sanitation, 
and electrification 
Total public goods 
project spending 
1.338 13.964 2.745 2.462 2.652 Supporting coalition size 
(0.139) (0.000)*** (0.004)** (0.016)* (0.001)*** 
-1.527 4.012 -1.185 -1.455 -0.927 Civil society membership/cap. 
(0.009)** (0.000)*** (0.046)* (0.041)* (0.066)+ 
3.331 -3.077 1.265 -0.112 2.297 Civil society membership * 
Supporting coalition size (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.312) (0.944) (0.029)* 
0.035 2.506 -1.996 -3.233 -0.741 Consumption index 
(0.836) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Education (mean) -0.426 -1.449 -0.633 -0.391 -0.569 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
-0.317 -2.196 -0.246 0.057 -0.349 Urban population (logged) 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)** (0.505) (0.000)*** 
-0.086 0.302 -0.126 -0.228 -0.078 Municipal budget (Peruvian 
Soles, logged) (0.037)* (0.000)*** (0.003)** (0.000)*** (0.030)* 
-2.665 11.106 -23.328 -28.570 -12.605 Debt service (pct.) 
(0.249) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
0.410     Transport project private 
transfers (pct.) (0.339)     
0.000     Transport project spending/cap. 
(2005) (0.000)***     
 1.217    Health project private transfers 
(pct.)  (0.464)    
 -0.080    Health project spending/cap. 
(2005)  (0.000)***    
  -0.675   Education project private 
transfers(pct.)   (0.341)   
  0.001   Education project spending/cap. 
(2005)   (0.140)   
   -0.037  Sewage, water, and 
electrification project private 
transfers (pct.) 
   (0.945)  
   0.001  Sewage, water, and 
electrification project 
spending/cap. (2005) 
   (0.228)  
    67.901 Public works project private 
transfers (pct.)     (0.000)*** 
    0.000 Public works project 
spending/cap. (2005)     (0.254) 
9.396 7.698 11.585 11.586 11.301 Constant 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
    67.901 Public works project private 
transfers (pct.)     (0.000)*** 
    0.000 Public works project 
spending/cap. (2005)     (0.254) 
Observations 1370 1370 1370 1370 1605 
p values in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at .1% 
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Inequality, Particularism, and Public Goods Provision 
Chapter 6 
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Introduction 
In this, the final empirical chapter of this dissertation, I demonstrate that my earlier results 
are not only an artifact of the high level of inequality in Peru.  I show that, although economic 
inequality20 appears to worsen particularism, particularistic exchange is present in both equal and 
unequal municipalities.  This analysis is a logical extension of earlier empirical tests. 
In chapter three, I established the importance of particularistic exchange in driving 
government service provision in Peruvian municipalities.  Although my findings align nicely 
with theory presented in chapter 2, which is intended as general theory regarding democracy and 
public goods provision, empirical research based on a single-country sample will always face 
questions regarding its generalizability to other populations. 
In chapters 4 and 5, I examine the impact of two important factors—political polarization and 
civil society density—on government service provision and particularistic exchange, finding that 
both polarization and civil society density mitigate particularism.  Although my findings in these 
chapters also validate general theory about public service provision and particularism, these 
results face problems of generalizability, because they are based on a single-country sample of 
cases.   
Because inequality has often been linked to clientelism and particularism (Drinot 2006; 
Karstedt 2003; Munoz, Paredes, and Thorp 2007; Schneider and Zúniga-Hamlin 2005; Sives 
2002), perhaps the largest threat to the generalizability of these earlier findings has to do with the 
very high degree of economic inequality in Peru.  According to these scholars, unequal settings 
are particularly ripe for particularism and clientelism.  This is because, in unequal settings, the 
                                                
20 Here, I measure economic inequality by constructing a Gini index of asset ownership based on ownership of 
common household appliances.  Though this approach has some weaknesses, this is similar to the technique used by 
INEI, the Peruvian national statistical agency, to measure poverty through consumption. 
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wealthy and powerful can extract concessions from politicians through their control of less 
wealthy clients, and because in general, the wealthy have an easier time sustaining collective 
action in pursuit of their interests than the poor.  If Peru’s high levels of economic inequality 
make the particularism observed in chapters 3, 4, and 5 possible, it may be that these results are 
not generalizable to more equal settings.  Conversely, if particularistic exchange takes place in 
both relatively equal and relatively unequal municipalities, there are strong reasons to believe 
that the results described earlier do, in fact, apply to a range of settings outside of Peruvian 
municipalities.   
In this chapter , therefore, I investigate the relationship between a third factor—economic 
inequality—and particularistic government service provision among my sample.  Economic 
inequality and other forms of heterogeneity are factors which scholars argue is likely to drive 
public goods provision, although the direction of the relationship is contested (Alesina, Baqir, 
and Easterly 1999; Baland and J.-P. Platteau 1999; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and 
Weinstein 2009; Munoz, Paredes, and Thorp 2007; Savoia, Easaw, and A. McKay 2010; 
Varughese and E. Ostrom 2001). 
The relationship between inequality and particularism is inherently interesting and relevant 
for policy reasons (Savoia, Easaw, and A. McKay 2010; The World Bank 2003;  2005).  For 
example, the World Bank (2005) notes that inequality is associated with underdevelopment, and 
addressing the causes of inequality, and the links between inequality and poverty, are an 
important goal in the alleviation of global poverty.  Particularism might be one such link.   
In addition, this examination of the effects of inequality on particularistic exchange in Peru 
may help to allay concerns about generalizability of the results presented in this dissertation.  
Here, I hope to allay concerns that my results may not be generalizable due to the historically 
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high levels of class- and ethnically-based inequality present in Peru and other Latin American 
polities.  Therefore, I demonstrate that my results regarding the prevalence of particularistic 
exchange hold across both relatively equal and unequal municipalities in Peru.   
The Peruvian Context 
In chapter two, I generate the hypothesis that politicians will spend more on public services 
where they have greater numbers of supporters to reward for their political support.  There, I 
show that there is a strong and statistically significant correlation between public spending in a 
range of policy areas.  This statistical relationship strongly suggests that clientelism-like 
exchange is an important cause of variation in public service provision in Peru.  Further, 
qualitative observations strongly suggest that the exchange of government services for political 
support is commonplace in Peru and elsewhere around the world.  A number of characteristics 
may make clientelism-like exchange more likely in the context of Peruvian municipal 
government than in other places around the world.  I will outline these characteristics inthe next 
section.   
Supporting coalition size and public service provision 
In chapter two, I present strong qualitative evidence that clientelism-like exchange is an 
important cause of variation in public service provision across Peruvian municipalities.  I 
presented statistical evidence for the presence and importance of clientelism-like exchange (see 
Figure 1).   In essence, government service expenditures rise as politicians’ numbers of 
supporters increase, requiring greater targeted spending to maintain the loyalty of the coalition of 
supporters.   
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Inequality in Peru 
Like many developing countries, especially much of Latin America, Peru has both high and 
sustained economic inequality, even as economic development has led to substantial increases in  
 
Figure 1: Typical particularistic effects.  The strong and highly significant relationship 
between supporting coalition size and transportation project spending is highly suggestive of 
particularist exchange.  This graphic was originally generated with 95% confidence intervals 
around the predicted variables with control variables held at their means, but the confidence 
intervals were so close as to be indistinguishable from the predicted values themselves.  Note 
that the x’s represent predicted values with all controls held at their observed variables, not their 
means. 
the gross domestic product.  Although GDP growth has averaged nearly nine percent per year 
since the mid-2000s, inequality has declined very little in that time.  Indeed, although 
measurements of inequality are notoriously controversial, and good longitudinal data on 
inequality sub-nationally does not exist for Peru, national-level inequality statistics suggest that 
Peru’s level of economic inequality is nearly as high as that of Brazil, placing it amongst the 
most unequal countries in the world.  Further, this level of inequality has been sustained as long 
as national-level statistics have been available, beginning in the early 1960s.  (Munoz, Paredes, 
and Thorp 2007).  The presence of this very high degree of inequality, combined with 
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explanations for particularism and clientelism that associate inequality with clientelistic practice 
bring into question the generalizability of the earlier findings presented in this dissertation.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this sustained inequality is driven by heterogeneity in 
wealth between ethnic groups—while indigenous populations tend to be very poor, mestizo and 
especially European, “white” individuals tend to be much more wealthy (Drinot 2006; Munoz, 
Paredes, and Thorp 2007).  In addition, regional disparities in wealth are very large, with urban 
areas, and particularly urban areas in the coastal region being much more wealthy than the 
highlands or inland jungle regions (Ahmad and García-Escribano 2006;  2008).  These realities 
result in much worse outcomes for the indigenous.  Education levels for indigenous workers are, 
on average, four years lower than that for mestizo workers, infant mortality is higher, and life 
expectancy and literacy are substantially lower, although exact differences are difficult to pin 
down because Peruvian government surveys fail to gather information about ethnicity (Giugale, 
Retes-Cibils, and Newman 2007). 
Scholars argue that this persistent inequality is driven by institutionalized racism in Peruvian 
government policy (Drinot 2006) or by clientelistic processes which themselves are facilitated by 
political and economic inequalities (Crabtree 2010).  Because of this asserted link between 
inequality and clientelism, some question remains about the degree to which the findings 
presented in this dissertation are generalizable—it may be that particularistic exchange is 
prevalent in Peru because of the degree of inequality.  Therefore, I examine the effect of 
inequality on particularistic exchange.  Although I find that inequality has an impact on 
particularistic exchange, the relationship is not such that the generalizability of my findings is 
brought into question.   
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Theory and Empirics: Inequality, Particularism, and Public Goods 
A growing literature in Political Science, Economics, and the other social sciences explores 
the causes and effects of economic inequality.  In academic circles, the relationship between 
inequality and collective action, for example, has been well studied (Baland and J.-P. Platteau 
1999; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2009;  2007; Munoz, Paredes, and 
Thorp 2007; Naidu 2009; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Savoia, Easaw, and A. McKay 2010; 
Varughese and E. Ostrom 2001).  In addition, the policy community recognizes the importance 
of inequality in promoting deprivation and underdevelopment (The World Bank 2003;  2005).  
Even so, scholars recognize that inequality is, in many ways, poorly understood, and scholars 
have called for further study of the causes and effects of economic inequality, singling out the 
need for sub-national and micro-level studies (Savoia, Easaw, and A. McKay 2010).  Here, I 
present such an analysis—a sub-national examination of economic inequality. 
In this section, I review the literature on inequality, noting four contending hypotheses which 
may be drawn from scholarly works regarding the relationship between inequality, government 
service provision, and economic exchange.  These are that inequality may (a) reduce or (b) 
increase government service provision in general, and that inequality may (c) exacerbate or (d) 
reduce particularistic exchange. 
Inequality may increase or decrease public goods provision 
Perhaps the most consistent claim made regarding inequality and public goods provision is 
that inequality is, through one of several hypothesized mechanisms, associated with less public 
goods provision.   
Habayarimana et al. (2007) provides a useful overview of these mechanisms.  First, 
heterogeneity may promote differences in preferences between, for example, different ethnic 
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groups or different socioeconomic classes, making it difficult for them to pursue collective action 
or common goals regarding public goods provision because, in fact, their goals are different.  
Second, heterogeneity may make it difficult for individuals to work together, because they lack 
social bonds and interact only infrequently.  Finally, individuals may feel less altruistic towards 
groups outside of their own ethnicity or class, leading to an unwillingness to cooperate 
(Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2007). Using experimental techniques, these 
scholars find little evidence of the first mechanism, but do find evidence of the second and the 
third.  These results support other empirical work which also finds a link between heterogeneity 
and less collective action (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2009; Varughese 
and E. Ostrom 2001). 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and other scholars suggest that inequality is associated with 
less public goods provision through a fourth mechanism.  This is that inequality fosters distrust, 
making it difficult for individuals to work together (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Rothstein and 
Uslaner 2005; Uslaner 2000).  These findings are consistent with other works that suggest that 
ethnic heterogeneity is associated with lower levels of public goods provision across US cities 
(Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999), and that lower levels of interpersonal trust are associated 
with less public goods provision (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994; Putnam 1995). 
Finally, Baland and Platteau  argue that, where public goods are provided through formal 
rules and regulation, inequality has the tendency to lessen the amounts of public goods provided, 
by undermining the legitimacy of rule-systems for contribution to provision systems (Baland and 
J.-P. Platteau 1999).   
All of these works lead to the following hypothesis: 
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H1: Regardless of supporting coalition size, greater inequality will be associated with less 
spending on government services. 
Although fewer in number, several scholarly works also suggest that inequality promotes 
greater public goods provision.  In general, these works argue that public goods provision often 
includes some contribution of effort or resources from a range of actors in a given setting.  
Where some actors stand to benefit disproportionately from the provision of public goods, 
though actors are more likely to contribute a disproportionate amount (relative to their share of 
the population), and may even be willing to unilaterally bear the cost of the provision of the 
good, if the benefits outweigh the cost.  These conditions are more likely where inequality is 
high (Baland and J.-P. Platteau 1999).   
These papers suggest the following: 
H2: Regardless of supporting coalition size, greater inequality will be associated with more 
spending on government services. 
Inequality may promote particularism 
Though less scholarship has investigated relationships between inequality and particularism, 
clientelism, or pork barrel politics, a few scholars have presented theory relevant for the 
questions investigated here.   
In general, scholars of clientelism—including economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and 
political scientists—argue that unequal societies tend to generate exploitative formal or informal 
institutions which facilitate clientelism and particularism.  In such places, elites support 
politicians with funds and political support, including (often) the electoral support of poor voters 
who are beholden to wealthy employers or landlords (for example), and politicians return the 
favor by pursuing policies which are beneficial to the rich at the expense of the poor (Acemoglu, 
Ticchi, and Vindigni 2006; Crabtree 2010; Drinot 2006; Galor, Moav, and Vollrath 2009; 
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Karstedt 2003; Savoia, Easaw, and A. McKay 2010; Schneider and Zúniga-Hamlin 2005; Sives 
2002; Wood and Murray 2007). 
For example, Galor et al. (2009) argue that wealthy landowners in unequal states around the 
world have effectively promoted lower levels of public education service provision, so as to keep 
rural labor forces immobile and inexpensive.  Likewise, Muñoz, Paredes, and Thorp (2007) 
identify inequality in Peru as the cause of uneven collective action across socioeconomic classes, 
unequally beneficial policies, and persistent class- and ethnicity-based inequality.  Similarly, 
Andersson and Agrawal identify inequality as a cause of lower levels of public goods provision 
through common property management, though they find that effective local institutions mitigate 
these relationships (K. Andersson and Agrawal 2011).   
Similarly, Stokes and co-authors have often argued that inequality promotes clientelistic 
exchange by making it relatively more cost effective for (typically wealthy) politicians to 
purchase the votes of the poor, who receive private benefits through the process of particularistic 
exchange, but who are then ignored in the policy-making process in favor of the wealthy and 
middle classes (Cleary and Stokes 2006; Stokes 2005;  2007). 
All of these works imply this hypothesis: 
H3: Inequality will be associated with increased particularistic exchange—where supporting 
coalitions are small, municipalities will pay more on government services that benefit that 
relatively small coalition of voters, and where supporting coalitions are large, they will 
spend less, primarily to benefit important, wealthy residents.   
Although there seems to be something of a scholarly consensus around the idea that 
inequality and clientelism should be positively correlated, the idea has rarely, if ever been tested 
with large-n, quantitative techniques in a rigorous way.  Here, I proceed by conducting such a 
test.   
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Theory and Operationalization 
As Chapter 2 demonstrates, the impact of particularistic exchange on government service 
expenditure varies according to the size of the coalition of voters supporting the victorious 
candidate. 
Where supporting coalitions are small, mayors will face pressures to redistribute wealth from 
non-supporters to members of their supporting coalitions.  In these cases, (a) expenditures in so-
called “public goods” will be low, as mayors attempt to provide targeted (club) goods or private 
goods to supporters, and (b) expenditures in general will be low, as mayors face strong 
incentives to exclude non-supporters, and to avoid spending on opposition-supporting 
individuals. 
Where supporting coalitions are larger, however, pressures to exclude supporters and to 
provide club or private goods will weaken, as (a) the per-supporter benefit of private or toll 
goods provision decreases relative to the benefits of public goods provision, and (b) it becomes 
more likely that positive externalities will benefit supporters rather than opposition members, 
because supporters comprise a larger proportion of the population. 
In earlier chapters, these hypotheses are tested by examining the relationship between 
supporting coalition size and government spending in a series of policy area categories.  
Therefore, to test the effect of economic inequality on particularistic exchange, it is necessary to 
examine the effect of inequality on the relationship between supporting coalition size and 
government service spending.   
There are three possible effects of inequality on the relationship between supporting coalition 
size and government service expenditures.   
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First, inequality may exacerbate clientelism and/or particularistic exchange.  In this case, 
expenditures in a given policy area will be greater where mayors’ supporting coalitions are 
smaller—and therefore, where spending tends to be directed at goods and services which are 
targeted at small groups (club goods) or individuals (private goods).  Where supporting 
coalitions are larger—and spending would otherwise be directed to broadly beneficial public 
goods—spending will be lower.  In essence, if inequality exacerbates particularism, it will be 
because elites effectively capture most expenditures, and therefore, supporting coalition sizes 
will be less important (and possibly insignificant) in driving government service expenditures in 
high-inequality cases.  Therefore, if results show a stronger relationship between supporting 
coalition size and expenditures in more equal municipalities, particularism is a driver of 
government expenditures in both relatively equal and relatively unequal cases. 
If, on the other hand, the relationship between supporting coalition size is only significant 
where municipalities are unequal, the results presented earlier in the dissertation may only apply 
to unequal municipalities.  Such results would cast doubt on the generalizability of the results 
presented here, beyond very unequal contexts such as those found in Latin American and some 
other developing-country settings.  In this case, the relationship between supporting coalition 
size and spending will be weak and/or insignificant where municipalities are more equal, but 
positive and significant where municipalities are unequal.  In this case, particularism is a driver 
of expenditures only where municipalities are unequal, and not elsewhere. 
Finally, the null hypothesis—that inequality will have no effect on particularism—is that 
there will be no significant difference in the relationship between supporting coalition size and 
expenditures, regardless of the level of inequality.  In this case, the relationship between 
supporting coalition size and expenditures will be positive and significant, but high-inequality 
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and low-inequality municipalities will not significantly differ in expenditures across the range of 
supporting coalition sizes.  Although such a result will be uninteresting in the immediate sense, it 
will suggest that the earlier findings presented here are generalizable outside of high-inequality 
settings, such as those in Peru and much of Latin America. 
Quantitative Methodology and Data 
Here, I use several under-utilized public data sources on Peruvian municipal governments 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and generalized linear modeling techniques to test 
the hypotheses presented above. The 2008 Peruvian Registry of Municipalities (RENAMU), the 
2007 Peruvian Census, and electoral data from the Peruvian National Office of Electoral 
Processes are the key data sources used in the analysis presented here, and I use OLS and 
extradispersed poisson regression to test the effects of particularistic vote exchange against the 
effects of electoral competition.  I perform several postestimation tests and robustness checks to 
demonstrate the robustness of my results.     
Data 
Two measures of different types of government service provision are used here as Dependent 
Variables.  The first of these is spending on infrastructure development per capita—spending on 
construction projects completed in 2007—in several categories which are often treated as public 
goods.  These include (a) transportation, (b) education, (c) and a summed total of spending on 
water, electrification, and sewage projects21.  Also used is the summed total of all of these 
categories as a dependent variable, and also the summed total of all project spending, which 
includes two additional categories—tourism projects, and “other”.  On this set of dependent 
                                                
21 The summed total of water, sewage, and electrification infrastructure project spending is, unfortunately, the way 
this data is provided by the Peruvian government, though I would of course prefer to use indicators of each of these 
three areas. 
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variables, I use both generalized linear models (extradispersed poisson reported here) and OLS 
regression using a logged variant of the variable.  This data was gathered in the 2008 Peruvian 
Registry of Municipalities by the Peruvian National Institute of Statistics and Informatics.  This 
data is available for about 1600 municipalities in each category.  I also use data on each of these 
spending categories in 2005 as a control.   
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I use measures of expenditures on completed new construction to examine the effects of 
particularism on government service provision—the relationship between particularism and 
infrastructure/construction spending is well-documented (Samuels 2001a;  2001b).  If 
particularistic exchange is an important cause of public spending patterns, it should be most 
visible in new construction expenditures.   
New construction is also a good measure of infrastructure development, which is sorely 
needed throughout Peru, to promote economic development and improved standards of living 
(Ahmad and García-Escribano 2006;  2008; Calderón and Servén 2004; Crabtree 2010; Estado 
and Locales 2006; Zas Friz Burga 2009; Giugale, Retes-Cibils, and Newman 2007; Hordijk 
2005; IPE 2003; N. Jones, Vargas, and Villar 2007; Palacios 2009; World Bank 2003; World 
Economic Forum 2005; World Resources Institute 2003).   
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the key independent variable 
The second set of dependent variables used here is a set of measures of total spending 
(current and capital expenditures) in several categories for 2007.  This data is less 
comprehensive—data is only available for about 730 district-level municipalities (out of 1599), 
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but the included municipalities are substantial in that they include nearly 80% of the Peruvian 
population, and so are an important sample in and of themselves.  Results using these variables 
generally support the results of the project spending/infrastructure development spending 
regression models.   This second set of dependent variables is available from the Peruvian 
Ministry of Economy and Finances.   
The key independent variable used here is based on indicators gathered in the course of the 
2007 Peruvian Census by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI).  These are 
measures of asset ownership of Peruvian households.  Specifically, households were asked about 
the ownership of six important household appliances—radios, televisions, washing machines, 
refrigerators, sound equipment, and computers.  These asset ownership indicators—used by INEI 
and the Peruvian government as measures of poverty in a country where many families have 
little integration with the cash economy—measure standards of living more effectively than 
income measures, especially in rural parts of the Andes and the Amazon, where barter and 
subsistence are commonplace.  These indicators were aggregated at the district level, then used 
to generate a Gini index of asset ownership, whereby families were ordered by number of 
appliances owned, and the cumulative total proportion of appliances for each number of 
appliances was subtracted from the cumulative hypothetical proportion if asset ownership was 
completely equal in the district.  The resulting measure is an index of inequality which, in theory, 
ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being perfectly unequal (one person owns all appliances in the district) 
and 0 being a completely equal distribution.  In reality, however, the minimum value was .023, 
the maximum was .330, with a mean of .134.   
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To test the effect of this variable across varying supporting coalition sizes—to test the effect 
of inequality on particularistic exchange—this variable was interacted with the measure of 
supporting coalition size.   
Because of the nature of Peruvian electoral rules (described above, in “Public Goods 
Provision in Peru”), the supporting  coalition size in each municipality is simply the percentage 
of the total vote received by the victorious party in the most recent election, since that party 
receives the mayoral seat as well as a majority in the municipal council.  Therefore, the 
supporting coalition is a coalition of voters, families, or villages, but is not a coalition of multiple 
parties.   
In addition to the independent variables of interest described above, I use several control 
variables in the models presented here   
First, I include several variables made available through INEI which were generated based on 
the 2007 Peruvian census, including the average level of education in each municipality, 
population (logged), urban population (logged), and a consumption measure.  The consumption 
measure is designed to provide a measure of standards of living where many citizens, 
particularly in rural areas, do not participate in the cash economy with any intensity, and is 
derived from a series of standard Peruvian Government (INEI) poverty indicators.  This is a 
count of the average number of household appliances—radio, television, washer/dryer, 
refrigerator, sound equipment—owned by families in the municipality.   
I also include several control variables from RENAMU data.  In the models in which the 
dependent variable is construction project spending, I include the percentage of completed 
project funding in each policy area which was funded with private donations.  This is meant to 
address concerns that private donors might use funding to influence municipal priorities.  
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Because there is not conditionality placed on transfers from regional or national governments, 
there is no need to include a similar measure for government project transfers in each area.  In 
addition, I use RENAMU data to control for debt service (pct. of total municipal budget) and 
total municipal budget size (total income, logged). 
For summary statistics of all these variables, see Table 1 (above). 
Methods 
In the first set of models presented here—in which the dependent variable is total spending 
on projects completed in 2007—I have used generalized linear modeling techniques for count 
data.  These are the most appropriate estimation strategy for a dependent variable which is 
skewed, with a long right tail, where values are only positive integers, and where the dependent 
variable contains many 0s, such that it cannot be transformed to normality without generating 
large numbers of missing cases (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Hoffman 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2008).  Typically, poisson models are used with dependent variables which represent 
counts or proportions.  However, poisson models assume a dependent variable with equal mean 
and variance (Hoffman 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).  Such is not the case with the 
dependent variables used here; there is significant evidence of overdispersion.  Therefore, I use 
extradispersed poisson models, which is one appropriate strategy for data distributed like this.  
The models displayed here use a square-root of the deviance-based standard error adjustment 
with iterated, reweighted least squares optimization, but I also test these models with several 
alternative estimation techniques, including zero-inflated poisson, negative binomial, 
heteroskedasticity-robust negative binomial, and alternative extradispersed poisson approaches 
and find that my findings are robust to changes in estimation strategy.  I choose to show the 
extradispersed poisson results here because scholars suggest that it is inappropriate to use most 
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typical robustness checks on negative binomial regression (Hoffman 2004).  I also use a logged 
version of the summed total of all project spending in an OLS regression model.  With this latter 
variable, results do not differ substantively from the count data models.   
A second set of models, described but not presented here uses the logged total spending per 
capita (per local resident) in a number of policy areas.  These include administration, agriculture, 
education, energy and mining, industry, fishing, social welfare spending, health and sanitation, 
transportation, urban development and housing, total spending, and total spending in areas 
normally considered “public goods” (health and sanitation, education, social welfare spending, 
and housing and urban development).  Where the dependent variable is one of these measures, 
the method used is a log-linear approach, where the dependent variable is logged, then OLS is 
used.   
The key independent variable here is an interaction term.  Because the coefficient and 
significance of the interaction term itself is not substantively meaningful or important (Brambor, 
Clark, and Golder 2005), I provide a graphic depiction of the effect of differing effects of 
“supporting coalition size” on public goods spending across values of “civil society density” as 
well as regression tables.   
In addition, I present the results of several robustness checks on both the OLS and 
extradispersed poisson models.   
I find that inequality does have an impact on particularistic exchange, but only in 
infrastructure spending—in the area where clientelism or particularism is most likely—and only 
in some policy areas.  In general, these results suggest that although particularism is worse where 
inequality is higher, particularism is salient regardless of the level of inequality.   
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A note on count data models 
Social science methodologists, including Political Scientists, have frequently prescribed 
generalized linear model estimation techniques for the analysis of count data (Afifi, Kotlerman, 
Ettner, and Cowan 2007; Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Hoffman 2004; King 1989; Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal 2008).  Such techniques include negative binomial regression, poisson and 
extradispersed poisson, and zero-inflated negative binomial and poisson techniques.  These 
techniques are appropriate when dependent variables have three primary characteristics.  First, 
values are censored at 0, second, values are integers only, and third, values are not distributed 
normally, instead being highly right skewed, similar to a chi-squared distribution (Cameron and 
Trivedi 1986;  1998; Hoffman 2004; King 1989; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) 
Scholars of political phenomena have used these techniques to study a range of topics, 
including terrorism and political violence (Kollias, Messis, Mylonidis, and Paleologou 2009; 
Danzell 2010; T. Y. Wang, Dixon, Muller, and Seligson 2011), congressional bill sponsorship 
(Kollias, Messis, Mylonidis, and Paleologou 2009), foreign direct investment (Kollias, Messis, 
Mylonidis, and Paleologou 2009), legislative productivity (W. D. Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, 
and Sinclair-chapman 2003; G. W. Cox and Terry 2008), the targeting of government 
expenditures (Rickard 2009) and a range of other topics (Boehmke 2005; Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy, 
and Aranson 2003; Holmes, De Piñeres, and Curtin 2007; Ingall and Crisp 2001; Neumayer 
2005; Schiller 2006).  In other social sciences, two of the most common uses of count data 
techniques include the study of economic innovation (R. Andersson, Quigley, and Wilhelmsson 
2009; Branstetter 2001) and the demand for health services (Ekman 2007; Shin 2006; Street, A. 
Jones, and Furuta 1999) 
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In political science, count data techniques have not often been used to study expenditures, 
because most expenditure data studied by political scientists can be logged to a normal 
distribution and analyzed using OLS regression (so-called log-linear techniques).  However, the 
project expenditures data used here contains a large number of zeros, which is data which would 
be lost if logged.  This is because a large number of municipalities completed no new 
construction of, for example, schools, health clinics, roads, or potable water systems in 2006.  
These zeros are meaningful, representing no investment in the production of these types of 
projects, and their exclusion may bias regression results.     
One area of the social sciences in which the analysis of similarly distributed expenditure data 
is quite common is health economics.  Health expenditures for a given individual, family, or 
jurisdiction are positively skewed, contain large numbers of zeros, and include only positive 
integers, just like the project data analyzed here.  In health economics, therefore, the use of count 
models (poisson, extradispersed poisson, negative binomial, and zero-inflated models) to study 
expenditures is very common (World Bank n.d.; CIA n.d.) 
A note on multicollinearity 
Elsewhere in this dissertation, I test the effects of several other independent variables on the 
relationship between supporting coalition size and government spending in several categories.  
For purposes of display, I have shown my statistical regression models without the other 
chapters’ independent variables of interest.   
One concern, therefore, is that the results reported here are significant because important 
control variables—the independent variables of interest in the other chapters—are correlated 
with the independent variables of interest.  One way to allay these concerns is to test each 
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interactive effect in a model where the other interactions are present.  Therefore, I have tested 
each of the models with each of the other interaction and base terms from the dissertation.   
In general, the results reported here are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables.  
There are a few exceptions, however, which deserve some note.  Where all interactions and base 
terms are included, the models which use total spending in a given policy category frequently 
become insignificant.  Directions of relationships do not change, however, and predicted values 
do not vary substantially.  In addition, where one set of interactions and base terms or another is 
included as a control (but not all interactions) these results are more often significant.  Therefore, 
the most likely explanation is that multicollinearity inflates the variance of these coefficients, 
leading to inefficient estimates.  This explanation is consistent with the correlation of interaction 
terms and their base terms, which frequently are worrisome.  For example, the inequality 
measure used here is correlated with its interaction (with supporting coalition size) at .76, 
opposition strength at .34, the opposition strength interaction with supporting coalition size at 
.15, as well as the standard of living (consumption) measure at .58.  These correlations raise 
legitimate concerns about overspecification, multicollinearity, and inefficient estimates, 
especially where each interaction and all included base terms are included in a regression model.  
Variance inflation statistics, when all variables are included in a given model are very high, 
ranging between 12.6 and 35.4, depending on the independent variable and dependent variable of 
interest.  Regardless, these numbers are high enough to suggest that inclusion of all independent 
variables of interest will generate false negative results.  These very high VIF statistics further 
demonstrate the extreme robustness of these results, where they remain significant.    
It deserves to be emphasized, that (a) project spending models, with a larger number of 
observations, are robust to these controls, (b) total spending models are robust to the inclusion of 
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each interaction and base terms in sets, (c) predicted values and the direction of relationships do 
not vary when these additional controls are included, and (d) total spending models have much  
  
  
Figure 3: Inequality promotes particularism.  Where the dependent variable is a measure of 
new construction/infrastructure development spending on projects completed in 2007, results are 
consistent with hypothesis 3—inequality tends to increase spending where supporting coalitions 
are small, and decrease it where they are large.   
smaller numbers of observations, making them more susceptible to problems of variance 
inflation through multicollinearity.  Finally, the correlation between the independent variables of 
interest here (supporting coalition size, civil society density, opposition strength, and inequality) 
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is low enough that omitted variable bias should not be a concern, and where correlations are 
higher (such as between inequality and opposition strength, with r of .34), models are robust to 
the inclusion of the relatively well-correlated control variable. 
Results 
In general, results of the statistical tests described above support Hypothesis 3—that 
inequality tends to exacerbate particularistic exchange, having a impact on spending which 
differs depending on the size of the mayor’s supporting coalition.  However, this effect—the 
tendency of inequality to exacerbate tendencies towards particularistic exchange—appears to be  
limited to the areas of spending where particularism is most likely.  Specifically, the impact of 
inequality on particularistic exchange is only visible in infrastructure development/public works  
projects/new construction expenditures.  Taken together, these results suggest that economic 
inequality does have some tendency to promote particularistic exchange, but particularism is not 
limited to high-inequality cases.  Particularism is present both in relatively equal and relatively 
unequal municipalities.   
In statistical models where the dependent variable was the logged per capita expenditure in 
both current and capital expenditures in a given area22, inequality had no visible effect on the 
relationship between supporting coalition size and expenditures.  In short, inequality appears to 
have no discernible effect on general (current and capital) expenditures.  In addition, inequality 
itself was insignificant where included individually and along with the interaction term.  
However, regardless of whether the inequality variable and interaction term were included in 
models together or whether the inequality variable was included alone, the relationship between 
                                                
22 These included twelve areas of spending, including administration and personnel, agriculture, education, energy 
and mining, industry, fishing, social welfare and women’s rights, health and sanitation, tranportation, urban 
development and housing, total expenditures, and total expenditures in areas normally considered “public goods” 
(education, social welfare, health and sanitation, and transportation).   
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supporting coalition size and total expenditures (in a given policy area) remained significant.  
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Therefore, particularism appears to have a similar effect on expenditures, regardless of the level 
of inequality in a municipality.   
Unlike the total expenditure statistical models described above, inequality does appear to 
have an effect on particularistic exchange in the area of spending where particularism is most 
likely—new construction, infrastructure development, or public works project spending.   
Here, results tend to confirm hypothesis three—that inequality worsens particularism.  
However, these results show that, although particularism appears to be more common in more 
unequal municipalities, particularistic exchange is present even in relatively equal municipalities.  
These results are most intuitively visible in figure 3.  Where supporting coalition size is 
small, unequal municipalities (here, these are municipalities with an asset ownership Gini 
coefficient of .2) spend more than relatively equal municipalities (Gini of .1) in infrastructure 
development in all the areas for which data is available.  This includes (a) education project 
spending, (b) transportation project spending, (c) health project spending, (d) electrification, 
sewage, and potable water project spending, and (e) the sum total of all these areas.  Where 
supporting coalition sizes are larger, however, more equal municipalities spend more on these 
types of projects than relatively unequal municipalities.  These models are also validated with a 
log-linear model (logged dependent variable with OLS regression) with total project spending as 
the dependent variable, demonstrating that these results are not a quirk of the methodology used.   
These findings are consistent with theory that suggests that inequality worsens particularism.  
However, particularism is not limited to the high-inequality cases.  The relationship between 
supporting coalition size is, in fact, most highly significant where inequality is relatively low.   
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Discussion 
In general, the results reported and described above are consistent with hypothesis 3—that 
high inequality exacerbates existing tendencies for particularism.  However, even where 
municipalities are more equal, total and public works (infrastructure development/new 
construction) expenditures are significantly driven by particularistic exchange.   
In low inequality municipalities, expenditures are driven primarily by reciprocal exchange 
between voters and politicians.  As identified in “Theory”, above, this means that municipalities 
will tend to spend more, and focus their expenditures in true public goods with large positive 
spillovers where coalitions of supporters are relatively large.  Where supporting coalitions are 
small, however, and only comprise a small minority of local voters, politicians will fact strong 
incentives to redistribute revenue to supporters, providing them with private or toll goods and 
excluding non-supporters.  The result is relatively lower levels of spending on most government 
services where supporting coalitions are small, and relatively higher levels of spending where 
they are large.   
In places where inequality is high, however, supporting coalition size becomes less 
important.  This is because, as inequality rises, resources and power in the community are held in 
fewer hands, and it becomes more important for politicians to pursue the support of those elites 
who control resources.  It becomes less important to seek the support of a coalition of voters, and 
more important to seek a supporting coalition of a small group of elites (or even a single 
individual or family).   
Therefore, the number of voters supporting the victorious candidate in the most recent 
election is not an important predictor of government service expenditures where inequality is 
high.  It is an important predictor, however, where inequality is low.   
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Why, therefore, do the results vary between models where the dependent variable is total 
spending, and the models where the dependent variable is spending on new construction?  There 
are three possible answers. 
The first possibility is that the smaller number of cases in the total spending models makes it 
more difficult to find statistically significant results.  If this is the case, a more complete dataset 
would generate statistically significant results, similar to those in the project spending models. 
Perhaps a more likely possibility, however, is that particularism is more likely, and therefore 
more visible in new construction spending because this is an area in which particularism and 
clientelism often finds expression.  Scholars have found that construction expenditures tend to be 
a common outlet for corruption, clientelism, and particularism, making the observation of these 
phenomena more likely in construction expenditures, and less likely in other areas of the budget 
(Samuels 2001a;  2001b).   
Finally, the relatively higher population of the cases included in these regressions may mean 
that particularism is less likely (see chapter 1), and if a full set of observations were available for 
total spending, these models may also be significant.   
Conclusion 
Earlier in this dissertation, I demonstrate that particularistic exchange between politicians and 
voters—the exchange of votes and political support for tangible government services—is an 
important driver of government service provision amongst Peruvian municipalities, and perhaps 
much of the developing world.  I have then demonstrated that two factors—civil society and 
institutional checks and balances—have the potential to reduce or eliminate much particularistic 
exchange, which most scholars and policy-makers, after all, consider undesirable (Acemoglu, 
Ticchi, and Vindigni 2006; Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003; Crabtree 2010; Escobar 1994; 
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Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Hicken 2010; Transparency International 2008b;  2009b;  2008c;  
2009a;  2007; Trounstine 2008a; van de Walle 2003).   
Here, I follow up with an examination of the most important threat to the generalizability of 
this study—economic inequality.  Peru, and therefore, the sample examined here, may be 
particularly susceptible to the rise of particularistic exchange because of the high level of 
economic inequality present, and if economic inequality is an important driver of the results 
presented in chapters 2, 3, and 4, particularistic exchange may not be so important as this 
dissertation suggests.  
In this chapter, however, I demonstrate that although economic inequality is an important 
driver of particularistic exchange, particularism is present across the full range of municipalities, 
including municipalities with relatively low levels of economic inequality.   
These results suggest, therefore, that particularism is worse where facilitated by high levels 
of economic inequality, but is still present in relatively unequal municipalities.   
Therefore, particularistic exchange is likely to be an important cause of government spending 
and service provision in a wide range of places outside of Peru—not only in places where 
inequality facilitates greater particularism through patronage and clientelism.   
At the same time, these results suggest that inequality itself is undesirable in that it is likely 
to promote the particularistic provision of private and toll goods to elites, not to masses.  The 
results imply, therefore, that high inequality, by worsening tendencies towards particularism, 
may impede the provision broadly-beneficial government services, and may discourage 
outcomes that are associated with the broad provision of public goods, like reduced infant 
mortality, improved mass education, greater economic development, and more thorough 
198 
development of human capital.  In short, inequality is a problem in its own right that deserves 
attention.   
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Conclusion 
Chapter 7 
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Background 
The question, “why do some governments provide more services than others?” has been 
extensively analyzed in Political Science.  In Comparative Politics, explanations have focused on 
the presence or absence of democratic institutions or other associated characteristics of 
democracy.  In short, democracy causes greater public goods provision, either because electoral 
institutions broaden the number of supporters needed to keep a politician in office, or because the 
threat of electoral defeat creates incentives for politicians to buy off larger numbers of supporters 
with the provision of government services and other benefits (Baum and Lake 2003; Bueno De 
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Lake and Baum 2001; Olson 1993; McGuire and 
Olson 1996).   
According to the first theoretical approach, where electoral institutions require politicians to 
gain the support of larger numbers of voters, broadly-beneficial public goods provision will be 
more likely, because politicians are able to most efficiently buy the support of large numbers of 
voters where they provide public goods with large positive spillovers.  Therefore, where electoral 
rules require larger coalitions to win, more public goods will be provided (Bueno De Mesquita, 
Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 2002; 
Olson 1993; McGuire and Olson 1996). 
According to the second approach, public goods provision will be greater, not where 
politicians are forced to buy the support of larger numbers of voters, but where competition 
makes it more likely that they will be thrown out of office (Baum and Lake 2003; Lake and 
Baum 2001). 
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Particularism Causes Service Provision 
This focus on democracy, however, fails to explain much variation in public goods and 
government service provision around the world.  For example, in decentralized regimes, sub-
national jurisdictions vary greatly in the quantity of government services they provide, even 
where formal democratic institutions are constant across jurisdictions.   
This apparent anomaly, therefore, raises an important question: What determines this 
variation in government service provision across regimes with identical, or nearly identical 
institutions?   
One possible explanation, which has been under-studied in comparative politics, is that 
politicians’ strategies for re-election often focus on the construction of networks of particularistic 
exchange.  Such networks, sometimes called clientelistic or patronage networks, vary in size, and 
differences in public service provision may be a result in the exogenous variation of these 
networks.  According to this explanation, developed more fully in the introduction and chapter 
two, politicians develop personalized and reciprocal relationships with voters, who support them 
by voting and through other means, and in return, politicians reward this support with 
government services.  Where coalitions of supporters (as measured by vote share) increase in 
size, expenditures on government services also increase, as politicians spend to retain the loyalty 
of these larger numbers of voters.   
In some ways, this theoretical approach is similar to the first theory presented directly 
above—that electoral rules promote the formation of “winning coalitions” of a particular size, 
which then determine the quantity of government services provided.  Unlike the electoral 
institution explanation, however, the number of supporters politicians seek to buy off is not 
determined primarily by electoral rules.  Instead, politicians generally seek to maximize the size 
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of their supporting coalition, regardless of electoral rules, in order to reduce future uncertainty 
about electoral outcomes.  Politicians’ abilities to generate large coalitions, however, are 
determined by exogenous factors, however, resulting in a great deal of variation in the sizes of 
supporting coalitions across governments.   
Like Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003), I argue that where 
politicians’ supporting coalitions are small, they will face strong incentives to provide private or 
toll goods (excludable goods) to relatively small groups of supporters.  Where these supporting 
coalitions are larger, however, the provision of broadly beneficial goods becomes more cost-
effective, and incentives to provide excludable goods decreases, as positive spillovers become 
relatively more likely to benefit supporters.  However, unlike Bueno de Mesquita et al., I argue 
that supporting coalition size is determined primarily by the size of particularistic networks, 
rather than by electoral rules, which do not vary across many sub-national polities.   
To test these ideas, I use quantitative analysis of under-utilized statistical data on Peruvian 
local governments and jurisdictions available through the Peruvian national government.  
Peruvian local governance is the ideal setting for the study of particularistic exchange, because 
Peruvian local governments exhibit a unique institutional structure which makes particularistic 
exchange especially likely (and therefore, especially visible), and which makes the separate and 
interactive examination of certain characteristics—most notably, supporting coalition size and 
opposition strength—possible, in a way which is not feasible in other settings.   
My quantitative and qualitative tests suggest that much government service provision is the 
result of a process which is described as inefficient (Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2006), 
undemocratic (Escobar 1994), and inherently undesirable (Transparency International 2007;  
2008c;  2009a).  In short, particularism drives expenditures and service provision to a significant 
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extent.  Therefore, I examine a second research question here.  This is, “What factors exacerbate, 
and what factors mitigate particularistic exchange”? 
Opposition Strength and Particularism 
Although the causes of particularism have only rarely been empirically evaluated in a 
comparative setting, scholars have often analyzed similar processes, and as a result, strong theory 
abounds which can be utilized to explain the dynamics of particularistic exchange.   
First, scholars have argued, alternately, that institutional checks and balances, “veto players” 
or veto points, opposition strength, government fragmentation, and/or government polarization 
(a) exacerbates particularistic dynamics, or (b) mitigates particularism (Bawn and Rosenbluth 
2006; Becher 2009; Gehlbach and Malesky 2010; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Haggard and 
Kaufman 1995; Heller 1997; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; D. McKay 2009; Milesi-
Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002; Persson 2007; Rogowski 1987; Rogowski and Kayser 2002; 
Tsebelis 2000). 
The first possibility is that a stronger opposition may mean that larger numbers of actors in 
legislatures or other political organizations need to be bought off with particularistic benefits, for 
themselves and their supporters, in order to pass and implement policy.  In essence, the more 
players in the game, the more particularism there will be, as larger numbers of players’ support is 
bought with more excludable benefits (Gerring and Thacker 2004; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; 
Rogowski and Kayser 2002). 
On the other hand, stronger oppositions may prevent particularism, providing some degree of 
oversight, and institutional checks, on mayors and legislative majorities who would otherwise 
prefer to provide excludable benefits to their supporters alone .  According to this theoretical 
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formulation, stronger oppositions are likely to reduce particularistic exchange (Gehlbach and 
Malesky 2010; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Rogowski 1987).   
In chapter three, I test the effect of opposition strength on particularism, using qualitative and 
quantitative techniques.  I find that strong oppositions reduce particularistic exchange.  
Specifically, where mayors’ supporting coalitions of voters are small (and therefore, where 
spending is more likely to be excludable goods, directed at key supporting constituencies), strong 
oppositions reduce levels of spending.  However, where supporting coalitions are larger (and 
therefore, where expenditures are more likely to be in broadly beneficial, possibly public goods), 
expenditures tend not to differ in municipalities with strong and weak oppositions.   
Civil Society and Particularism 
A second factor which may exacerbate or mitigate particularistic exchange is civil society.  
But like theory regarding opposition strength, theory on the effects of civil society makes two, 
contenting predictions. 
First, where civil society is dense, particularistic exchange may be reduced, as civil society 
groups press politicians for broadly-beneficial public goods, or at least reduced redistribution 
from the majority to the mayor’s supporting minority coalition.  Civil society groups may prefer 
broadly-beneficial services either because of norms of fairness, or because they prefer policies 
which will be more likely to them in some way, even if the alternative is high-reward and high 
risk (relatively higher benefits if services are targeted at an individual, his family or village, but 
no benefits if services are targeted elsewhere) (Escobar 1994; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 
1994).   
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On the other hand, civil society groups may promote particularism by using pressure tactics 
to encourage politicians to provide them with particularistic benefits (Aldrich 2008; Aldrich and 
Crook 2007; Aldrich 2011).   
In chapter four, I test these ideas using statistical and qualitative techniques.  I find that civil 
society density, like opposition strength, is associated with lower rates of particularism.  
Specifically, where supporting coalition sizes are small, and therefore, where expenditures tend 
to be targeted at excludable benefits for mayoral supporters, civil society density is associated 
with lower expenditures on government services, as civil society groups fight to prevent 
redistribution from majorities to minorities of mayoral supporters.  Where mayoral supporting 
coalitions are large, however, and expenditures are more likely to result in broadly beneficial 
public goods, civil society density is associated with greater expenditures, as civil society groups 
pressure local governments for greater quantities of broadly beneficial public goods. 
Inequality 
Economic inequality is a third factor which is likely to exacerbate existing tendencies for 
particularism (Drinot 2006; Galor, Moav, and Vollrath 2009; Karstedt 2003; Munoz, Paredes, 
and Thorp 2007; Sives 2002; The World Bank 2003).  In addition, the high level of economic 
inequality in Peru may be the single greatest threat to the generalizability of the findings of this 
dissertation.  Therefore, I examine the effects of economic inequality on particularism by 
constructing a new index of inequality in asset ownership, and testing the effect of this index on 
particularistic exchange.   
I find that, although economic inequality worsens particularism—increasing spending where 
supporting coalitions are small, and decreasing it where supporting coalitions are large—
particularism is present even in low-inequality settings.  Where inequality is low, expenditures 
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are a function of supporting coalition size, suggesting particularistic, excludable benefit 
provision to small supporting coalitions and generalized, public goods provision where 
supporting coalitions are large.  Where inequality is high, however, supporting coalition size is 
insignificant as a predictor of expenditures, suggesting that in high-inequality cases, mayors 
choose to provide goods only to small groups of relatively wealthy and powerful voters.   
Although these findings suggest that inequality is a cause of undesirable spending outcomes, 
it also indicates that expenditures respond to particularistic incentives, even in low-inequality 
settings.  As a result, it seems likely that the results of chapters two through four are 
generalizable to at least some settings outside of Peru.   
Implications 
These findings, taken together, carry important implications for scholars’ understanding of 
the way democracy operates, and how to make ostensibly democratic governments function 
better, even where particularism is prevalent. 
Democracy sometimes operates through particularism 
First, although scholars have sometimes argued that clientelistic or particularistic politics are 
antithetical to democracy (Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003; Crabtree 2010; Escobar 1994; Hicken 
2010; Kaufmann et al. 2010; Keefer 2007; Roniger 1994), the findings present here suggest that, 
in some settings at least, democracy is particularism, in the sense that many of the benefits 
brought by “democratic” institutions like free and fair elections work through a mechanism of 
particularistic exchange.  That is, the public benefits of electoral democracy—which scholars 
have typically connected with the nature of electoral institutions and the presence and degree of 
electoral institutions—are, in many cases at least, brought about through processes which many 
have called undemocratic.   
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These results do demonstrate that, under certain conditions, these processes of particularistic 
exchange produce undesirable outcomes, at other times and under other conditions, they produce 
very desirable results.  Specifically, governments controlled by small cliques of voters are likely 
to distribute benefits in ways that benefit only that small minority.  However, this same process 
of particularistic exchange can generate broadly based public goods where these “cliques” of 
voters are larger.  My findings support the speculations of some scholars who argue that 
patronage networks, when broad, can be beneficial rather than harmful, and that clientelistic 
practices can coexist with post-industrial, wealthy, democratic polities, including in OECD 
countries like Japan and Austria (Gunes-Ayata 1994b; Scheiner 2007; Mustapha and Whitfield 
2010; Wilkinson 2007).   
In general, these results suggest that Lake and Baum’s (2001) focus on competition, and 
Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s focus on electoral institutions and minimum winning coalition size is 
justified, but incomplete.  My results suggest that electoral institutions can manipulate minimum 
winning coalition sizes and thereby increase or decrease government service provision.  
Likewise, the presence of electoral competition is an important necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for the broadly-beneficial provision of government services.  A third factor, however—
the size of a politician’s supporting coalition—must also be taken into account in some (perhaps 
most) settings in order to accurately predict the level of government service provision likely to 
be provided.   
Particularism can be manipulated 
Second, several institutional factors can be manipulated by constitution-writers and reformers 
to generate better governance and improved government service provision.   
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Electoral institutions 
The first of these factors is the nature of electoral institutions.  My findings demonstrate that 
where the supporting coalitions of voters for victorious candidates and parties are larger, more 
government services—and more public goods, specifically—are the likely outcome.  The 
implication, therefore, is that earlier conjectures about the role of electoral institutions are, in 
part, true (Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Scheiner 2007).  Electoral 
institutions can be manipulated to generate larger victorious coalitions of supporters, and 
therefore, greater public goods provision.  That is, where electoral rules require majorities (either 
through legislative coalition formation, or through single member districts), greater public goods 
provision is more likely.  
In the case of Peru, one clear implication, therefore, is to do away with Peru’s electoral rules 
which guarantee mayoral parties a majority on municipal councils.  By doing away with these 
rules, Peruvian local governments controlled by minority-support mayors will be required, in 
order to institute policy, to form coalitions with opposition parties in municipal councils.  The 
end result will be governing coalitions of parties which represent majorities, or near majorities, 
of voters, making broadly-beneficial public goods provision more likely in a larger number of 
municipalities.   
Opposition strength 
A second manipulable factor which is associated with the provision of greater public goods 
and fewer excludable goods is the strength of local opposition parties in municipal councils.  
Here, too, electoral rules have a bearing on the size of opposition parties.  And here, too, 
electoral rules which generate more proportional results, in the Peruvian case, will generate 
better local government service provision in the sense that they will be more likely to produce 
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public goods provision and less likely to generate excludable goods provision.  Another possible 
method to improve public goods provision is to require supermajorities for approval of certain 
types of local legislation (spending legislation is a logical example), which would give more 
leverage to legislative oppositions and minorities.   
Electoral aggregation 
A final factor which can be manipulated to make particularistic exchange less harmful is 
through the manipulation of jurisdictional sizes for electoral purposes.  In chapter two, I 
demonstrated that particularistic exchange is more prevalent in small municipalities.  This is 
because in small jurisdictions, politicians find it less costly to gather information on who is a 
supporter, and who supports the opposition, because electoral returns reported in smaller 
communities make it easier to trace electoral support to groups and communities, and because 
social networks and direct observation make contact with larger numbers of local voters, directly 
or indirectly, more frequent.  Therefore, in order to reduce the effects of particularistic exchange, 
reformers and constitution writers could manipulate jurisdictional boundaries or require a 
minimum population for local jurisdictions in order to make information-gathering on local 
voting patterns more costly.  Of course, such advice must be taken with caution, as any increase 
in jurisdictional size may also increase the cost of other types of information, including 
information about the needs and preferences of local voters. 
Generalizability 
As with any study which samples from a single national case—in this case, the data source is 
a complete cross section of Peruvian municipalities, with data from 2005, 2006, and 2007—the 
results of the analyses presented here will face concerns about generalizability to other types of 
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settings.  To what extent can these findings be extrapolated to municipal, regional, and national 
governments elsewhere around the world? 
As in any study, it is impossible to address every concern about generalizability.  
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons why these findings may be applied to other settings.   
First, Peru is a country with a tremendous amount of diversity in terms of level of economic 
development across municipalities.  While many municipalities high in the Andes and deep in 
the Amazon are as poor as towns and villages anywhere on the planet, some districts of Lima and 
other major cities demonstrate average standards of living which are at least even with some of 
the middle-income countries of Western Europe.  Second, intra-municipality inequality varies 
substantially across the country, and is a threat to generalizability addressed in chapter five.  
Finally, although Peruvian municipalities possess a unique institutional structure which makes it 
possible to observe the interaction between different factors which appear to drive particularism 
and government service provision, these institutions—including strong executives and 
disproportionate assemblies—are common elsewhere (just not in the same combination).   
On the other hand, there are important factors which do not vary across Peruvian 
municipalities, which scholars have associated with fiscal outcomes, such as politicians’ and 
representatives’ positions in the institutional hierarchy (Adler 2002; Arnold 1979; Cain, 
Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Collie 1988; Goss 1972), institutional structures such as 
parliamentarism or bicameralism (Cheibub 2006; Cutrone and McCarty 2006; Gerring and 
Thacker 2004; D. McKay 2009; O'Halloran and Lohmann 1994), and political culture (Stokes 
2005; Putnam 1995), which do not vary, or vary very little across Peruvian municipalities.  Such 
factors may substantially encourage or prevent clientelism in ways which have not been (and in 
some cases, cannot be) explored in the Peruvian context.  Therefore, the results presented here 
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should be extrapolated with great caution to settings where these important variables take on 
values different from those observable in Peru—for example, settings with strong, ideological 
political parties, or very different political cultures or institutional structures. 
Future Research 
The findings presented here raise a long list of interesting and important questions which 
should be the focus of future research.   
First, if elected mayors attempt to use the provision of government services to build and 
maintain clientelistic networks in order to pursue re-election, is such a strategy successful?  Are 
mayors who spend more on public services more likely to be re-elected, and is the relationship 
stronger for particular types of spending? 
Second, scholars in comparative politics have argued that single member district, 
majoritarian political systems are more susceptible to pork barrel spending and other types of 
geographically-based particularism than proportional systems (Gerring and Thacker 2004; 
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002; Polinard, Wrinkle, Longoria, and Binder 1994; 
Trounstine 2008a;  2010).  The evidence presented here strongly suggests, however, that 
proportional systems are not immune from the temptations of pork barrel spending.  Therefore, is 
there a geographic dimension to the provision of government services in Peruvian municipal 
governments and proportional governments elsewhere?  For example, are mayors more likely to 
focus spending on villages or regions where supporters are more common, or do expenditures in 
this kind of setting follow class or sector lines? 
Third, although scholars have often asserted that particularism, clientelism, and patronage is 
strongly undesirable, the widespread pursuit of particularistic strategies by Peruvian municipal 
politicians seems to suggest that many voters prefer particularism to broadly-beneficial public 
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goods.  Therefore, are voters, on average, more satisfied with local governance is more 
prevalent? 
Finally, although the particularistic provision of private and toll goods may effectively 
exclude large segments of local populations, theory and anecdotal evidence from Peru and 
elsewhere suggests that particularistic policies are often most beneficial for the poor whose 
demands can more inexpensively be met, on average, than the demands of wealthy elites (Dorsett 
1977; Ferejohn 1987; Johnson 1969).  Therefore, are outcomes better where particularistic 
exchange is more common?  And do particularistic politicians do more to improve conditions for 
the poor, for example, by improving nutrition, literacy, and income, and by reducing infant 
mortality and the incidence of disease?   
Conclusion 
In short, this dissertation does much to answer questions about (a) how democracy functions 
in providing services for voters, (b) how particularistic exchange—which may be undesirable—
can be reduced by electoral institutions and other formal rules, and (c) the settings in which 
particularism is most common.  In addition, the results presented here bring into question many 
scholars’ normative assertions about the undesirability of particularistic exchange, which appears 
to often (though not always) generate desirable outcomes.  Certainly, though, this analysis is not 
the last word, and these questions deserve much greater examination.  
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